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OF HANDOUTS AND WORTHLESS
PROMISES: UNDERSTANDING THE
CONCEPTUAL LIMITATIONS OF
AMERICAN SYSTEMS OF POOR RELIEFt
Larry Cala Backer*
The evolution of public welfare has been from public 'charity'
towards social justice.'
Not.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the limitations, conscious and unconscious,
on the reform of contemporary modes of assistance to the poor in the
United States. My primary purpose is to delineate this nation's under-
lying paradigm of poor relief. I argue that the functional parameters
of poor relief in the United States form a coherent world view which
I describe as the static paradigm.' The basic assumption of this para-
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1
 Robbins v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. Rptr. 398, 404 (1985) (quoting County of Los Angeles
v. Worker's Comp. Appeals Bd., 179 Cal. Rptr. 215, 220 (1981).
2 1 use "paradigm" to refer to a system of interrelated fundamental and critical assumptions,
which are then used to derive certain theories and models of behavior. The word refers to critical
assumptions which have beets articulated and to others which may be critical but unrecognized.
As John Steinbruner notes, the word retains a residual vagueness because it is frequently infeasible
to list exhaustively all the assumptions of a paradigm. This article argues that the static paradigm
gives rise to a number of possible models, some significantly different from others, but all of
which share the limitations and orientation or the fundamental working assumption of the nature
of things from which they derive. See JotiN D. STEINBRUNER, THE CyBERNETEc Tula:my OF
DECISION: NEW DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL. ANALYSIS 11 n.7 (1974). Steinbruner drew his defini-
tions from the antifundamentalist theoretical discourse of Thomas S. Kuhn relating to the
derivation and ultimate rejection of major theories in modern science. See THOMAS S. KntIN,
COPERNICAN REVOLUTION (1959) (esp. at 74); THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (1963).
997
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digm is that neither the mores and attitudes of the recipients of aid,
nor the social and economic systems which produced indigents are
subject to fundamental or permanent change. 5 From this paradigm I
derive theories to explain and describe the limitations of acceptable
reformulation of institutional systems of poor relief. These theories are
intended to be descriptive as well as prescriptive. They facilitate an
understanding of the assumptions underlying this country's approach
to public aid, as well as the practical limitations to the reformulation
of our country's current approach to the servicing of its poor. It also
serves to point the way to possible reforms of that system.
I use Part I of this essay to place the nature of my inquiry in
context. The bulk of Part II discusses the social context in which the
problems of the poor exist. Part III sets out the parameters of the static
paradigm. The paradigm provides the (mostly unconscious) postulates
and critical assumptions which govern the fundamental ordering of
systems of institutional poor relief in the United States. Underlying our
conceptions of poor relief are the notions (in the nature of cultural
mores) that current social and economic systems are substantially
immutable and unchallengeable, that income inequality must be pre-
served and that the basic conditions giving rise to the need to aid some
members of society are not subject to successful manipulation. To give
the paradigm some historical context, I briefly examine two archetypal
static systems—Canon Law poor relief and the Elizabethan Poor Law.
From the paradigm and archetypes, I briefly describe a general theory
of poor relief in the United States." This theory provides the basis for
the derivation, in Part IV, of the system of specific rules limiting the
range of conceivable models for reforming institutional poor relief
within the conceptual universe of the static paradigm.
In Part V, I test the explanatory potential of the theory by exam-
ining two contemporary "issues." First, I examine the basis of the
"common wisdom" that welfare, both general assistance and public
assistance, doesn't work. 5
 Poor relief systems don't work because of the
3 See infra Part IIIA, Critical Assumptions: The Static Paradigm.
4
 Explaining the principal regularities in current institutional approaches to the relief and
maintenance of the poor is outside the scope of this article. I undertake that analysis in Larry
Cates Backer, Medieval Poor Law in Twentieth Century America: Towards a General Theory of Modern
American Poor Relief 44 CASE W. Rxs, L. Rev. (forthcoming, Spring 1
5
 The term "general assistance," as used in this article, means public programs, financed from
state or local funds, which furnish financial assistance or assistance in kind to needy families or
individuals primarily, though not necessarily, in their homes. This definition is similar to that
which has been used by the U.S. Department of Human Services, and consists primarily of money
payments, assistance in kind provided directly to recipients, vendor payments for medical or
remedial care, or vendor payments for other goods and services. OtTICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE,
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existence of a fundamental disjunction between the stated goals of
poor relief systems and the capabilities of any such system imple-
mented in the United States. In simple terms, this is saying nothing
more than that program goals and program functions conflict. This
conflict implicates a core disjunction—program goals are derived from
a way of conceptualizing the role of the poor and of poor relief which
is alien to the conceptualizations that produce the programs currently
in place; the recently restated purposes of poor relief derive from the
stirrings of a dynamic paradigm fundamentally incompatible with the
static orientation of modern poor relief systems.6 Second, I offer a
preliminary analysis of the recently proposed (but not enacted) "over-
haul" of the California federal/state poor law system in light of the
paradigm.'' The California proposals repeat in large measure recently
enacted or proposed "reforms" in New Jersey, Wisconsin and other
states.6 These reforms demonstrate the power of the theory to predict
U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, CHARACTERISTICS OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE IN THE
UNITED STATES 3 (1978).
Although a detailed study of the static orientation of federal public assistance programs is
beyond the scope of this article, I note that this fundamental disjunction affects federal categorical
relief systems such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"), Social Security Act,
ch. 531, §,§ 401-406, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29 (1935) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-662 (1988
& Supp. II 1990)). AFDC provides cash assistance to usually female headed households, and is
the program usually perceived by the public as "welfare." AFDC, originally styled Aid to Depend.
ent Children ("ADC"), began as a limited federal response to the inability of state and local
welfare systems to cope with the economic problems of the Great Depression. The program
consisted of grants-in-aid to state and locally run welfare programs. While participating states
were permitted to set eligibility and benefit levels, the grants in aid were conditioned on compli-
ance with a number of conditions, the more important of them being that (i) aid be limited to
the categories of people to whom the grants were intended to be directed, (ii) the programs be
available in all political subdivisions, (iii) a uniform hearing process be established, (iv) benefits
be paid in cash, and (v) eligibility be uniform. For a discussion of AFDC in historical context,
see, e.g., Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependent Children: The Family
Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y. U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 457, 479-83 (1987-88); Robert
Burns, Rawls and the Principles of Welfare Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 184, 219-27 (1989). For an
overview of the United States' welfare system, see SAR A. LRVITAN, PROGRAMS IN Am or 'HIE POUR
le0 II 'rim 1980's (4th ed. 1980),
I See. Proposed Law: The Government Accountability and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1992,
California state initiative measure submitted for voter approval on November 3, 1992 as Propo-
sition 165. Proposition 165 was disapproved by California voters and has not become law. See
Virginia Ellis & Paul Jacobs, Tax- the-Rich' Plan Put Hex on Welfare Cutbacks, L.A. Timm, Nov. 5,
1992, at A3; infra Part V, Applying the Model to Determine the Limits of Change.
8 For the New Jersey legislation, see N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 44:10- 19 to -33 (West Supp. 1993); see
also Louis D. Greenwald, Legislative Surveys: New Jersey Assembly Bill No. 4700-4705—The Family
Development Initiative, a Package of Bills That Seek to Make Families Self-Sufficient; to Provide for
Educational Training; to Create Individual Responsibility; and to Encourage Empowerment and
Self-Commitment, 16 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 833 (1992); Les Payne, At $64 That Baby's a Steal,
NxwsnAv (Nassau & Suffolk Ed.), Jan. 26, 1992, at 30; infra Part V.B, Examining the Limits of
Static. Systems; the Example of Californiaa  Proposition 165.
1000	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 34:997
the form which the political debate about "bettering" the poor relief
system will take in the United States. Part VI presents a summary in
the form of a commentary, exploring the "value" of static poor relief
systems and the extent to which the static paradigm giving rise to such
systems is embedded in the social, economic and cultural mores of this
nation.
I would also call attention to an additional theme running
through this essay—that the hortatory provisions of many modern
versions of poor relief amount to little more than sophisticated means
by which legislators comply with the wishes of an electorate desperate
to be told what it wants to hear. The result: modern legislation speaks
the language of self-sufficiency; but modern approaches to poor relief,
as well as our fundamental conceptions of poverty and poor law, con-
tinue to speak the ancient language of maintenance, of alleviating
short term poverty by feeding the hungry and clothing the naked. Our
poor relief systems thus appear to strive for a dynamism that belies
For a discussion of the Wisconsin efforts, see The Parental and Family Responsibility Initia-
tive, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.19 (West Stapp. 1992), an experimental program that has been
implemented in several Wisconsin counties. The major provisions of that effort include a require-
ment that teenage parents live with their parents or guardians and that the benefit levels of new
residents will not be greater than the benefits paid in the state of prior residence. A popular press
account of the Wisconsin proposal is contained in Juneau, Oneida and Rock Counties Added to
Bridefare Program, UPI, Sept. 11, 1992 (BC Cycle, Regional News), available in LEI'S, Nexis
Library, UPI file, and discussed infra in Part V.B, Examining the Limits of Static Systems; the Example
of California Proposition 165.
For a discussion of the Maryland efforts, see Carolyn Colvin, Secretary of the Maryland
Department of Human Resources, Leiter to the Editor, Maryland's Responsible Welfare Plan, WAsii.
Posr, Aug. 9, 1992, at C8. The "Primary Prevention Initiative" imposes a series of behavior
modification requirements on welfare recipients. Under that proposal, AFDC benefits would be
reduced by 30%, most of which could be "earned back" by performing certain tasks in the manner
specified by the state: paying the rent on time, taking one's children for prescribed medical
examinations and forcing one's children to attend school. See Richard Whitmire, Can You Cut
Family Aid and Not Hurt Children?, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Jan. 16, 1992, available in, LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Gannett News Service File. This program has been criticized by Maryland legisla-
tors. See Retha Hill, Md. Legislators Question Welfare Overhaul Plan: Committees Raise Doubts About
Whether Goal is Changing Behavior or Saving Money, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1992, at B8; see also
Part V.13, Examining the Limits of Static Systems; the Example of California Proposition 165. The
federal governtnent granted Maryland a waiver from federal requirements for the implementa-
tion of the program on July 1, 1992. See Fern Shen, Md. Welfare Checks Tied to Behavior: Punitive
Program is Approved by U.S., WASH. POST, July 2, 1992, at DI.
The Florida legislature also is considering the Human Support System Act of 1993 (clearly
statutory name inflation continues unabated!). It purports to transform the state's social services
delivery system. The plan institutes two pilot programs in rural and urban areas. These consist
primarily of reducing AFDC benefits across the board, limiting AFDC benefits to 24 months,
requiring participation in community work programs, imposing school attendance requirements
on children of AFDC recipients and limiting AFDC benefit increases for children born to AFDC
recipients. See FL. H.B. 1023, Reg. Sess, (1993).
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their origins and purposes. Advertising systems of poor relief as "new"
and "improved," especially to the poor, does a disservice to the recipi-
ents of aid, whose expectations are raised and then dashed,' and to
taxpayers whose assessment of the efficacy of the systems becomes quite
negative, and who wind up blaming the poor for the failure of such
systems to live up to their billing.' 4'
While my larger ambition is to present a theory that both explains
the principal conventions which inform current approaches to the
relief and maintenance of the poor, including legal and positive re-
sponses, and to identify possible means of changing these norms, I do
not champion any specific program of "reform." The implications of
my exploration of this country's notions about poverty, the poor and
the construction of programs in relief thereof, explored in Part V of
this essay, are both clear and capable of cutting in opposite direc-
tions—it is as easy to conclude that there is no welfare problem as it is
to determine that the entire socio-economic system of the United
States needs drastic overhaul in order to preserve the dignity of; and
opportunities for, the poor. The implications of Part V suggest options
and characterizations of the problem in need of solution which can be
given content only by the values of the decision makers. As such, the
problem and the "solution" remain substantially political and beyond
the scope of this essay. Understanding welfare today is much like
walking into a dark room filled with furniture of various description,
a room which we have used for years. We argue about the purpose of
the room; the room, itself, however, remains unseen." My primary
9 See, e.g., Stephen Buckley, D.C. Merchants Losing Patience With Panhandlers, Want. Post
Mar. 10, 1990, at B1 (quoting a homeless man as expressing anger when people say, 'you're big,
you're healthy, go get a job.' Why don't they say, 'Son, you want to work? I know where you can
get a job,' even if it's mowing lawns or digging ditches or fixing cars."). Rut see Dwight Hobbes,
Down, Out and Overindulged: The Case Against Helping Guys Like Me, WASH, Pos. '', Feb. 14, 1993,
at Cl (former homeless person arguing there exist enough social services so someone truly
wanting job could obtain one).
i° See THEODORE R. MAilmoR	 AL, AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE:
ENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALrrnis 1-2, 228-37 (1990) ("Even former supporters of activist
government efforts to combat social ills publicly announced their dismay at 'the failure of so
many of the government programs they once cherished,' and their frustration that 'the social
problems that [liberal programs of the 1900s] were supposed to solve remain.'" Id. at I, quoting,
in part, Robert Walters, Liberals Disillusioned With Government, 7 NAT'L]. 815 (1975)).
11 Thus, over the course of the last thirty or so years, academic and political debate again has
centered on the traditional questions regarding implementation problems with respect to the
relief of the poor, but have largely avoided looking closely at the underlying motivations or
imperatives of the systems of relief whose provisions are defended or sought to be modified,
There are, however, significant exceptions to this last statement. See Rontler Noziex, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA 167-74, 265-68 (1974) (discussing proper distribution of wealth and income;
arguing economic assets should be left in whatever hands they reach through free and fair
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purpose is to illuminate the room. Perhaps, thus illuminated, we can
more intelligently continue our arguments.
II. THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT
During periods of economic instability, when people belonging to
the better-off classes begin to notice the increasing number of beggars
on the street, or hear reports of swelling "welfare" rolls, or the intrac-
tability of the "poor," it becomes fashionable to discover, once again,
the existence of a "welfare" crisis, and demand that somebody, any-
body, do something about the "problem."" Prior attempts to "solve"
the problem are dutifully analyzed and found to be wholly or partially
inadequate to the task. On this basis, generation after generation of
individual transactions and, on this basis, rejecting distributive basis of welfare on grounds that
such requires (bad) coercive transfer); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 436-38
(3rd ed. 1986) (discussing approach ofJohn Rawls from economic perspective); CHARLES FRIED,
RIGHT AND WRONG 120-24 (1978) (rejecting notion of distributive basis for welfare on basis of
his conclusion need cannot be adequately compartmentalized and contained); JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (attempting exposition of unified theory of justice; arguing distribu-
tion of income and wealth is just if there is no alternative distribution that would make worst off
people in society better off); Burns, supra note 6, at 187-88, 265-71 (discussing application of
social philosophy of John Rawls' A THEORY of jusTicE to American social welfare policy and
arguing "the kind of Kantian liberal constructive theory Rawls proposes fails to express our
considered judgments in social welfare policy and law, or to extend our considered judgements
in a meaningful way, or to provide a normatively superior determinate alternative."); Frank I.
Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One's View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121
U. PA. L. REV. 962, 1015-19 (1973) (exploring relationship between constitutional adjudication
of welfare rights and Rawls' A Timmy or JUSTICE, and arguing Rawls' theory provides judges
engaged in constitutional adjudication with exhaustive and coherent set of principles of justice
in harmony with popular will and understanding); Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare
State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REv. 877, 897-901 (1976) (arguing for middle
ground, which permits redistribution of sufficient resources to guarantee basic material needs,
in debate between egalitarians and libertarians on issue of coerced income redistribution);
Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything that Grows:" Toward a History of Family Law, 1985
Wis. L. REV. 819 (1985) (discussing manner in which rules about roles and duties between men,
women and children conceptually underlie rules about welfare and governance of state by
examining experience of women and social experience as means of understanding family law).
For a discussion of traditional analysis in the context of the static paradigm, see Backer, supra
note 4, at nn. 21-28.
12 Newspapers, magazines and other popular journals have been full of seemingly endless
barrages of articles describing the problem and, sometimes, even discussing proposed "solutions."
See, e.g., George Skelton, Wilson Says Welfare System is Chasing Jobs Out of State; Government:
Governor Sees the Issue as a Choice Between a Healthy Business Climate and an Overly Generous Relief
Program that Keeps Forcing Higher Taxes, in L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1992, at A3; Paul Taylor, Carrots
and Sticks of Welfare Reform: Author of Landmark Federal Bill Hears Why States Are Going Their
Own Way, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1992, at Al 3; James W. Michaels, Oh, Our Aching Angst, FORBES,
Sept. 14, 1992, at 47; Hobbes, supra note 9; Gertrude HimmelFarb, A De-Moralized Society?,
FORBES, Sept. 14, 1992, at 120.
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creative elected or appointed public official," legal academic and so-
cial scientist," idealogue or demagogue bravely put forward yet an-
other series of "innovative" solutions to the "problem."" This process,
similar in many ways to the type of progress made by those who ride
stationary bicycles, has clogged Western society since at least the Late
Antique period.' 6
Who are "they," or these "people" or the "poor" who so vex
generations of social tinkerers? Simply stated, they are those whom
people who write about them label as "poor;" they can be whomever
one wishes them to be. Not surprisingly, then, definitions tend to vary
with the society" and the times." The starting reference point in the
15 See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON POVERTY AND WELFARE, STATE OF N.Y. EXEC. CHAMBER, A NEW
SOCIAL CONTRACT: RETHINKING THE NATURE AND PURPOSE or PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 8-14 (1986);
Low INCOME OPPORTUNITY WORKING GROUP, DOMESTIC POL'Y COUNCIL, UP FROM DEI.ENDENcy;
A NEW NATIONAL PUBLIC ASSISTANCE STRATEGY 51-58 (1986) (Report to President). Much of
the musings of officials charged with the discovery of new and improved methods of dealing with
the poor Ihnit themselves to is description of the personal failings of the poor. See Taylor, supra
note 12 (quoting NewJersey Governor Florio stating goal of efforts is to "wean people off welfare,
and the way to do that is to force them to be responsible for their actions.").
14 The list of articles and books on the subject of the poverty problem and schemes to effect
its solution approaches infinity. Some of the more influential include GEORGE GILDER, MEN AND
MARRIAGE (1992) (expanded and updated version Of SEXUAL SUICIDE (1973)); LAWRENCE M.
MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1986); WILLIAM J.
WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1987); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980 (1984);
FRANCES F. PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC
WELFARE (1971); Michelman, supra note 11; Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 VALE L.J. 733
(1964); see also the numerous articles and books elsewhere cited in this article. Of course, not all
important works in this field accept the thesis that the current systems of maintenance are in
need of fundamental repair or modification. See, e.g., MARMOR ET AL, supra note 10, at 19-21;
TASK FORCE ON POVERTY AND WELFARE, Supra note 13, at 28-31.
15 For descriptions of the crooked path the United States has followed in the area of poor
relief, see, e.g., R. LUBOVF„ THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 1900-1935 (1968); PIVEN &
CIALWARD, supra note 14, at 180-98,248-82; SAMUEL. Nit:NC:HER, POOR LAW TO POVERTY PROGRAM:
ECONOMIC SECURITY Policy IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 279-309 (1967); JAMES T.
PATTERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY 1900-1985 (2d ed. 1986).
16 This is reflected in the development of Catholic poor relief under the Canon Law, dis-
cussed infra in Part 111.B, Paradigm Archetypes. The modern history of western poor relief likely
begins in the Fourth Century, with the system of poor relief implemented by Ambrose, then
Bishop of Milan, and memorialized in Ambrose's De Officiis, reprinted in 16 PATRoLoGIAE CuRsus
CosteLETus; AMBROSE OPERA (Series Latina, J.I'. Migne ed.) (Paris 1844-1855). See BRIAN
TIERNEY, MEDIEVAL POOR LAW: A SKETCH OF CANONICAL THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION IN
ENGLAND 56-67 (1959).
17 Thus, to take an extreme example, the notion of poverty in Haiti is probably substantially
different from the general sense of what constitutes poverty in the United States. "[P]overty-
grim, degrading and ineluctable—is not remarkable in India. For few, the fate is otherwise. But
in the United States, the survival of poverty is remarkable." JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT
SOCIETY 254 (3d ed. 1976),
t 5 Thus, the people who Americans today tend to label as poor may live in ways even beyond
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United States has tended to be income qualifications, the so-called
"poverty-line." Of course, even in the United States, the definition of
poverty might well vary depending on the political agenda of the
definer. 20
the reach of the working classes of a century ago. See., e.g., MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER
AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (2nd ed. 1969); Michaels, supra note 12 (describ-
ing difference in relative nature of affluence over last 60 years, "Unless they blow their money
and energy on booze or drugs, the American poor have more physical comforts today than the
average American did when Forbes first appeared 75 years ago.'); see infra note 24.
19 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, Enuc. AND WELFARE, THE MEASURE OF POVERTY (1976)
(detailed history of genesis of poverty line as measure of poverty). Poverty is measured in the
United States in relation to the income necessary to provide an adequate diet. Poor people are
defined as people with cash income less than three times the cost of an adequate diet, adjusted
for inflation and for a number of family characteristics such as family size, urban or rural
residence, etc. The cost of an adequate diet was based on an economy food plan developed by
the United States Department of Agriculture in 1961. See Mollie Orshansky, How Poverty is
Measured, 92 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 37-41 (Feb. 1969); Mollie Orshansky, Counting the Poor: Another
Look at the Poverty Profile, 28 Soc. SEC. But.. 3 (1965); cf. MENCHER, StipTa note 15, at 365-66;
MuRRAY, supra note 14, at 57 n.2. The assumptions on which this measure of poverty is based—
that families spending the amount necessary to maintain the economy food plan can provide
nutritionally adequate diets, and that poor people spend about one third of their income on
food—have been questioned. See, e.g., DAVID R. RIEM ER, THE PRISONERS OF WELFARE: LIBERATING
AMERICA'S POOR FROM UNEMPLOYMENT AND Low WAGES 17-18 (1988); TASK FORGE ON POVERTY
AND WELFARE, supra note 13, at 16-17 (arguing poverty line measure understates cost of poverty);
Low INCOME OPPORTUNITY WORKING GROUP, Stip/ note 13, at 8-9 (arguing poverty line over-
states number of poor).
2°Conservative critics believe that the "poverty line" approach to measuring poverty presents
a false picture of poverty in America by overestimating people in need. See Low INCOME OPPOR-
TUNITY WORKING GROUP, supra note 13, at 8-9. This overestimation of the extent of poverty
occurs because the measure of poverty, as adjusted, includes cash income but not in•kind transfers
such as food stamps or medical care. SeeAletha C. Huston, Children in Poverty: Developmental and
Policy Issues, in CHILDREN IN POVERTY: CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY 1, 7-8 (Aletha
C. Huston, ed., 1991). The poverty line approach fails to pick up what conservatives consider to
be the income generated by the huge underground economy. See STANLEY L. FR1EDLANDF,R,
UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE URBAN GORE: AN ANALYSIS OF THIRTY CITIES WITH POLICY RECOMMEN-
DATIONS 186-89 (1972). The poverty line approach also fails to pick up differences in COSI. of
living and quality of tile between regions. See MURRAY, SUM note 14, at 57 n.2.
Liberal critics argue that the poverty line, even as adjusted, underestimates the severity of
poverty because it does not indicate the variations in family income below the poverty line.
Instead, the better measure of poverty and its extent would focus on the poverty gap, the dollar
amount by which the incomes of the poor fall below the poverty level. See Huston, supra at 1, 7;
generally Sheldon H. Danziger et al., Antipoverty Policy: Effects on the Poor and the Nonpoor, in
FIGHTING POVERTY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T 50-77 (Sheldon H. Danziger & Daniel H.
Weinberg eds., 1986).
Other critics reject the poverty line concept because it attempts (albeit crudely) only a
measurement of absolute poverty. However, because of the general wealth of America, relative
poverty and not absolute poverty ought to be the yardstick against which programs in alleviation
of the plight of the poor ought to be measured. For these critics, the touchstone is decency, not
absolute deprivation. Those whose income falls far behind that of the community "cannot have
what the larger community regards as the minimum necessary for decency; they cannot wholly
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What is the "problem" that so captivates the imagination of people
in the United States? The description of the problem is simple enough
to state—in its broadest conception it is that certain people live under
conditions that are deemed unacceptable 2 because they are unable or
unwilling to provide for their own material needs or those of their
families. 22 In other words, certain people in our society live in ways,
and do without things, that others with more resources and influence
in society believe they should not. Of course, there has been little
agreement among scholars or those who determine policy respecting
exactly what bundle of things the "poor" need and in what combina-
tion)
escape, therefore, the judgment of the larger community that they are indecent." Ste GA LAMA MI,
.supra note 17, at 245-49.
1 This determination is at least made by those who believe they have the authority or moral
backing to make such judgements for society. In a pluralistic society like ours, the question of
who has the right to determine what is unacceptable, itself, is subject to lively debate. Contrast
CHARLOTTE TOWLE, HELPING: CHARLOTTE TOWLE ON SOCIAL. WORK AND SOCIAL. CASEWORK
(Helen H. Perlman ed., 1969) (social' workers ought to have discretion to make determinations
of need and best strategies for aiding the poor); HERBERT BISNO, THE PHILOSOPHY or SOCIAL.
WORK (1952) with K•NNE- 111 C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INqUERY (1969)
(arguing for legally based, detailed routinized system of aid to the poor, with ultimate discretion
left to legislature or regulatory arm of government). How groups obtain the power to determine
worthiness for poor relief is beyond the scope of this article. Contrast William H. Simon, Legality,
Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE U. 1198 (1983) with Joel F. Handler,
Discretion in Social Welfare: The Uneasy Pavilion in the Rule of Law, 92 YALE 1270 (1983) and
Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antimonies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialectic Empowerment, 1 6 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 659 (1987-88).
22 Why these people live in this unacceptable state is another story. Compare TASK FORCE ON
POVERTY AND WELFARE, supra note 13, at 17-28 (poverty and dependance explained as function
of overall economic conditions, and deficiencies in education and skills of the poor) and Kathryn
M. Neckerman et al., Family Structure, Black Unemployment, and American Social Policy, in THE
POLITICS OF SOCIAL. POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 397, 416-19 (Margaret Weir, et al. eds., 1988)
(labor policy must be substantially reoriented to solve poverty problems of poor (and especially
African-American poor) households) with MURRAY, supra note 14, at 147-91 (poverty and depen-
dance of able-bodied is largely function of maintenance programs constituting welfare in United
States). Additionally, there is some evidence that some people accept the "lifestyle" of poverty
deliberately—by refusing to acquire or retain; employment. See, e.g., In re Billie Boggs, 522
NX.S.2d 407, 412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), rev'd sub nom., Boggs v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp.,
523 N.Y.S.2t1 7l (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987), appeal dismissed as moot, 525 N.Y.S.2d 7% (1988) (releasing
homeless person from involuntary confinement as mentally ill under New York program on basis
of determination that fact she chose to live as panhandler did riot make her necessarily mentally
ill).
"Among the problems is the need to determine whether society ought to concern itself with
the alleviation of dire poverty, that is, the prevention of starvation, or, instead, with the alleviation
of less extreme need as determined from time to time, or yet again with the extremes of income
inequality giving rise to these problems. See MENCHER, supra note 15, at 364-67. In any case, we
find it difficult to allow the poor to make these choices for themselves. Thus, paternalistic
programs are created to help make decisions for the poor. See, e.g., Food Stamp Act, Agriculture
and Foot! Act of 1935, ch. 641, Pub. L. No. 74-320, 49 Stat. 774 (current version at 7 U.S.C.
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The notion of needs, however, can be broken down into two major
components. The first is that the poor need "things" in order to sustain
themselves in a dignified and socially acceptable manner." Food, shel-
ter, clothing and at least some form of medical care comprise the bulk
of the physical "things" the poor are generally thought to need. 25 These
needs must be met by some person or entity—the state, the charitable
person or institution, family or friends—when the needy have no place
else to turn. Satisfaction of these needs provides immediate and direct
benefits to the recipients (they do not go hungry or homeless) and
indirect and secondary benefits to the providers (they do not have to
witness death by starvation or deal with the lack of personal hygiene,
violations of conventional morality, or criminal activities of the desper-
ately poor)."
Obviously enough, satisfaction of the perceived "needs" of the
poor in this first sense constitutes the fundamental goal of any system
of poor relief. Thus, the most straightforward goal of any kind of aid
to people is to provide them with the necessities of life, such as may
be defined from time to time. In its simplest manifestation, this provi-
sion requires only that the recipients actually need what is given.
Satisfaction of this need, at its most generous, can be unquestioning
and open-ended." Naturally enough, most societies tend not to be at
their most generous for long periods, if at all.
§§ 2011-2030 (1988 & Supp. II 1990); 900 Stares Cut From Food Stamp Program, TUI-SA WCRLD,
Dec. 10, 1992, at A18,
It should be understood, of course, that this socially acceptable level is a constantly moving
target. As society as a whole becomes more affluent, the minimum decent level rises as well. See
Michaels, supra note 12 (comparison between expectations of people in years past and today);
EDWIN C. BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENLY CITY REVISITED 127-47 (1974) (noting how, on compara-
tive basis, things are better now than in past even for poorest segment of society).
25 'l'his type of aid constitutes the bulk of traditional poor relief, and certainly that given from
the medieval period through the nineteenth century. See infra notes 148-79 and accompanying
text. States and even the federal government continue to provide direct aid of this sort today.
For instance, the federal government continues to provide food assistance by distributing surplus
food to the needy. SeeAgriculture and Food Act of 1935, supra note 23; Agriculture Act of 1949,
ch. 792, 63 Stat. 1051 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1421 et seq. (1988 & Stipp. 11 1990);
Older Americans Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-73, 79 Stat. 219 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3001-3057 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)).
26 The attitudes of donors were quite bluntly stated in a recent article describing a relatively
short encounter by a commuter in New York with the indigene
Penn Station is a mecca of apparently homeless, drug-dealing, alcoholic, pickpock-
eting, begging, stinking vagabonds. I spent much of the evening negotiating my
way through rivers of urine, broken glass and human feces. All this in a place where
commuters are not permitted to smoke cigarettes.. . . These people must be en-
couraged to seek refuge in public shelters.
Joseph T. Poggi, Clean Up Penn Station, NEWSDAY, Apr. 10, 1990 (Nassau & Suffolk Ed.), at 53.
27 indiscriminate charity has been advocated since the time of the Early Church. SeeTIERNEY,
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The second "need" is more abstract—the need for the poor to be
economically self-reliant. Unlike the more concrete need for "things,"
satisfaction of the need for self-reliance may provide greater benefit to
the donor (the state) than to the recipient. Thus, the satisfaction of
this need provides the recipients with a variety of benefits, direct (the
ability to provide for their own needs) and indirect (independence),
but these are not quantitatively different from the benefits derived
from the receipt of life's necessities from the state or some other
person or institution, without indulging in the drudgery of work." On
the other hand, the giver receives significant direct benefits (reduction
of the future burden and expense of providing for the pauper), as well
as the indirect benefits associated with the provision of "things" to the
poor. As such, the giver, usually the state, has perhaps a greater interest
in meeting this second need than does the recipient."
The need to foster self-reliant indigents has found expression in
the societal goal of eradicating poverty, or, stated more cynically, mak-
ing the poor disappear. Historically, this need has been viewed in
different ways. 3" In the United States, this need is said to be satisfied
by securing and maintaining a job paying a sufficient amount to meet
the worker's minimum physical needs. 9 ' Once a job is acquired, so the
supra note 16, at 55-60 (discussing openhanded views of John Chrysostom). But see infra notes
159-66. The closest modern counterpart of' these ancient views is the Swedish system of relief
described in NORMAN FURNISS & TIMOTHY TWFON, THE CASE. FOR 'rue WELFARE STATE: FROM
SOCIAL. SECURITY TO SOCIAL EguAt.rry 122-52 (1977).
28 This might be especially true where the level of giving approaches what would be available
if the recipients held a job for which the recipient was qualified. Note that the incentive to prefer
one to the other shifts as the level of relative benefits shifts and as the intangible costs of benefit
acquisition change. Thus, for example, as the humiliation level increases in connection with the
provision of aid from the state, the cost of receiving aid versus getting a job increases, and the
recipient is more likely to prefer one (the job) to the other (the humiliation). This, apparently,
is the theory employed by some county agencies charged with dispensing general assistance. See,
e.g., Joel F. Handier, The Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependent Children: The Family
Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.C. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 457, 524-33 (1987-88)
(describing practices in Los Angeles County, California). Unfortunately, analyses like this may
not matter where there are no jobs available, whatever the cost of alternative forms of benefit
provision. See, e.g., REIMER, supra note 19, at 43-56.
29 The state will always be better off if it can substitute wages from the private sector for relief.
Indeed, the wealth available to the state (for other purposes) increases as the amount of (taxable)
income earned by citizens increases. As such, the state's interest in eliminating the need to
support the poor through creation of employment might well be greater than the need of the
poor to support themselves, at least as long as the institutional benefits available to the poor are
comparable to those obtainable from private sector wages. See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 14, at
154-77. For a contrary view, see, e.g., MARMOR ET AL., supra note 10, at 104-24.
m See infra Part III.B, Paradigm Archetypes.
81 This abstract need, however, might not be attainable by till, Certainly, the able-bodied might
find a job and disappear into the ranks of the working and sell-sufficient population. Ott the
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theory goes, the recipient becomes self-reliant (she receives the things
she needs from someone other than the state), happy, and is no longer
dependent on special aid from either government or her better-off
neighbors in order to survive. In effect, the indigent is converted into
a productive and tax-paying member of society, welcomed into the
ranks of (at least) the working class. Unfortunately, there may not be
a positive correlation between employment and indigent self-reliance."
Similarly, there does not exist universal consensus supporting the
notion that there is a strong positive correlation between physical
maintenance of the poor by the state and economic independence."
This lack of a perceived correlation has given birth to an extensive
literature on the problems of state charity and dependence.'"
The notion of self-sufficiency gives rise to categorical distinctions
between otherwise equally destitute people—one which is based pri-
marily on the employability of the recipient. 35 Those who are perceived
other hand, the old, the sick, the incapacitated, might have a harder time of it. As a consequence,
these people might be deemed not to have this need. Further, the satisfaction of this need
becomes more complex when people cannot attain self-sufficiency, that is, provide for their needs
at a level deemed minimally satisfactory by society, even after the provision of full-time employ-
ment.
52 For instance, job income may be insufficient to provide for family needs. See, e.g., ROBERT
HAVEMAN, STARTING EVEN: AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM TO COMBAT THE NATION'S NEW
POVERTY 165-68 (1988); CHRLsToPIIER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND
THE UNnERGLAss 233-35 (1992); Irwin Garfinkel, Thward an Effective Income Support System, in
MICHAEL C. BARTH ET AL., TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE INCOME SUPPORT SYSTEM: PROBLEMS, PROS-
PECTS, AND CHOICES 151,153-56 (1974); BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT HARRISON, THE GREAT
AMERICAN JOB MACHINE: THE PROLIFERATION OF Low WAGE EMPLOYMENT IN THE U.S. ECONOMY
(1986) (study prepared for Joint Economic Committee, on file with author); TASK FORCE ON
POVERTY AND WELFARE, supra note 13, at 64-65.
"See, e.g.. Mn,EA supra note 14, at 69-90; CHARLES MURRAY, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS AND
GOOD GOVERNMENT 267-73 (1988). But see MARMOR ET Al.., supra note 10, at 104-24.
34 See, e.g., Low INCOME OPPORTUNITY WORKING GROUP, supra note 13, at 7-37; TASK FORCE
ON POVERTY AND WELFARE, supra note 13; GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 114.27 (1981);
NA'FHAN GLAZER, THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL POLICY 1-17,140-55 (1988); MURRAY, LOSING GROUND,
supra note 14, at 145-91; GILBERT Y. STEINER, SOCIAL INSECURITY: THE POLITICS OF WELFARE
112-31 (1906); fames I. D'Hern, Note, Aid to Families With Dependent Children and Emergency
Assistance: New Jersey's Aid to Homeless Families, 13 SETON HALL LEGIS. J., 181 (1990); and the
studies in Christopher Jencks, Is the American Underclass Growing?, THE URBAN UNDERcLAss 28,
36-39 (Christopher, Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).
35 As a result, the state and society has, for millennia, divided those in need into categories,
and aid is given on the basis of such category classification. The broadest traditional categories
of poor were the deserving and undeserving poor. The modern equivalent of these categories
are the unemployable and the employable poor. See Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their
Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499,1502-08 (1991); WALTER I. TRATFNER, FROM POOR
LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 8-10 (3d ed., 1984); Kerry
R. Bensinger, From Public Charity to Social Justice: The Role of the Court in California's General
Relief Program, 2t Loy. L.A. L. REV. 497,502-03 (1988). Of course, those incapable of providing
for their own needs are the exception to the broad scope of this world view, Employable poor
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to be unable to work are favored. 36 Those who are able-bodied but do
not work are generally disfavored. 37 The strongly held belief underlying
this categorization is that, once the target population" is convinced
that the acquisition and retention of a full-time job is in their best
interests, poverty and, therefore, the problem of the poor (that is, that
the poor exist at all), will disappear and society will "improve" all of its
citizens."
Beside providing for the needs of the poor, a government must
also satisfy its need to control its population.° Although this goal has
been most congenially discussed in purely historical terms, the per-
ceived need to link poor law and social order is not dead. In order to
preserve a social order based on inequality of income, wealth and
opportunity, a government must provide the masses who populate the
marginal classes with something to keep them in their place. Keeping
the indigent in their place is important because the poor are useful to
have when extra workers are needed; they are humanity's way of
stocking up for events like warfare and economic booms, an infinitely
exploitable group of people for all kinds of societal needs. They are
ought to work, and this category is divided into those who are willing but unable for some reason
(lack of education, job training, job information, etc.) for which the state is eager to provide
help, and those perceived to be unwilling to work (satisfied with the level of benefits given by the
state) for whom the state has reserved work "incentives." Unemployable poor, in contrast, are
expected to do nothing. This category is the one knr which the least conditional societal giving
is reserved.
36 Thus, for instance, AFDC was first made available to mothers with dependent children on
the theory that they should not be working. The same applied to federal categorical relief for
the aged and the blind. See generally, William ft Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare
Rights, 44 Mo. L. REv. 1, 7-9 (1985).
37 For these people, there is little to eat at either the local or the federal trough. See generally,
Edward Mattison, Stop Making Sense: Charles Murray and the Reagan Perspective on Social Welfare
Policy and the Poor, 4 YALE L. Por.'v REV, 90,93 (1985). However, sortie distinction is made between
those who have worked and those who may be seeking work, and those who are perceived to be
loafing. Thus, the recently unemployed are eligible under some circumstances for unemployment
compensation. See generally, MF,AD, supra note 14, at 128-32.
38 The targeted population must necessarily comprise only a subset of the entire population
requiring assistance for the simple reason that not everyone requiring assistance is capable of
working.
39 This notion was perhaps best summarized in the early 1960's notion of "a hand up, not a
handout." See generally, PArrEusoN, supra note 15, at 142-54. While originally an argument of
liberal thinkers, this notion was appropriated by self-professed conservative thinkers in the 1980s.
The twist to the original notion is that, rather than treating the self-sufficiency need/obligation
as one of the two principal needs of recipients, it treats this need/obligation as the sole focus of
provision for the aid of the poor. See e.g., STEINER, supra note 34, at 18-47; MURRAY, LOSING
GROUND, supra note 14, at 22-23.
4° See, e.g., FIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 14. The views or Piven and Cloward underwent
some modification in their later work. See FRANCES F. PivEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, THE NEW
CLAss WAR (1982).
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like the jackals of the African savannas, that group in society who can
take whatever is discarded by the rest—and be grateful about it to
boot. 4 ' The gratitude and mindfulness of the poor is a learned re-
sponse—the self-conscious goal of free education in the United
States. 42
 However, while those in control of society must ensure that
sufficient provisions are made to keep these exploitable people
satisfied, they need not be so generous as to either increase the expec-
tations of the recipients or make them less receptive to whatever task
might be required of them, 43
The mixing of these needs with changing social, demographic and
economic realities has foisted on society periodic waves of agitation for
"reforms" to "solve" the recurrent "welfare" crises and to eradicate
poverty, resulting in the creation of a variety of programs to provide
aid of one kind or another to the poor. Some of these programs are
the creatures of private efforts;44
 the most significant sources of poor
relief, however, are governmental programs on the local, state and
(principally) federal levels. 45
 These programs can be formal, designed
to provide relief indefinitely, 46 or ad hoc, as simple as giving money to
a beggar on the street, or funding a pilot project of some kind. Some
are available to all who apply, but most are available only to those who
meet whatever threshold criteria are established as a prerequisite for
the receipt of aid. 47
 Income is the most common but not the sole
4I A delightfully perverse and cynical rendition of the thirteen most important functions of
poverty can be fcnind in HERBERT J. GANS, PEOPLE, PLANS, AND POLICIES: ESSAYS ON POVERTY,
RACISM, AND OTHER NATIONAL URBAN PROBLEMS 264-68 (1991).
42 See Mencher, supra note 15, at 151-52.
43 Thus, Richard Cloward and Frances Piven have argued that the function of welfare within
the capitalist system was to ensure an abundant supply of cheap labor, the so-called reserve army
of the unemployed. As such, except in times of social unrest. welfare and aid to the poor arc kept
as low as possible—high enough to prevent unrest, but no more. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra
note 14, at 341-48; PAUL FRE1RE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 40 (1968) (arguing that only
through empowerment of the poor and subversion of this system can the poor be liberated);
Alfieri, supra note 21, at 678-90; cf. PArrEicsoN, supra note 15, at 163-64.
44 This is accomplished primarily through voluntary private charity. See generally, GLAZER,
Supra note 34, at 128-39; Robert H. Bremner, Private Philanthropy and Public Needs: Historical
Perspective, 1 RES. PAPERS (HISTORY, TRENDS AND CURRENT MAGNITUDES) 89-114 (Sponsored by
Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, U.S. Treasury Dept., 1977).
45 For a discussion of these programs see supra note 6; TRATTNER, supra note 35, at 284-339.
46 For instance, AFDC, supra note 6, makes certain monetary benefits available to qualified
recipients throughout the period during which they maintain their eligible status.
47 1t can be argued that even an act as simple as giving to a beggar on the street can involve
eligibility prerequisites. One might, perhaps, be more willing to give money to a street beggar
dressed in rags than one in an expensive dress. The clothing and hygiene, in this example, would
serve the same purpose (informally) as the multi-page forms the destitute are required to
complete in order to obtain aid from the state. The formal criteria employed for sorting the poor
in this manner vary considerably. These criteria can be as simple as proving a certain income
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qualification for aid eligibility. Even with the intrusion of the federal
government in the poor relief business, the provision of aid remains
dependent in some respects on other criteria, including marital and
family status," physical or mental condition," age, 5'1 and perhaps even
race and ethnicity. 51 For all practical purposes, an indigent person who
fails to meet these criteria is effectively barred from participation in
virtually any federal program." For such ineligibles—able-bodied un-
level for eligibility tinder the Food Stamp Program (see supra note 23), or a certain physical or
mental condition for eligibility under the Supplemental Security Income Program (see infra note
49). The criteria, or at least proof of eligibility, can be quite complex. Thus, the plaintiffs in City
of Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles alleged that the application procedures for general
assistance in Los Angeles County were unreasonably onerous, and included an initial oral screen-
ing, the completion of a twelve page application, interviews, and fraud investigations. First
Amended Complaint For Declaratory Relief, ¶1 6-41, City of Los Angeles v. County of Los
Angeles, No. C-655-274 Superior Court, LA, County, Cal. (Oct. 19, 1987) (unpublished, on file
with author).
45 Thus, for instance, AFDC, the largest cash assistance program in the United States and
considered to be a pillar of the American system of public assistance, excludes most indigent
two-parent families and all indigents who are not responsible for minor children. See Simon,
Legality, Bureaucracy, supra note 21, at 1200-01.
"The Supplemental Security Income Program Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1465 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383 (1988 & Supp. 11
1990)), provides monthly payments to people who meet the income (based in part on state
criteria) and assets (no more than $2,000 for one person or $3,000 for a couple) eligibility criteria,
and who are also over 65 years of age or blind or disabled. The criteria used to determine
eligibility arc codified at 20 G.F.R. §§ 416.920 to .924 (1992).
"The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-306 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), provides benefits
to aged persons who meet certain criteria.
5 ' Writers stressing the racial considerations of poor relief systems and the delivery of aid
111CII.ItIC CAROL B. STACK, ALI. OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL. IN A BLACK COMMUNITY
127-28 (1974); DOROTHY K. NEWMAN ET Al.., PROTEST, POLITICS, AND PROSPERITY: BLACK
AMERICANS AND WHITE INsTrruTioNs 1940-75, at 262-64 (1978); Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship,
Rare, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 1,8-24, 31-49 (1988); rf: EINER, supra note 34,
at 3, 240-48 (federal programs set up in manner to minimize federal intrusion in state handling
of racial issues); DANIEL. P. MOYNIHAN, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, TILE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE
FOR NATIONAL. ACTION (1965); Lynn R. Osborn, Language, Poverty, and the North American
Indian, in LANGUAGE AND POVERTY: PERSPECTIVES ON A THEME 229-42 (Frederick Williams ed.,
1970) (overview of effect of lack of language skills as contributor to poverty of Native Americans).
Writers stressing the ethnic bias of current public assistance include Note, Into the Mouths
of Babes: La Familia Latina and Federally Funded Child Welfare, 105 Hairy. L. Rev. 1319 (1992);
Vera P. John & Vivian M. Horner, Bilingualism and the Spanish-Speaking Child, in LANGUAGE AND
POVERTY; PERSPECTIVES ON A THEME 140-52 (Frederick Williams ed., 1970) (arguing lack of
bilingual education prevents poor children from achieving their potential). On the patriarchal
underpinnings of current poor relief systems and the power of such systems to maintain the
subordination of women, see, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Women, Work, Welfare and the Preservation of
Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249 (1983); Amy E. Hirsch, Income Deeming in the AFDC Program:
Using Dual Track Family Laws to Make Poor Women Poorer, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 713
(1987-88); Mary Jo Bane, Politics and Policies of the Feminization of l'overty, in THE Pourtcs OF
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 381 (M. Weir et al. eds., 1988).
52 Note, however, that even eligibility does not guarantee participation. As William Simon
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employed men, women without children, two-parent families—the
only sources of help, besides private charity, are state or local programs
of general assistance." Whatever the program—federal public assis-
tance, state or local general assistance, private charitable efforts—the
basis upon which all of these programs are conceived is the same. It is
to the examination of this "basis," the creative force underlying mod-
ern American poor relief programs, that this article turns to next.
III. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF CHANGE AND AMERICAN POOR
RELIEF
The fundamental working assumptions underlying all discussion
of poor relief in the United States, assumptions which provide the
intellectual framework for conceptualizing the "problems" of poor
relief, is most usefully described as "static." The term static, of course,
is one that, while capable of precise definition, is also capable of great
ambiguity. I use it in this article in two significant respects. I first use
it to describe the underlying parameters or ground rules we apply in
the construction of systems of poor relief. These include those parame-
ters within which poor relief system builders conceive of the economic
order and the functioning of society. These overarching conceptions
serve to limit the universe of options available to system builders;
"[t]hese assumptions serve to define problems which receive intellec-
tual attention; they identify what data are pertinent enough to justify
the efforts required to collect them; they provide coherent explana-
tions for the central phenomena with which a . . . field concerns
itself."" I also use the term to encompass the structural characteristics
by which any individual static system of poor relief can be identified.
These characteristics are the nuts and bolts common to all static sys-
tems of poor relief—the actual means employed to maintain the poor.
I will discuss the static paradigm in its wider and more fundamental
effectively argues, the formalization of entitlement, bureaucratization of administration, and the
proletarianization of the workforce have virtually made a game out of the attainment of benefits,
even by those qualified. See Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, supra note 21, at 1198-99, 1200-22.
Simon's point is demonstrated in the recent litigation filed against the County of Los Angeles
alleging, in part, that the County effectively reduced its welfare caseload by implementing a
complex system filled with traps fur the unwary and unsophisticated applicant See First Amended
Complaint For Equitable Relief; 11 6-41, City of Los Angeles.
Cf STEINER, supra note 34, at 8-17.
54
 STEINI3RUNER, supra note 2, at 10. In this sense, the parameters on which a poor law system
builder relies help shape and limit the choices available. Once a generalized conception of
societal ground rules for system building is accepted, certain ideas become out of limits, or
outside the consciousness of the builders.
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sense. I first examine the critical assumptions which, together, form
the static paradigm. I then examine the paradigm in the context of its
historical referents. From these assumptions and referents, I derive a
preliminary theory of poor relief which incorporates the limited and
limiting conceptual framework of stasis. This provides the basis for the
exploration of those limits in Part IV.
A. Critical Assumptions: The Static Paradigm
The static paradigm, at the broadest level, connotes the unchang-
ing, the passive, the inactive. It implies a fundamental acceptance of
stasis, hence my choice of name. Notions of stasis and passivity infuse
the choices available in the structuring of relief, and act to limit the
perceived range of the possible. In other words, stasis implies a world
view, a notion of action, which is limited to the existing, the actual, the
traditional. It is a backward looking view, at least in the sense that there
is little faith in progress or potential positive change for humankind. 55
It is a view rooted, ultimately, in the changelessness of things, in the
notion that conditions can get no better for some without making
others worse off, 56 and in the "End of History."" It implies a content-
ment with the amelioration of that which, at some fundamental level,
cannot be changed. It accepts as given the social and economic order.
Why the concern over the underlying spirit animating the notion
of relief? There are several reasons. First, this spirit affects the manner
in which the mutability of the conditions giving rise to the problem of
poverty and its alleviation are perceived, and the way in which the
clients of this service—the poor—are characterized. In an important
sense, this notion of stasis also affects the acceptable boundaries of
conceptualizations of the system: what the system is and is not capable
of; what it can accomplish; what the clients of the system are capable
55 Paul E. Peterson, The Urban Underclass and the Poverty Paradox, in THE URBAN UNDER-
cLAss 3,10 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991); Ross, supra note 35, at 1509-10
(and articles cited therein); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE
EXPANSION OF NATIONAL, ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITIES, 1877-1920 (1982).
56 Th IS is reflected in the acceptance of the notion that labor market outcomes in the United
States produce a just distribution for a substantial number of labor market participants. Conse-
quently, adjustments to this just system arc not only unnecessary, but amount to an unacceptable
admission that the system is unjust See Burns, supra note G, at 229. This notion approaches, at
least on a philosophical level, that of Pareto optimality or superiority. On Pareto optimality as an
economic concept, see POSNER, supra note II, at 12-13.
"Referring to FRANCIS EUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992), in
which the author argued that the failures of every other conceivable form of human social and
economic organization have left humanity with only the option of a free market economy within
a liberal democratic order.
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of doing or not doing; what can be attempted and what is unthinkable.
Paradigmatic assumptions, thus, produce and police the cognizable
range of goals, strategies and approaches to poverty and the poor
recognized by society. Such a system tends to dismiss as unrealistic
those approaches and possibilities that might be favorably considered
by societies which adhere to different world views."
A number of postulates flow from this core assumption of the
static paradigm, that the social and economic order is taken as a given.
First, changing the fundamental makeup of society or the economic
order is viewed as futile. Stasis dictates that the basic conditions giving
rise to the need to aid some members of society are not subject to
successful manipulation. Indeed, any attempt at manipulation will
leave society worse."
Second, stasis limits poor relief to systems which do not challenge
the status quo. Though this notion is ancient," it has not lost its
vitality. 6 ' Systems created out of a static view tend to define their goals
58
 For instance, systems derived from a world view that accepts the idea of the mutability of
conditions and of people might be more willing to implement programs designed to actually
bring about change, than those whose views are grounded in the underlying stasis of the human
condition and social order. A concrete example is where the poverty of the able-bodied is caused
by their lack of desire to work. The program rooted in the static vision of things would tend to
assume that human nature is immutable, and would ignore the problem of disinclination to work.
Consequently, such a program concentrates on providing subsistence and compelling the poor
to work irrespective of their inclination. On the other hand, the program rooted in the non-static,
or dynamic vision of things might tend to concentrate on changing conditions giving rise to this
lack of desire—wages that are too low, for instance, the underlying assumption being that the
poverty of the able-bodied is a condition caused by wrong-thinking which, once corrected, will
eliminate the poverty of those affected.
59 Thus, scholars, in the early part of this century could, with confidence, express the view
that
[T]tle preservation of some of the medieval feeling in favour of a due subordination
of class to class, and of a separation between different classes which had different
duties to perform, has had happy results upon English society and the English state.
A strict caste system is favourable to corruption and fatal to progress; but a system
which persists in ignoring all differences between classes, and in attempting to
realize the fantastic doctrine of the equality of all individuals of the state, is favorable
to social discontent and consequent unrest, and fatal to individual effort.
WILLIAM S. HOLLISWORTH, 4 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 406 (1924). This view finds its modern
echo in the somewhat wry observations of Herbert Gans in outlining the status affirming func-
tions of a permanent class of poor people. GANS, supra note 41, at 264-68; and the writings of
people such as MURRAY, EN PURSUIT supra note 14, at 234.
8° See Part III.B, Paradigm Archetypes.
61 Thus, President Harding, in opening the 1921 Conference on Unemployment stated;
It is fair to say to you that you are not asked to solve the long controverted problems
of the social system. We have builded [sic] the America of today on the fundamen-
tals of economic, industrial and political life which have made us what we are, and
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in a symptomatic way, making the obese heart attack patient comfort-
able but dismissing the possibility that the patient's heart condition
can improve, or that the patient can be induced to change his eating
habits. 62
Third, acceptance of the status quo in the United States requires
the acceptance of the existence, value and immutability of income
inequality, and of the notion that a person has the right to the substan-
tially undisturbed enjoyment of the fruits of his or her labor.° These
are also ancient concepts. 64 As a consequence, some people will always
have less than others—perhaps substantially less. And, among those
with substantially less, there likely always will be people whose income
will be insufficient to purchase life's necessities. We style these people
"poor," whether we measure the insufficiency of their income by refer-
ence to some absolute determinant (for instance, a "poverty line") or
as a percentage of some calculable median or medium standard of
living below which the quality of life is deemed inadequate. 65 The poor,
the temple requires no remaking now.. .. 1 would have little enthusiasm for any
proposed relief which seeks either palliation or tonic from the federal treasury.
quoted in William Chenery, Unemployment at Washington, 37 SURVEY* 42 (1921).
° This is reflected in the enormous amount of literature devoted to the so-called "culture of
poverty" meant to explain the medical or psychological or social basis for the inability of the poor
to overcome their condition. See DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING
(1969); BANFIELD, supra note 24; Jamas Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975); Oscar Lewis,
The Culture of Poverty, in ON UNDERSTANDING POVERTY: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCI-
ENcEs 187,191-92 (Daniel P. Moynihan ed., 1968).
6s "There has always been the underlying contention that, as a matter of natural law and
equity, what a man has received save by proven larceny is rightfully his." GALBRAITH, supra note
17, at 68. This notion is more bluntly put by Charles Murray;
Some people are better than others. They deserve more of society's rewards, of
which money is only one small part. A principal function of social policy is to make
sure that they have the opportunity to reap those rewards. Government cannot
identify the worthy, but it can protect a society in which the worthy can identify
themselves.
MURRAY, LOSING GROUND, supra note 14, at 234. But see ROBERT J. LAMPMAN, ENDS AND MEANS
OF REDUCING INCOME POVERTY 33-42 (1971).
(34 See infra Part 111.13, Paradigm Archetypes,
65 Thus, it has been an easy step from the conclusion that someone with less resources than
another is poorer than that other, to the conclusion that the person with lesser resources is poor.
HAuitiNcTorg, supra note 18, at 1-2; GALBRAITH, supra note 17, at 254. Moreover, in a society
where every person is said to own his or her own labor, the result might still be the same. The
inability or unwillingness of any portion of the population to realize the value of their human
capital could, in the absence of other resources, reduce these people to absolute poverty. See, e.g.,
Robert C. Ellickson, The Untenable Case For an Unconditional Right to Shelter, 15 DARV. &
Pun. POL'Y 17,30-31 (1992); seeMuRRAY, LOSING GROUND Supra note 14, at 150-52; Kim Hopper
et al., Economies of Makeshift: Deindustrialization and Homelessness in New York City, 14 DRIS,
ANTHROPOLOGY 183,211-18 (1985).
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therefore, make up a necessary element of a stable social and eco-
nomic order."6
Who are those at the bottom of the scale of income inequality?
For those who accept the static vision, the people at the bottom of the
economic and social ladder are life's losers, social and economic devi-
ants who could not or would not conform their behavior to our gen-
erally prescribed socio-economic norms. They are those who found it
unnecessary to seek, obtain and hold a job or to properly arrange their
personal affairs to avoid the burdens of pregnancy, drug addiction and
the like. It follows inevitably under such a view, that the poor are
deemed primarily responsible for their own miserable condition; inch-
gence is produced not by the social or economic system, but by the
deviance of the poor."' The necessary punishment for deviance is
poverty. This is another sense in which the static vision accepts as
fundamental the notion that poverty is substantially ineradicable. Stasis
assumes that every generation will have its share of losers. Extreme
income inequality is the most visible evidence of this difference be-
tween winners and losers. As such, poverty is necessarily status based.
The incentive, then, is to favor passivity. A passive orientation
permits alleviation of the conditions deemed offensive, without a care
for the reform of society or its economic basis, as the practical expres-
sion of the acceptance of stasis. Alleviation of deprivation requires a
system of poor relief to do little more than to provide such material
things as will increase the standard of living of the recipients to a level
deemed acceptable by the donor, be it an individual, entity, or the state.
In this guise, the notion of the need for aid as a relational concept is
ancient in Western culture.t's But even this status-based notion, in a
66 See supra note 56; see also Ross, supra note 35, at 1510 (commenting on poverty literature
and recurrence therein of theme of permanence of poverty).
67 See, e.g., DAVID WARD, POVERTY, ETHNICITY, AND THE AMERICAN CITY, 1840-1925; CHANG-
ING CONCEPTIONS OF THE SLUM AND THE GHETTO xi-Xii (1970); Hobbes, supra note 9; see also
infra notes 98-107.
c'In the 4th Century, Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, devised an elaborate system of categoriza-
tion of the poor for determining eligibility for aid. In determining whether aid was appropriate,
Ambrose explained that it was important to determine the social position of the recipient Thus,
people of good birth or high station were worthy of aid to the extent their standard of living fell
to the point where they were unable to maintain their position in the community. This relational
conception of need and poverty was carried over into the Canon Law system of poor relief, and
from that, inherited by the colonies, TIERNEY, supra note 16, at 56-57. This view finds modern
expression in the writings of those who argue that the key to eradicating poverty lies in reducing
relative poverty. See 1-IARRINGTON, supra note 18, at 158-59. It also finds expression in the status
limitations of federal categorical aid programs which determine need on the status of the
recipient
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world of substantial resources, is meant to be open-handed.° It re-
quires nothing of the recipient other than that the person be in need.
Well, almost nothing, for another characteristic of stasis is queu-
ing." Queuing is best understood as a product of, and the solution to,
the problem of the limited resources available for the relief of the poor.
Queuing takes two forms: eligibility discrimination and need hierar-
chies.'" The imperatives of prioritization and need hierarchies work in
tandem to identify the poor and to provide each with a proper ration
book. Eligibility discrimination is based on the notion of self-
sufficiency; eligibility for relief will tend to be a function of the ability
of the potential recipient to fend for himself or herself." Need hierar-
chies are a measure of relative deprivation—the greater and more
immediate the need, the higher one's place on the hierarchy of need
and the more likely that the identified need will be met."
Eligibility discrimination and need hierarchies exist as an inherent
part of poor relief under the static paradigm, whether or not there are
sufficient resources to aid all of the needy, and whether or not need is
determined using absolute or relational criteria. Let's look at the
necessity of discrimination and the creation of need hierarchies in
situations involving sufficient and insufficient resources to aid all of
r9 "In hospitality there is to be no regard for persons, but we ought to welcome indifferently
all for whom our resources suffice." John Chrysustom, translated and quoted in TIERNEY, supra
note 16, al 55.
"Queuing, of course, is not unique to stasis. Queuing is a natural concomitant. of limited
resources and high demand. For elementary queuing theory and its application to the social
sciences and economics, see, e.g., HARVEY M. WAGNER, PRINCIPLES Of OPERATIONS RESEARCH
851-902 (2nd printing 1975); 1.,Ajos TAKACS, INTRODUCTION To THE THEORY or QUEUES (1962);
DONALD GROSS tic CARL M. HARRIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF QUEUING THEORY (1974).
71 Eligibility discrimination serves a gatekeeper function—determining who may line up for
aid, and in what order. It serves to mark a social and economic boundary between social normality
and deviance. Need hierarchies are the means used to catalogue the poor. It is the means used
to determine how much aid every eligible person ought to receive, and the order in which it
ought to be received. Eligibility discrimination separates the destitute from the rest of the
population. Need hierarchies sort out who as among the eligible ought to receive aid first and
how much aid is to be given. Seen in this way, need is intimately related to, but not identical to,
eligibility discrimination as a prioritizing tool.
72 Income criteria provide the modern counterpart under most governmental programs. See
supra notes 47-51; infra text accompanying notes 191-206.
"After a person has qualified as needing aid, the hierarchy of needs answers the questions:
(1) when may 1 receive my aid and (2) to how much aid am I entitled? The second question,
more than the first, separates the concepts of discrimination (am I needy?) from need hierarchy
(am 1 so get what I believe I am owed today?). Note also that while the discrimination of the two
is similar, it is not always the same. Thus, while discrimination principles may exclude the
able-bodied from assistance, or at least place them well back in the line, the ordering of the
hierarchy of need may catapult an able-bodied indigent to near the front of the line if, for
example, such an able-bodied person is in danger of starvation.
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the needy. Assume that there are enough resources available to main-
tain all of the needy in a satisfactory manner (according to then
current social norms). In such a case, eligibility discrimination rein-
forces social and economic definitions of need. To that end, even a
society with an abundance of resources retains for itself the power to
identify the poor. Its tool is eligibility discrimination. Indeed, eligibility
discrimination is a function of the necessity of income inequality. Thus,
as the goal of poor relief approaches income equality,74
 the necessity
of eligibility discrimination diminishes, approaching zero at the state
of total income equality, inconceivable in a static regime. Eligibility
discrimination, thus, remains fundamental to the determination of
assistance in a resource rich society; aid is unlimited, 75 but only for
those whom society, through the state, identifies as qualifying for the
status of "needy."
A resource rich society also requires the creation of a hierarchy of
need. Creation of such a hierarchy is necessary because need contains
its own chronological imperatives based on the relative effect of dep-
rivation—the hungriest ought to go first. This hierarchy is imposed
whether poverty is defined in relative or absolute terms. In either case,
the ordering will reflect the subjective valuations of the hierarchy. 76
Queuing of some sort is both necessary and inevitable to satisfy the
needs of the hungriest first, progressing last to the least needy.
The need for queuing in both forms increases when we change
our previous assumption and postulate a situation where there do not
exist enough resources to satisfy all of the needs of the poor. Resource
poverty provides an incentive to use both means for identifying and
sorting the pool of eligible indigents, where identification and sorting
74 In a system based on the goal of creating perfect income equality, the trigger for the
provision of aid would have to be any difference in income. Such a system has not been seriously
advocated in the United States, though the idea of such a program has been lampooned. See
KURT VoNNEGuT, JR., Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY House 7-13 (1968). But
see Richard Delgado, Rodrego's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality and Stasis in Anti-Discrimination Law,
44 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1993).
75
 Limitlessness, in this sense, is strictly temporal. There remain strict limits on the quantum
of aid to be made available even to those who qualify. See infra notes in Part V.B, Examining the
Limits of Static Systems; The Example of California Proposition 165.
76
 In a system based on determinations of absolute need, discrimination, naturally enough,
would be based on the relation of the needy to whatever current standard of need is set by the
state. To the extent that need is relational, discrimination is possible based on a manipulation of
the notion of need, and the eligibility for that need. Those unable to care for themselves might
he most in need, and, therefore, put at the head of the line. The able-bodied, on the other hand,
might be deemed to be marginally poor, and put in the back of the line. Likewise, a political
determination that younger people have greater value than older people will result in the creation
of need hierarchies reflecting this essentially political choice. See infra note 77.
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serve a limiting function. Moreover, in such a case, both discrimination
(which indigents may stand in line) and need hierarchies (what re-
sources are allocable to a particular indigent) become highly politi-
cized. This is particularly acute in societies which are resource poor, in
whole or in part, from an unwillingness to divert resources to the
maintenance of the poor. In such cases, the driving force of aid distri-
bution and the underlying political imperative molding discrimination
and hierarchy is scarcity of resources and not the needs of the indi-
gents."
Indeed, I hypothesize that both eligibility discrimination princi-
ples and need hierarchies are, to some extent, political concepts."
Each is given definition by the value context of the people who craft
them; each is, therefore, manipulable to suit the needs of providers
and recipients" in a manner that is dependent on the characterization
of poverty as either an absolute or relational concept. 8° Manipulation
is a simple concept in this context. It involves the drawing of bounda-
ries to determine an indigent's place in line. It is as simple as defining
eligibility to exclude from aid all persons who are potentially employ-
able," or to exclude certain child care support from aid given to
families with children. 82
77 This is most clearly illustrated by states' recent attempts to ration the availability of health
care as among the pool of the eligible poor, all of whom are considered deserving. Florida has
attempted to divide its poor into seven ranked categories, each based on status (i.e., the elderly,
pregnant women and infants), and provide health care based on the rankings. See Florida Plan
Would Ration Health Care, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 17, 1992, at AS. Oregon has instituted a similar
plan. See id.
Understand, of course, that the lack of resources, though quite real, is perhaps more a
function of the political limitations society has placed on public expenditure than on the inability
of the government to raise taxes sufficiently to provide the services. Thus, there may be no
resources because to increase tax burdens would result in unacceptable distributive effects. This
type of change is precisely what the static systetn is devoted to avoid. `This is not pretty. It's
reprehensible and we don't like it. But to ignore it is to do what government has been doing for
too long—ignore hard choices." Id. (quoting Dr. Leslie Beitsch, Florida Director of Division of
Health Services).
78 See infra notes 213-17; if. MENCIIER, SUPra note 15, at 364-71.
79 The latter at least to the extent that they have power to influence the process of need
determination. See, e.g., PivEN & CLow Ann, supra note 14, at 177 (arguing "structure ofAmerican
public welfare system meshes with and enforces the work system, not least by excluding potential
workers from aid."); STEINER, Supra note 34, at 148 (noting each group with stake in welfare
system—administrators, politicians, program advisors and recipients—"has been less of an insu . u-
ment of change than one of retaining the particulars of a program with which they all acknow-
ledge dissatisfaction.").
86 See supra notes 18-24.
81 See infra notes 192-206.
82 See, e.g., Proposed Law: The Governmental Accountability and Taxpayer Protection Act of
1992, supra note 7, §§ 6, 7 (prohibiting grant increases to grant recipients who bear children
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Context is supplied by the status quo. The poor relief system will
tend to mimic the social and economic system which creates the poor
in the first instance. Just as the social and economic order punishes
social and economic deviants, static poor relief systems punish devi-
ance by conditioning aid on the magnitude of the deviation. Static
systems of poor relief thus punish deviance as well.
To punish deviance and reward conduct affirming the prevailing
social and economic norms, static system builders employ eligibility
discrimination and need hierarchies to create well-known categories
of aid-worthiness." Near the top rung are the disabled, who are inca-
pable of satisfying their needs through their own labor. Theirs is not
so much the poverty of deviance as it is the poverty of chance or ill-luck.
Traditionally, these have included the old, the blind, widows with
young children, and the developmentally and physically handi-
capped.84
 At the bottom rung are the able-bodied poor. These people
are clearly capable of taking care of themselves. They deviate from
accepted conduct norms by refusing or failing to do so. Theirs, there-
fore, is a poverty born of deviance. Necessity is borne with the least
adverse effect by them, unless they are in clear and immediate danger
of physical harm (starvation, catastrophic illness). Stated another way,
necessity is most easily borne by the able-bodied because they, as a
group, can most easily ameliorate their own economic predicament,
and social and economic rules compel the able-bodied to do this. As
such, there is no reason to treat them like those with more limited
options.
while receiving aid). See also infra Part V.B, Examining the Limits of Static Systems; The Example
of California Proposition 165.
83 Theda Skocpol & John lkenberry, The Political Formation of the American Welfare State In
Historical and Comparative Perspective, 6 Cont. Soc. REs. 87, 120-39 (1983). Skocpol and [ken-
berry quite correctly demonstrate that the "New Deal's original refusal to institutionalize public
assistance for the able-bodied—as opposed to the 'dependent'—has ever since remained charac-
teristic of American 'welfare' at the federal level and in most of the states." Id. at 138; TASK FORCE
ON POVERTY AND WELFARE, SUPD2 note 13, at 85 ("The Task Force believes, as do most Americans,
that people who are unable to work because of age or disability should be supported without
harassment at a decent level of income, even if long term support is required.").
84 These categories form the bulk of the federally favored categories, the members of which
traditionally included most welfare recipients tinder federal welfare programs. See, e.g., Asa Briggs,
The Welfare State in Historical Perspective, 2 AticitiVES EUR. Soc. 221 (1961); Handler, supra note
6, at 470-83, 487-88. Notions about disability, or an inability to work, have undergone substantial
change in recent years. There has been a shift away from the wholesale categorization of
particular conditions as disabling, to a notion that conditions (i.e., blindness) might restrict, but
not eliminate, the person's ability (and therefore obligation) to work. See, e.g., MEAD, supra note
14, at 132-35; James R. Sheldon, Jr., PASS: SSI's Plan For Achieving Self Support, 25 CLEARING-
house REv. 962 (1991).
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I have talked about the necessity for eligibility discrimination and
need hierarchies under a static approach to poor relief, and the pre-
dilection of stasis to punish the violation of social and economic taboos
by discriminating against the able-bodied. Let us explore this predilec-
tion further. Why do static systems base discrimination on a determi-
nation of fitness for work, rather than on some other characteristic,
such as strength, education, astrological sign or good looks? For one,
stasis accepts the idea that the immutable economic and social system
has provided, and will continue to provide, sufficient occupations to
employ all able-bodied people who actively seek employment." Fitness
for work as a distinguishing characteristic makes sense the more a
society believes (however irrationally) that a job awaits every seeker. Of
course, such jobs might have to be sought out with some effort, and
might not be to the person's liking. However, the social and economic
system is indifferent, in this regard, to the preferences of the able-
bodied unemployed." For some reason, the fact that the only work
available is exploitative, or perpetuates racial, gender or ethnic subor-
dination is also irrelevant. 87 It is enough that there exists enough
honest work to employ all who need work; that is, to ensure that every
able-bodied person's needs can be met by the sweat of her brow,
without the intervention of the state."
85 This is an old notion with roots back to the labor policies of the Ordinance and Statute
of Labourers of 1349-1351, which had been designed to provide adequate cheap labor to
employers at the time of the labor shortages caused by the Black Death. Society has tended to
view the problem of the able-bodied idle not as a problem of want or poverty, but as a problem
of "seepage from the supply of labor." KARL DE SCHWEINITZ, ENGLAND'S ROAD To SOCIAL
SECURITY 6 (1943); See E. Merrick Dodd, From Maximum Wages to Minimum Wages.' Six Centuries
of Regulation of Employment Contrads, 43 Cotust. L. Ruv. 643 (1943); Jacobus tenBroek, Califor-
nia's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257,
270-71 (1963-1964). Of course, in times of labor surplus, the jobs available might well have to
be provided by the state. See id.
Rli The problem, then, is not the lack of work, but the attitude of those able-bodied who have
not sought work out. It has been noted that, "if you want to work, the program is there for you.
But you've got to want to do it for yourself." KEN AULETTA, THE UNDERCLASS 226 (1982) (quoting
Eric Lax, interviewer for Manhattan MDRC program, subject of Auletta's study). See also id. at
210-19 (discussing case histories of participants and noting degree to which several participants
dropped out of program because they were bored, or thought the work dumb); MEAD, supra note
14, at 73 ("Turnover rather than lack of jobs largely explains why [the poor] are so often
unemployed. Of course, as in musical chairs, if the turnover stopped there might not be enough
jobs for everyone. Then government job-creation efforts would be more necessary than they seem
now. But at present, for most jobscekers in most areas, jobs of at least a rudimentary kind are
generally available.").
"The most celebrated exponent of the view that only work !natters is Murray, supra note
14. Indeed, much of the work available may perpetuate the current discriminatory tendencies of
society. See Law, supra note 51; DOROTHY L. NEWMAN, PROTEST, POLITICS AND PROSPERITY 262-64
(1978).
88 Gen. 3:17-19 (setting forth Divine work commandment). Thus, Robert Burns notes that
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The social and economic order thus imposes the obligation on all
able-bodied individuals to work. If, in fact, society provides enough
employment to occupy all of the able-bodied—for that is what the static
system builder believes—then unemployed able-bodied people are
shirkers, people who seek to satisfy their needs without using their own
resources (that is, their labor).89 Such people fail to conform their
behavior to strongly held societal norms and expectations. As such, the
able-bodied unemployed are considered less deserving (or undeserv-
ing), not because they are healthy, but because of the belief that there
does, in fact, exist sufficient work for them.
There is more than a whiff of status in this view: the function of
the laboring class is to labor, and the laboring classes include all those
without wealth sufficient to provide for their needs. The laboring poor
and the poor who will not labor violate the core tenet of the rules
governing their status." If this category of poor would only seek work,
they would not be needy. In this sense, the need of the able-bodied is
evidence of a character flaw. 9 '
Since deliberate unemployment is considered fundamentally un-
fair from the perspective of stasis, the people who indulge in that
federal categorical relief is based on the notion that special consideration ought to be made for
family units that do not contain potential participants in the labor market and do not derive
income from the labor market. Burns, supra note 6, at 227-29. Indeed, the modern critics of
forms of poor relief in the United States concentrate on illustrating the work disincentives of
modern Forms of poor relief. See MURRAY, LOSING GROUND supra note 14, at 145-66.
"This view often is expressed in popular press opinion accounts of the welfare problem. As
one example illustrates:
Welfare was created during the New Deal to help Americans bridge the chasm
between jobs and to help those who could not work at all... .
When welfare came to be a substitute for a job, too many Americans adopted a
lifestyle where work was irrelevant to survival and, soon thereafter, contrary to their
values. So we see more welfare, not less; a permanent welfare underclass instead of
families moving across FDR's bridge to better times.
Pete du Pont, If Even Democrats Want Welfare. Reform, Its Coming, STAR TRIB., Sept. 29, 1992, at
A15 (opinion of chairman of Committee for Republican Leadership writing for Scripps Howard
News Service).
An exception to this view would include the able-bodied unemployed who are actively
seeking work and find themselves temporarily unemployed. This exception is certainly recognized
in the United States and provision is made therefore in the form of unemployment insurance,
not poor relief. This category is part of the favored categories qualifying for governmental aid.
See LEVITAN, supra note 6, at 43-46. But the work incentives imposed by society are strong even
among this group. See, e.g., Sheldon, supra note 84.
90 tenBroek, supra note 85, at 276 & n.88.
91 This is the "stubborn reality of the underclass" for Ken Auletta, which complicates the
problem of making the destitute disappear. AULETrA, supra note 86, at 275; JAMES Q. WnsoN,
The Rediscovery of Character: Private Virtue and Public Policy, in ON CHARACTER 11, 16-17 (fames
Q. Wilson ed., 1991). This is also the almost archetypal vision of the welfare queen—a mother
of 29 who gets used to welfare. AULETrA, supra note 86 at 225-26.
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(in)activity can be characterized as neither honest nor, perhaps, truly
needy—more thieves than victims of misfortune." 2 Such people are
thieves because they effectively steal resources otherwise available to
aid those with no alternative other than institutional poor relief. Fur-
ther, because no person could truly be idle, the unemployed poor are
not merely stealing from the mouths of the deserving, they are doing
far worse; they are employing themselves in dishonest occupations—
primarily robbery and theft." In a society which accepts the notion that
people are entitled to the fruits of their own productivity, the state
could hardly permit people to earn their keep by stealing the wealth
(or the fruits of the productivity) of others. Labor, in this sense, has
the salutary effect of reducing the institutional cost of maintenance by
limiting the right to be maintained to those who "truly" need it, those
who could not potentially secure life's necessities by any other means.
It also makes social control easier and cheaper. The lower the institu-
tional cost of maintenance, the fewer the riches which must be diverted
from those who have acquired them.
As such, eligibility discrimination and need hierarchies serve an-
other important purpose: to punish the least deserving, who have no
business pretending to need or deserve the aid of society in the first
place. A static system's most severe punishments are reserved for those
who are viewed as subversive, those potentially able or willing to disrupt
the established social or economic order."' The stronger the belief that
idleness is a personal choice and that every person has a moral, relig-
ious and legal duty to work, the more likely that those who do not will
• 2 In discussing the economic efficiency of income inequality, Richard Posner argues that
liJnvoluntary redistribution is a coerced transfer not justified by high market-transaction costs;
it is, in efficiency terms, a form of theft." POSNER, SUtrra Hole 11, at 436. Poverty, in this sense, is
the natural reward of the lazy and incompetent; it is also a fate such people deserve. See
GALBRAITH, supra note 17, at 67 (describing view of popularized Western classical economics:
"The competent entrepreneur and worker were automatically rewarded. The rest, as automat-
ically, were punished for their incompetence and sloth.").
°Indeed, this explanation was commonly ofkred as a reason for the criminalization or the
state of idleness. Idleness was described as:
the mother & rote of all vyces, whereby hath insurged & spronge & dayly insurgeth
& spryngeth contynual theltes :Tinders and other haynous offenses & great enor-
mytes. . . in all places throughe out this Realme Vacabundes & lieggers dayly
do increase in grease & excessyve nombres into great routs and companies .. to
the high displeasure of God the inquyetacon & damage of the Kyng's People & to
the marvaylous disturbance of the Comon Weak of this Realme.
22 Hen. 8, c.12 (1530).
94 For a similar conclusion from a different perspective, see GERTRUDE. HIMMELFARB, THE
IDEA OF POVERTY: ENGLAND IN THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL. AGE 381-400 (1984) (describing develop-
ment of notion of poor as dangerous and potentially revolutionary, and on that basis, in need of
strict social control).
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tend to be seen as a threat to the community and will be dealt with
accordingly.95
 This is all the more so when this type of deviance can
lead to anti-social behavior—mostly run-of-the-mill criminal activity—
which must be suppressed if for no other reason than that it amounts
to an illegitimate and arbitrary means of redistributing wealth. 9 G
I have said that one of the beneficial effects of laboring (to society
at least) is the perception that fewer resources are misallocated (by
diversion to the able-bodied). I explore this further here. Stasis, when
applied to the problem of poverty, has implications for the approach
taken with respect to the allocation of society's resources. The static
paradigm assumes that the expenditure of public funds has a neces-
sarily redistributive effect which runs counter to the notion of income
equality as a reward of individual productivity. Stasis, therefore, will
resist the allocation of any resources to the relief of the poor. The result
is that under a static view institutional programs of poor relief will tend
to be crafted in a manner that will minimize the cost of providing poor
relief.97
 This is consonant with the quintessentially static assumptions
that the poor are the authors of their own poverty and that large scale
transfers of wealth to the able-bodied are counterproductive. The
so-called traditionalist popular press has been particularly effective in
articulating these notions, especially in arguing that undocumented
immigration provides evidence of the falsity of the notion of job scar-
city as an explanation of poverty. Thus, Georgie Ann Geyer writes:
`Why AREN'T poor Americans—black, white, any shade of
the Clinton rainbow—taking the jobs that illegals are taking?'
An example of this notion was recently expressed by New Jersey Assemblyman Wayne R.
Bryant, the author of New Jersey's revisions to its Aid to Families With Dependant Children
program, when he stated that, "the most useful thing welfare can do for the poor is to press
middle-class values upon them. A middle-class wage earner does not go to his boss and say, 'I'm
having another child, so I'm entitled to a raise.'" See Taylor, supra note 12.
96
 The link between poverty and lawlessness is routinely assumed by commentators. See, e.g.,
Jencks, supra note 34, at 74-83. its modern rhetorical form was developed in the 19th century.
HIMMELFARB, supra note 94, at 381-87, finds modern expression in the notion of an underclass
riddled with vice and criminal tendencies. Auu'rrA, supra note 86, at 275.
97 See tenBrock, supra note 85; Skocpol & Ikenherry, supra note 83, at 124 (arguing that one
of the principal reasons that universal welfare state programs were never institutionalized in the
United States has been the fear that such programs "might result in politically uncontrollable,
easily expandable 'handouts' from the public treasury to masses of individual citizens"); Wayne
Greene, Board Kicks Off New Philosophy of Welfare, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 1, 1992, at Al ("The state
Commission for Human Services on Monday started a new era of lean budgets, program reviews
and new thinking about welfare that puts taxpayer concerns at the forefront."). The notion of
cost containment has become especially acute in the area of medical assistance to the indigent.
See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg & William G. Kopit, Coverage and Care for the Medically Indigent:
Public and Private Options, 19 IND. L. REV. 857,896-905 (1986).
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... The first and ideologically fashionable answer to the ques-
tion is that lower income black or white Americans simply will
not take these jobs [as farm workers or domestics]. But any
way you think about that statement, it indicates that some-
thing is terribly wrong in our society.
If they won't take those jobs because the jobs are too de-
meaning, then we need to do some basic re-educating. If they
won't take them because they can get more money and
benefits on welfare, then we need to do some basic re-working
of our welfare system."
Redistribution of income in the context of poor relief, then,
amounts to little more than a subversive act. As a consequence, stasis
places a premium on alternative approaches to the maintenance of the
destitute. Noninstitutional charity provides one such attractive alterna-
tive. To the extent that those with substantial resources are able to
derive pleasure from relieving the misery of the destitute with their
own funds, such tendencies are to be encouraged. Even where dona-
tions are coercively derived, through social pressure, for example, the
objective is still the same. Private charity thus becomes an integral part
of any static program of poor relief." Private giving has none of the
coercive redistributive effects of governmental programs and comple-
ments the notion that the social and economic system is unchange-
98 Georgie Anne Geyer, Why Won't U.S, Poor Take Jobs Illegals Take?, TulsA WORLD, Jan. 31,
1993, at D1,
For example, former President Bush, in accepting the Republican Party nomination for
President in 1988, stated that:
For we are a nation of communities, of thousands and tells of thousands of ethnic,
religious, social, business, labor union, neighborhood, regional and other organi-
zations, all of them varied, voluntary and unique... a brilliant diversity spread like
stars, like a thousand points of lights in the broad and peaceful sky.
Does government have a place? Yes. Government is part of the nation of commu-
nities—not the whole, just a part.
George H. W. Bush, Address at the Republican Party Convention accepting the Republican Party
Nomination for President of the United States, Aug. 18, 1988 in Fmrrs ON FILE Wow-) NEWS DtoKs•r,
Aug. 19, 1988, at 605. The Reagan Administration also worked hard to popularize private
charitable giving as a significant means of fighting poverty. See, e.g.. Low INCOME OPPORTUNITY
WORKING GROUP, supra note 13, at 43-47.
At the heart of the static system's integration of charity are a number of statutes and programs
designed to facilitate the giving of charity. In the United States, the most important of them
include favorable tax policy—primarily, the charitable deduction, 1.R.C. § 170 (1988 & Supp. 11
1990), and the exclusion from income of much of the income received by charitable organiza-
tions, I.R.C. § 501 (1988 & Supp. [I 1990). Other methods are also available, and include Good
Samaritan provisions. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 1987); TEx. Civ, FRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 84.001 to .008 (West Supp. 1993).
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able." Moreover, private charity is driven by a relentless social pressure
that rewards charitable giving with social and economic advance-
ment.'°' The well-off appear to profit from charity as it is least likely to
threaten the social order, or empower the poor." As such, some have
argued, private charity is, in a democratic society, profoundly anti-
democratic."
In addition, cost reduction incentives tend to focus on minimizing
aid—providing the least amount necessary for maintenance to the
smallest number of people. From the perspective of stasis, resources
devoted in excess of those necessary to keep the poor from destitution
are resources poorly spent; they will not increase the productivity of
the people being maintained, while those who are productive are
forced to share their resources with those who are not as productive.
In the jargon of our times, we provide opportunity (to work) not results
(income). Finely crafted definitions of income units charged with the
obligation of mutual maintenance, usually family units however
broadly defined, and the attempt to link the indigent and those taxed
to support them (i.e. local administration) provide some of the corn-
"} This notion has generated some support, and even greater interest, among economists.
Mainstream economic theory hypothesizes that governmental transfers, in the form of institu-
tional poor relief has two effects, a "substitution effect" and an "income effect." With respect to
the former, the hypothesis holds that, assuming that the combination of private and public
transfers in the aggregate optimally meet the aggregate social need for poor relief, increases in
governmental transfers lowers the social need for additional contributions, everything else being
equal, thereby encouraging the substitution of public goods for private charitable transfers. The
"income effect" is fairly intuitive; the more the government takes from a person in the form of
taxes, the lower that person's disposable income, and the less able the person will be to contribute
to charity. Thus, as taxes arc raised to meet public poor relief obligations, the level of private
giving should decrease. See Burton A. Abrams & Mark D. Schitz, The "Crowding-Out" Effect of
Governmental Transfers on Private Charitable Contributions, 33(1) PUB. CHOICE 29,30-31 (1978).
I m See. Long, Social Pressure and Contributions to Health Charities, 28 PUB. CHOICE 55, 66
(1976); Berry Keating et al., United Way Contributions: Coercion, Charity or Economic Self-Interest?,
47 S. EcoNt. J. 816,817 (1981).
11)2 See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 21. But see Sarah C. Carey, Philanthropy and the Powerless
(1975), II RESEARCH PAPERS (PHILANTHROPIC FIELDS OF INTEREST) 1109-64 (Sponsored by
Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, U.S. Treasury Dept., 1977).
tt5 To the extent that the wealthy control a significant portion of the funds used to alleviate
the plight of the poor, the funds will be used only as that portion of the population directs. This
notion was put nicely by Fernand Braude], "[h]e who gives, dominates. The theory of the donor
works not only at the level of individuals and societies but also for civilizations." FF.RNAND
BRAUDEL, II THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE WORLD IN THE AGE OF PHILLIP II, 826 (2d revised
ed. 1966, trans. 1973 by Sian Reynolds). Thus, voluntary charity substitutes decision making and
the preferences of the donor class for the collective preferences of the nation, at least as
represented in the nation's legislative bodies. GANS, supra note 41, at 264-68. Christopher Edley,
Jr„ Season's Seethings: I am Not a Point of Light, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 18-25,1989, at 26.
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mon bases for effecting the cost reductive imperatives of the static
view. i 04
Lastly, the fundamental passivity of stasis implies a reactive, rather
than an active, approach to the aid of the poor. It describes an outlook
that regards the problem of poverty as substantially constant in the
aggregate, though cyclical as to particular people or groups. This
outlook accepts as an unchangeable fact the existence of a group of
people with less than others, who are in a constant potential state of
need; the potential is realized when, for an endless number of causes, 105
some, but not necessarily all, of this group of poor become destitute
for periods of time. There is no relief from this cycle because, as
already noted, there will always be people with substantially more than
others in a society that accepts substantial income inequality. Programs
of relief are geared primarily to respond to need which is both unend-
ing in the aggregate, and temporary for a great number of individuals.
In this sense, our permanent poor relief programs are meant to be
temporary and to relieve only the most extreme want.'°'
Reactive sensibilities reinforce the tendencies to treat poverty as a
separable problem, to elevate the goal of amelioration, and to mini-
mize the perceived utility of eradicative programs. The guiding notion
is that the poor are a separate, and inferior, component of the general
population.w7 The compartmentalization of poverty is deeply embed-
ded in the American psyche. It is evidenced by the way in which poverty
is defined, by reference to a poverty line, for instance—a boundary
which identifies and subordinates one kind of person (a person in
need) from the rest of us. It is evidenced by the language of separation
used to describe the poor. The desperately poor are not like the rest
of the laboring population; they are a different subspecies of humanity.
They are the "lower classes," the "underclass," the "dangerous [classes],
I°4
	 infra Part III.C, Out of Paradigms and Archetypes: A General Theory of American Poor
Relief infra text notes 335-41 and accompanying text
1 °5 This is the old "causes of poverty" problem, over which scholars and others have destroyed
thousands of acres of woodland. A listing of articles coveting this subject would likely exceed the
length of this article. For a brief list, see the articles cited supra in note 51.
1 °6Jou F. HANDLER & ELLEN J. HOLLINGSWORTH, THE "DESERVING POOR:" A STOOP OF
WELFARE AosrtiNtsTunTioN 203 (1971) ('AFDC is basically a low-level income maintenance pro-
gram, and very little else; !ouch more routine than flexible.").
I 07 See HIMMELFARII, supra note 94, at 288-304,371-400 (discussing development of notion
of separateness and inferiority in 19th Century Britain); PIVEN 8c CLOWARD, supra note 14, at
165-75 (degrading non-productive able-bodied serves as effective means of reinforcing work
ethic); Alfieri, supra note 21, at 682-90 (examining tendency of even advocates of the poor to
treat them as sub-status individuals and give short shrift to their concerns); Karst, supra note 51,
at 3-7 (describing manner in which modern welfare system separates the poor from rest of society
and treats them, through such programs, as inferior).
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discontented and potentially revolutionary." 108
 The very labels society
uses to "describe" the poor brands them and makes self-evident the
need to make them act differently (for their own good). It reinforces
the conclusion that they are responsible for the ills with which they are
plagued as well as those (societal or economic) ills which gave rise to
their poverty in the first place.'"° Indeed, separation itself serves as a
means of characterizing the very nature of the poverty which gave rise
to the indulgence in creating distinctiveness. It is, thus, commonplace
to hear that poverty is caused either by an inability to provide for
oneself because of childrearing, physical or mental disabilities,"° or by
the refusal to do so. Both are deviations from the norm, either to be
pitied (incapacity) or otherwise despised as such. In a large sense,
then, the problem of poverty is a dilemma caused by the poor," not
a deficiency of society in general."'
The static view in this manner also reinforces the belief that efforts
to eradicate poverty by modifying the social or economic basis of
society are beside the point. Neither the social nor the economic
system is defective in any fundamental sense. Rather, stasis imbues us
with the reality of a perception that the aid-eligible poor are inferior,
defective or otherwise not like the "normal" person in the United
States. They are the type of people who worry us because they do not
feel stigma. "They seem to be passive, accepting, satisfied, and unable
to take advantage of the few things that the AFDC program has to
offer." And in this manner, a validating basis is provided for the
tendency of stasis to embrace a reactive methodology. The manifesta-
1°8 HIMMELFARII, supra note 94, at 371-400; Autzt-rA, supra note 86, at 272; Jencks, supra
note 34, at 143-203; Peterson, supra note 55, at 3; Ross, supra note 35, at 1517-39 (analyzing
marginalizing rhetoric in judicial decision making which treats the poor as class apart).
"Labelling theory has taught us that we tend to become what we are called. David P.
Farrington, The Effects of Public Labelling, 17 Burr, J. CRIMINOLOGY 112 (1977); see also Ross,
supra note 35, at 1509-10 (arguing such notions make it easy to conclude poverty is irremedi-
able).
II° In effect such people are different from the societal standard because, not only do they
lack the money or resources to provide for themselves, but also because they cannot function in
accordance with the societal norm. See Ross, supra note 35, at 1502-08.
III See, e.g., Ross, supra note 36, at 1502-08; Briggs, supra note 84. Contrast this view to the
universalist notion of certain modern scholars who take the position that poverty is merely part
of an overall problem (correctable), a kind of societal disfunction or inefficiency. See, e.g., Theda
Skocpol, Targeting Within Universalism: Politically Viable Policies to Combat Poverty in the United
States, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 411-43 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).
112 But see. GILDER, supra note 14, at 79-98, in which the author argues that poverty, and
especially the poverty of the racial and ethnic ghettos are a direct result of a "crippling plague
of broken families" which followed naturally from the abandonment of traditional gender roles
and the primacy of the traditional family. Id., at 97-98.
115 HANDLER & 11.011.INGSWORTH, supra note 106, at 177.
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lion of this tendency is reflected by an implementation philosophy
which limits provision of the most basic material needs to those other-
wise eligible people who are desperate enough and persistent enough
to seek aid from the state; it is not guided by any desire to seek out
those whose economic condition could be improved. I "
The deviance of the poor extends beyond the physical; the poor
in the static world view do not act or necessarily share the same culture
as middle and upper class America." 5 Indeed, there might well be a
closer link between the poor and the criminal class, than between the
poor and the people who bear the financial burden of maintaining
them." 6
 This view has been amplified in non-homogeneous societies
114 Piven and Cloward describe the passivity of a federal/state welfare system in which the
applicant quite literally had to undertake something akin to a quest out of Arthurian legend in
order to obtain the "prize"—some form of relief to which the applicant Was likely entitled to in
the first place. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 14, at 149-61. Those who need the system most,
and who could best benefit. from whatever programs are in place are the least likely to know
about the programs, or its potential benefits, and therefore are also the least likely to seek these
programs out. See HANDLER & HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 106, at 177; Simon, Invention, supra
note 36, at 17-23 (describing increasing passivity of system separating its income maintenance
from its social services functions).
115 This raises die familiar canard, the "culture of poverty," See supra, note 89. This concept
has ancient roots. In the medieval period it was assumed that the poor were different; the poor
were supposed to be different. in a strict hierarchical society. Seengumx, .supra note 16, at 58-61.
While the poor were thought inferior, only the able-bodied who reamed to work, and thereby
violated the class and status norms of medieval society, were despised as deviants and punished
as beggars, thieves and vagabonds. Id. at 58. The only ground for II:RIMl to aid the poor was the
presumption that almsgiving would encourage vagrancy and idleness—in effect encourage the
violation of status norms. Id. at 61. This was the conceptualization of the problem that came to
dominate a substantial part of the Elizabethan Poor Law and American conceptions of poor relief.
JOHN POUND, POVERTY AND VAGRANCE IN TUDOR ENGLAND 39-76 (1971); MENCHER, supra note
15, at 39-53.
The modern version of this notion is tinged with racial and ethnic overtones. The inferiority
highlighted is evidenced by the subjects' lack of economic success, because to be normal means
to be successful, or at least stable and upwardly mobile. See, e.g., GALBRArl'H, supra note 17, at
254; W1I.sot4, supra note 91, at 11,
Indeed, modern conservatives share the vision of the poor as different (inferior), but they
tend to take the characterization a bit further. For "conservative" commentators, the difference
is not altogether benign or unconscious. They argue from the perspective of intentional conduct.
The poor are basically lazy at heart (or at least would prefer to receive money from the govern-
ment than work at a disagreeable job for the same amount of money) and require the rigor of
little or no governmental aid in order to induce them to work for a living. See, e.g., MURRAY,
LOSING GROUND supra note 14 (Murray's point is that everyone is lazy at heart, but the poor have
been given a means, through modern systems of institutional relief; to capitalize on their laziness
at the expense of those who work, with what Murray considers awful consequences for recipients
of this largesse); GILDER, supra note 34, at 64-74 (arguing poverty can be explained as result of
abandonment by the poor (as result of pernicious effects of modern welfare programs) of central
tenets of success—work, monogamous heterosexual family structure with traditional gender roles,
and faith represented by traditional Western moral codes).
115 See supra, notes 92-93.
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like that of the United States in the late 20th Century, where the poor
may be disproportionately members of non-majority racial and ethnic
groups.'" In this way, the static assumption that the poor are respon-
sible for their own condition 18 merges imperceptibly with the Ameri-
can Protestant vision of poverty.
Protestant theologians, commencing during the formative period
of the break with Roman Catholicism in the 16th Century, have as-
serted that hard work and frugality are close to divine commandments.
Influential early Protestant thinkers constructed their welfare systems
on this basis. Thus, for instance, Martin Luther's Ordinance for a Com-
mon Chest for the Saxon town of Leisig in 1523 provided for the
abolition of begging by the able-bodied. No aid was to be given to those
who could work for their keep, with the exception of the worthy poor.
They, along with the sick, the aged and orphaned, poor children were
the only classes of persons meriting maintenance by the community. 19
Ulrich Zwingli's Ordinance and Articles Touching Almsgiving, created
for the City of Zurich in 1525, is even more blunt in its assumption
that the able-bodied poor must suffer the (physical) consequences of
their lack of desire to work. The right to aid was based on the moral
character of the eligible and the election to refuse to work for one's
keep was a great immorality. Thus, minimal relief was to be accorded
"any persons, whether men or women, on whom it is known that they
spent and wasted their days in luxury and idleness, and will not work,
but frequent public houses, drinking-places and haunts of ill-repute." 120
Indeed, the able-bodied who refused to work were to be treated like
those who failed to attend sermons, blasphemers, and those who in-
dulged "in any other kind of wantonness and frivolity."' 2 ' These notions
found expression in New England where the Puritan thinker Cotton
Mather explained that only the disabled were worthy of charity. For
117
 See MOYNIHAN, supra note 61; Arthur R. Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic
Achievement!, 39 HARV. Enuc. REv. 1,74-96 (1969); John & Horner, supra note 51, at 140-52.
118 See supra, text accompanying notes 85-93.
I19 Martin Luther, Ordinance for a Common Chest, in SOME EARLY TaAcrs ON POOR RELIEF
84,92-93 (F.R. Salter ed., 1926) (First published in 1523).
120 Ulrich Zwingli, Ordinance and Articles `Touching Almsgiving, in SOME EARLY TRACTS ON
POOR RELIEF 99,100-01 (ER. Salter ed., 1926) (First published in 1525). Such unworthy people
were to be given aid only when they arrived "at the last stage of destitution, and even then
reference must be made to the Mayor and City Council before settling what is to be done with
them." Id. at 101. On the other hand, the pious, "who have worked all their days and taken
trouble to maintain themselves honourably, who have not consumed their substance with riotous
living but happen to be, through Cod's providence, unable to work any more to maintain
themselves by reason of war, fire, famine, accident, excess of children, old age or other infirmity"
were to be maintained at the expense of the state. Id.
t21 Id. at 99,101.
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the rest, the best charity was work.'" There was, thus, a clear tie
between compliance with the religious commandment to work and the
right to be maintained by the state in times of need. In a world in which
religion was not far removed from the everyday things of statecraft,
Protestant thinkers encouraged the state to help God reward in this
life those whose lives were guided by Divine rules, and to punish, both
in this life and the next, those who chose to ignore the Word of God.'"
Moral blameworthiness, thus, was part and parcel of the requirements
of relief. The unemployed, able-bodied person was morally suspect and
unworthy of relief. They were suspect because they likely became poor
through their own fault—by gambling, drinking or lack of desire to
work. Relief was, at bottom, a fault-based system.' 24 Thus, religious
theory serves to confirm the view of stasis respecting the nature of
society, the economic order and the poor. Poverty remains the outward
mark of inward sin. The poor deserve their fate.
B. Paradigm Archetypes
Every paradigm of the type I describe contains within it an arche-
typal form—a concrete manifestation of paradigmatic rules and con-
straints in purest form. It is this concrete archetypal manifestation
which gives the paradigm form and meaning.'" The archetypal crea-
122 Quoted in MENCHER, supra note 15, at 43-44 (Cotton Mather maintained, "for those who
Indulge themselves in Idleness, the Express command of God unto us, is, That we should let
theirs Starve.").
I"Thus, John Galbraith quotes the Calvinist precept—"The only sound way to solve the
problem of poverty is to help people help themselves." GALBRAITH, supra note 17, at 251. For
American Puritans, "[p]overty, like wealth, demonstrated God's hand, and while riches were proof
of goodness and selection, insufficiency was proof of evil and rejection." MENCHER, supra note
15, at 43. For a discussion of the blending of early Protestant theology and the poor law of the
American colonial period, see Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assis-
tance Law, 43 CAI.. L. RF.V. 175, 201-14 (1055); ,Julius Goebel, jr., King's Law and Local Custom
in Seventeenth Century New England, 31 CoLum. L. REV. 416, 427 n.19 (1931).
124 Compare the notions of Luther and Zwingli, supra notes 119-21 with those of modern clay
commentators:
We are now confronting the consequences of this policy of moral "neutrality."
Having made the most valiant attempt to "objectify" the problems of poverty,
criminality, illiteracy, illegitimacy, and the like, we are discovering that the economic
and social aspects of these problems are inseparable from the moral and psycho.
logical ones. And having made the most, determined effort to devise remedies that
are "value-free," we find that these policies imperil the material, as well as the moral,
well-being of their intended beneficiaries—and not only of individuals hut of society
as a whole.
Himmelfarb, supra note 12 (footnote omitted).
125 cf, Briggs, supra note 54, at 229-30 (noting importance of underlying philosophy of
welfare for determining parameters of systems created).
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tion of the static conception of the relationship of a society to its poor
in Anglo-European society is the system of poor relief created by Canon
Law, 126
 which, prior to the Protestant Reformation, was administered
by the Roman Catholic Church and enforced in ecclesiastical courts.
Modern poor relief in the United States derives in large part from the
ecclesiastical system in place prior to the Protestant Reformation, and
which was thereafter codified as the Elizabethan Poor Law.' 27 As such,
much of the way that the passivity and immutability of the static vision
has manifested itself in the motivations, structures and limitations of
current systems is rooted in the ancient ecclesiastical system long
thought discarded. 128
 Its tensions, goals, strategies, approaches and
arguments over reasonableness and justice are our own.' 29
The theoretical structure of medieval poor relief under Canon
Law can be succinctly summarized.'"While the structure of poor relief
during the medieval period is relatively unsophisticated by contempo-
rary standards, it does encompass a complete system not dissimilar to
our own. Canon Law accepted, as a fundamental part of its divinely
ordained system, the existing structure of property and social relation-
ships. This system was based on the ownership of property and was
hierarchical in nature. Every person was thought to have a well-defined
126 The Roman Catholic Church in the period after the fall of the Western Roman Empire,
and at least until the 16th Century, asserted jurisdiction over the care and protection of the poor.
Such matters were to be administered by the ecclesiastical government—parish priests, bishops,
and the hierarchy of the Church ultimately leading to the Pope in Rome—and regulated by
ecclesiastical law. Poor law, as such, prior to the Reformation, was a matter of Church law. Church
Law, in turn, was contained in the Corpus Turfs Canonici which are made up of GRATIAN'S
DECRETUM (c. 1140), and subsequent works containing Church Law appearing after 1140
through roughly the end of the 14th century. This was the law of the Church, which imposed
obligations on the faithful, and was applicable to the resolution of disputes governed thereby and
over which the Church claimed jurisdiction. For a short history of the Canon Law, see R.C.
MORTIMER, WESTERN CANON LAW 40-55 (1953), TIERNEY, Supra note 16, at 6-9.
127 The history of the evolution of medieval Canon Law into modern state general assistance,
has been extensively described. See TIERNEY, supra note 16, at 128-33; E.M. LEONARD, EARLY
HISTORY OF ENGLISH POOR RELIEF 210-59 (1900). For a fuller treatment of the static charac-
teristics of medieval and Elizabethan poor relief systems, see Backer, supra note 4.
128 Indeed, especially among Anglo-American writers, there is a long tradition of assuming
that modern notions of poor relief are based on the Elizabethan Poor Laws, codified in 1601,
and that, prior to their codification, no significant thought was given to the relief of the poor.
See, e.g., SIDNEY & BEATRICE WEBB, ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT: ENGLISH POOR LAW HISTORY:
PART I, THE 01.1) POOR LAW 3-5 (1927); TRATINF.R, supra note 35, at 1-13 (ecclesiastical relief
transitory product of its time); LEONARD, supra note 127, at 1-2, 17-20, 294 (characterizing
ecclesiastical poor relief as non-system of haphazard indiscriminate aid). But see id. at 58 n.3
(noting link between Elizabethan poor law and old methods of relief).
I 'e9 See infra Part VA, Explaining the Disjunctions Between Goals and Implementation; Why Don't
Current Systems of Poor Relief Seem to Accomplish Their Purposes.
110 See supra, note 126, for my working definition of Canon Law.
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place in society, from which followed expectations of income, social
position and obligation. Different styles of living were appropriate for
people holding different ranks within society and people occupying
different rungs of the hierarchy were expected to make do with differ-
ent amounts."' The notion of poverty, therefore, was not restricted to
a concern with absolute need. It also encompassed notions of unac-
ceptable and acceptable relative deprivation.' 32
 Poor relief, in this
sense, was a positive tool to maintain the social order.
The poor relief system reinforced the social and economic order
in other ways. Reinforcement of the obligations of class hierarchy, and
primarily that laborers labor, found expression in the tendency of
medieval poor law systems to criminalize vagrancy as a violation of
compulsory work laws. Thus, the ecclesiastical poor law system tended
to rely on secular criminal law to penalize the able-bodied who ought
to be working for their bread instead of begging for it.'"
The benefits of status and property, however, carried with them a
spiritual and quasi-legal duty of charity.'" In time of necessity all people
were expected to share their superfluous wealth with those in need;'"
otherwise the wealthy were under no obligation to donate their wealth
for charitable purposes (in addition to any required tithings). Those
131 As such, poverty was a relative concept. Thus, if a noble family was reduced to the financial
status of a rich peasant, the noble family would be considered impoverished, and qualilj ,
 for relief.
Why? Because they would be unable to live as required by their social station without aid. See
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, II-11, Q. 32, art. 6, Treatise on Faith Hope and Charity,
(translated as HI THE SUMMA TH EOLOGICA OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS at 1`522--23 (Fathers of
the English Dominican Province 1981) (''. . . for no man ought to live unbecomingly.").
182 Thornas Aquinas defined need in a manner anticipating modern notions of relative
deprivation. He stated that, "a thing is said to be necessary, if a man cannot without it live in
keeping with his social station, as regards either himself or those of whom he has charge. The
'necessary' considered thus is not an invariable quantity, for one might add much inure to a
man's property, and yet not go beyond what he needs in this way, or one might take much from
him, and he would still have sufficient for the decencies of life in keeping with his own position."
AQuINAs, ,supra note 151 (translated at 1323).
133 See tenBroek, supra note 85, it 270-79 (discussing rise of civil penal approaches to control
of vagabonds); Margaret K. Rosenheim, Vagrancy Concepts in Welfare Law, 54 CAI„ L. Ray. 511,
512-13 (1966); Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of'
Official Effurts to Drive Homeless Persons From American Cities, 66 Tut,. L. Ray. 631,635-38 (1992).
13 ' 1 See AQUINAS, supra note 131 (translated at 1321-22) (Giving alms from out of surplus is
precept. A failure to give alms, however, is mortal sin (i) when recipient is in evident need and
is unlikely to be relieved otherwise and (ii) when giver knowingly refuses to give of his superflui-
ties.).
135 See id.; TIERNEY, supra note 16, at 34-35. Superfluities or surplus were, in the Canon Law,
a relative term, generally referring to wealth in excess of that necessary for a person to maintain
his social status and social and economic obligations to his superiors. See id. at 37; AQUINAS, supra
note 131 (translated at 1321) ("On the part of the giver, it must be noted that he should give of
his surplus.. . .").
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who refused to give an appropriate amount of charity could be com-
pelled to do so through the Canon Law procedure of denunciatio
evangelica.' 36
 In England, after 1552, the secular government began to
supplement the Bishop's, power under the denunciatio evangelica pro-
cedure by legislation which provided the Church with the power to
collect a required contribution.'" However, the charitable person was
permitted a strictly passive role—while required to meet the needs of
those who sought aid, she was not compelled to seek them out.
In addition to the timing and extent of the duty of charity, Canon
Law created a crude system of eligibility discrimination: "to feed the
hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to harbor the
harborless, to visit the sick, to ransom the captive, to bury the dead."' 38
Determination of eligibility under these criteria was to be left to the
parish priest and to the donor, who both exercised the kind of discre-
tionary, informed decision-making which several hundred years later
was thought more appropriate for a professionalized cadre of social
workers. 139
 Canon Law limited discretion only to the extent of requir-
ing that the distribution of aid be in amounts "due and customary, 13140
with local churches to provide more detail to meet local needs.' 41
 The
Canon Law also provided that if there was enough for all, all who
sought aid would be given to the extent of their need. Otherwise, a
system of preferences devised by Ambrose in 5th century Milan was to
be applied, the preference system based on the physical condition of
136 See TIERNEY, supra note 16, at 38-39. Under the process of denundatio evangelica, any
person could renounce a recalcitrant parishioner to the Bishop. A recalcitrant parishioner was
one who refined to contribute his superfluous wealth to the relief of the poor. See infra, note
150, for an explanation of the notion of superfluous wealth. Originally, the denunciatio process
gave the Bishop only the power to exhort contribution from the recalcitrant donor; his only
power was to threaten excommunication. By the 15th century, the general opinion of the
Canonists had reversed itself. By the beginning of the 16th century, the commonly accepted
Canon Law position was that a recalcitrant parishioner could be compelled to fulfill his charitable
obligations. See TIERNEY, supra note 16.
137 See TIERNEY, supra note 16, at 127. The statute provided that alms for the poor were to
be collected in each parish church and that those who reinsed to give were to be reported, most
likely by the parish priest, to the Bishop, who could call the recalcitrant parishioner to induce
and persuade him to make the proper contribution. See LEONARD, supra note 127, at 57-59. After
1563, the English secular law provided that if the exhortations of the Bishop were unsuccessful
in extracting a contribution, a compulsory contribution could be assessed and collected. 5 Eliz.
I, c.3; see. TIERNEY, supra note 16, at 131; LEONARD, supra note 127, at 58 & n.3.
138 AquiriAs, supra note 131 (translated at 1318-20).
1 " See BISNO, supra note 21; TOWLE, supra note 21; Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, supra note
21; William M. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN, L. Rr:v. 1431,1437
(1986).
14° See TIERNEY, supra note 16, at 78.
141
 Tierney, for instance, describes the efforts to regulate the details of poor relief in England
in the 13th and 14th Centuries. TIERNEY, supra note 16, at 89-109.
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the recipient, his utility to the community and his connection to the
donor.' 92
 The amount of aid required was that sufficient to prevent
death or utter destitution."3
The institutional delivery of aid to the poor was the responsibility
of the Church. Under Canon Law, each bishop was responsible, in the
first instance, for the supervision of the care of the poor of the dio-
cese."' Relatively early in Church history, each diocese was divided into
several parishes, local units of administration presided over by a priest,
who was responsible for the administration of the revenue derived
from Church assets in the parish (church lands and the like) and the
tithings of parishioners, and its use, in part, for the maintenance of
the parish poor.'"
Even this most cursory description of the system of Canon Law
poor relief evidences the quintessentially static nature of that system.
The distinguishing feature of the medieval system of poor relief was its
acceptance of the notion that the social and political order was immu-
table as the fundamental core of its system-building philosophy. This
order was based on hierarchy and status of a kind that assumed sig-
nificant socio-economic inequality. 14t' True to its static nature, the Ca-
L'12 Thomas Aquinas cites to both Ambrose and Augustine in relating the principle of charity
that favors those most closely united to the giver over strangers, with exceptions that approach a
fairly comprehensive hierarchy of need based on the weighing of a variety of factors including
the strength of the family connection, the extent of the need and the worthiness of the stranger.
He also describes the exceptions of that rule. See Aqutr1/41 As, supra note 131 (translated at 1325-26).
143 Thus, Aquinas argued that an indigent was entitled to aid sufficient to meet his immediate
needs; aid in excess of this amount was to be discouraged, it being "better to give to several that
are in need.. .. 'Thus we are warned to be careful in giving alms, and to give, not to one only,
but to 'natty, that we may profit many.'" Id. (translated at 1326) (quoting GLOSSA LOMBARDI
reprinted in 191 PATROLOGIAE CURSUS COMPLINUS at 1660 (Series Latinad.P. Migne ed,) (Paris
1844-55)).
144 See TIERNEY, supra note 16, at 69-70.
145 It was well accepted under Canon Law that the obligation of the parish to support its poor
was legally enforceable in the church courts. See id. at 127. Such obligations became enforceable
before the English royal courts after 1563. See LEONARD, supra note 127, at 58-59 (describing
administrative process for enforcing charitable contributions).
Both monasteries and charitable hospitals were significant sources of charity in the medieval
period. See TIERNEY, supra note 16 at 83-85; LEONARD, supra note 127, at 18 (arguing that though
great, monastic charity was uncoordinated and indiscriminate). Charitable hospitals were the
equivalent of hospitals for the sick, and almshouses for the destitute. The charitable hospitals
were the forerunners of the almshouses and workhouses that emerged after the Reformation and
persist into the present. See generally, TIERNEY, supra note 16, at 85-87.
146 Quoting Ambrose, Aquinas suggests that, 'When you give alms to a man, you should take
into consideration his age and his weakness; and sometimes the shame which proclaims his good
birth; and again that perhaps he has fallen from riches to indulgence through no fault of his
own." AQUINAS, supra note 131 (translated at 1326) (quoting AMBROSE, DE OFFICIIS, reprinted in
16 PATROLOGIAE CURSUS COMPLETUS; AMIIR05E OPERA at 74 (Series Latina, J.P. Migne ed.) (Paris
1844-55)).
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nonical system of poor relief tended to isolate and regulate identifiable
economic and social classes—in its positive role as provider of alms to
young orphans, the old, the sick and the handicapped, and in its
negative role as enforcer of work obligations on the able-bodied un-
employed."'
The primary purpose of ecclesiastical poor relief was to prevent
destitution. The notion that a system of poor relief could actually end
the dependency of the poor, however defined from time to time, was
neither part of the consciousness nor even of the vocabulary of the
creators of that system. Rehabilitation was, thus, alien to the conceptual
universe of Canon lawyers. The creators of ecclesiastical poor relief
assumed a general population of industrious, poor laborers who, from
time to time in periods of adversity, might require the aid of those in
the locality with more resources. After all, it was not by the command-
ment of mere humankind that people were required to labor for their
sustenance; such had been a divine commandment in effect from the
very beginning of the species."' The obligation to aid the poor thus
extended to all of the needy no matter how the need arose.' 49 To the
extent that the able-bodied members of the laboring class required a
reminder of their obligation to fulfill the Biblical work imperative, the
limited aid available to the able-bodied ensured that resources were
spent on needier folk.'''
And what of the villain who scoffed at the Word of God and at
humankind and refused to eat by the sweat of his brow? Canon Law
minimized the obligation owed such a person: no obligation to aid
except to the extent necessary to prevent actual starvation. But the
Canon Law could rely on more incentive than a meager amount of
charitable aid. The shiftless poor mocked the law of humankind as well
as that of God, and, at least in England, the state supplemented the
I 47 Handicapped at least severely enough to render the person incapable of work. Under-
stand that one epoch's disability is another epoch's ordinary (although challenged) person. Good
examples of the transition in perception of the disutility of handicap include the blind, once
treated as substantially totally disabled, and the hearing impaired, whose rehabilitation has
proceeded substantially in this century. See MEAD, supra note 14, at 132-35 (describing work
requirements creeping into aid for disabled traditionally thought incapable of work).
148 Gen. 3:17-19 (setting forth God's commandment that Adam work for his keep).
149 See, e.g., AQUINAS, supra note 131 (translated at 1236).
159 The amount of aid might vary, and the circumstances triggering the obligation to give aid
might differ, but, ultimately, the fundaniental assumption was that no person was to be allowed
to starve to death if by the provision of such aid a death could be prevented. See, e.g., id.
(translated at 1326) ("On the part of the recipient, an alms may be abundant . . . by relieving
his need more than sufficiently; this is not praiseworthy, and it would be better to give to several
that are in need. ... 'Thus we are warned to be careful in giving alms, and to give, not to one
only, but to many, that we may profit many.'").
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relief efforts of the Church by imposing a secular obligation to work,
on pain of imprisonment. 15 ' As such, the quintessentially secular static
notion that the voluntarily unemployed, able-bodied person was a
social deviant reinforced a theology which taught that the voluntarily
unemployed were religious deviants.
In this context, institutional charity was conceived as a residual
system, the system of last resort. It had to be, for God had commanded
that all people work for their sustenance. As such, any system of
maintenance would have to be implemented in a manner that mini-
mized the amounts taken from others, and did not reward those who,
though capable of labor, did not labor for whatever cause. In the
language of the static paradigm, such a system was fundamentally
geared to provide poor relief based on the maximization of cost sav-
ings, and the reinforcement of the social order.
It is in the context of this fully developed static ecclesiastical system
that the English poor law system arose. As a secularized form of eccle-
siastical poor relief, it shared with the old religious system its funda-
mental static orientation.i 52 The Elizabethan Poor Law represented, in
effect, the culmination of the longstanding effort of the English Crown
to absorb the entire system of ecclesiastical poor relief. This effort had
begun in earnest during the reign of Henry VIII, when the functions
of the Roman Catholic Church were absorbed by the state.'" The
Elizabethan Poor Law has been rightly characterized as the attempt to
fuse the ecclesiastical system of poor relief with the civil statutes which
the English monarchy had over the prior several centuries enacted to
supplement that system.'" Thus, while the major characteristics of the
system of poor relief did not change much, the administrative mecha-
nism for the implementation of the programs of relief did change
substantially. 155
151 See supra note 150. In England, statutes required the able-bodied to work for anyone who
wanted them, at wages determined by the Crown, and criminalized begging. 25 Edw, 3, st. II
(1350-51) (Statute of Labourers, which had been preceded by Ordinance of Labourers, 23 Edw.
3, c. 1—V111 (1349)). In other emerging Protestant jurisdictions, work might not be required, but
failure to work might entitle the pauper to the barest aid essential to physical survival. See supra,
notes 119-23.
152 Indeed, the secularization might only be skin deep. Many of the first attempts at creating
"secular" poor relief borrowed heavily from the religious teaching and perceptions of the domi-
nant group in the community. These views were heavily infused with the dictates of religiously
derived "right conduct." See, e.g., the poor law ordinances of Martin Luther and Ulrich Zwingli
discussed, supra, at notes 119-21, and reproduced in SOME EARLY TRACTS ON POOR RELIEF 92-93
(F.R. Salter ed., 1926).
153 See, e.g., TIERNEY, supra note 16, at 131; tenBroek, supra note 85, at 258.
I" See LEONARD, SUPTa note 127; MENCHER, supra note 15.
155 See TIERNEY, supra note 16, at 109-31, Tierney argues, however, that a substantial clistinc-
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The administrators of this system of poor relief were to be the
"churchwardens of everie Parish, and fower . . . substanciall House-
holders there . . . [who] shalbe called Overseers of the Poore of the
same Parishe."' 56 They, with the consent of the Justices of the Peace, 157
were to determine the amounts necessary to maintain the poor, and
the manner of relief to be afforded on a case-by-case basis.' 58 While
legislation creating a non-ecclesiastical system of poor relief was na-
tional in scope, the administration of the system as well as the obliga-
tion to raise the revenues sufficient for the purpose were left strictly in
local hands.' 59
In general, the new, secularized English poor law forbade beg-
ging.' 6° It required all the able-bodied males and unmarried females
to labor for at least twelve hours per day to provide for their needs."
Furthermore, the overseers of the poor were to organize manufactur-
ing projects on which to put to work all of the employable poor.'" The
able-bodied refusing to work were to be sent to houses of correction.'"
The Tudor monarchs, and the Stuarts, thereafter imposed severe pun-
ishments on people classified as rogues, vagabonds and vagrants." The
overseers were required to put poor children to work or to apprentice
don between ecclesiastical poor relief and secular (Elizabethan) poor relief, was the latter's
concern with the suppression of vagrancy and begging. See id. That, I think, is too narrow a
reading of Medieval relief which relied in some measure on compulsory work statutes to suppress
any desire to abandon productivity. See supra note 150.
156 See 43 Eliz. 1, c.2 (1601).
157 "[T] he Majors, ISailifs, or other Head Officers of everie Towne and Place Corporate and
Citie within this Realme" [43 Eliz. 1, c.2, § VII (1601)] were normally appointed justices of the
peace by royal commission. See tenliroek, supra note 85, at 262 & n.27.
155 The administrators were responsible for "settinge to worke all such [poor' psons maned
or unmaried havinge no meanes to maintaine them," as well as for providing "the necessarie
Reliefe of the lame impotence olde blinde and such other amonge them beinge poore and not
able to work." 43 Eliz, I, c.2 (1601).
159 See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law, 43 CAL. L.
REv. 175, 178-81 (1955) (for American version of Elizabethan Poor Law); LE.oNmtn, supra note
127, at 133.
''0 7 Jac. 1, c.4 (1609); 39 Eliz. I, c.4, §§ II, III (1597); 39 Eliz. 1, c.3, § X (1597); 14 Eliz. 1,
c.5 (1572); 27 Hen. 8, c.25 (1535); 22 Hen. 8, c.12 (1530); 11 Hen. 7, c.2 (1495).
151 5 Eliz. 1, c.4, § XV (1562). This recodified at least the spirit of the old compulsory labor
statutes of Edward III. See supra note 151.
1e1 43 Eliz. 1, c.2 § 1 (1601); 39 Eliz. 1, c.3 § I (1597); see 18 Eliz. I, c.3, § IV (1575-76).
1 3 See 43 Eliz, I, c.2, § II (1601); 39 Enz. 1, c.3, § III (1597); 18 Eliz. 1, c.3, § IV (1575-76);
see also 14 Eliz. 1, c.5, § XXII (1572); 3 & 4 Edw. 6, c.16, § VI (1549-50); 1 Edw. 6, c.3, § XI
(1547); 27 Hen. 8, c.25, §§ VI, X (1535-36).
151 7 Jac. 1, c.4 (1609); 39 Eliz. 1, c.4, §§ II, III (1597); 39 Eliz. 1, c.3, § X (1597); 14 Eliz. 1,
c.5 (1572); 27 Hen. 8, c.25 (1535-36); 22 Hen. 8, c.12 (1530); 11 Hen. 7, c.2 (1495).
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them.'• The law imposed financial responsibility on relatives for the
maintenance of their destitute kinsmen.'"
The statutes sought to supplement such institutional relief as the
locality was willing to provide by private charitable efforts.' 1 i7 To facili-
tate charitable giving, or at least its effectiveness, the statutes refined
and expanded the law on charitable uses, principally to provide a
mechanism to better ensure that charitable foundations devoted their
resources in accordance with the wishes of the founder.'" The pur-
poses to which private charitable giving was devoted tended to mirror
those of institutional relief.'"
The manner in which the system was implemented is significant
evidence of its adherence to notions of poor relief "right" and "wrong"
which flow from the static paradigm. Essentially, the Elizabethan system
devised during the period preceding the English Civil War bears a
striking resemblance to the medieval ecclesiastical system of relief it
supplanted. Little more was really required where, as in Sixteenth
Century England, the state could easily fill the vacuum left by the
forced elimination of Church government and administration. The
differences between the two systems amounted to little more than
substitutions of procedures which made the secular system substantially
more efficient and sophisticated. Institutional relief was still delivered
locally; the locality with the relief obligation was still to provide and
distribute the funds for local relief. Local taxation and the charitable
165 43 Eliz. 1, c.2, §§ I, III (1601); 18 Eliz. 1, c.3, § IV (1575-76); 27 lien. 8, c.25, § VI
(1535-36).
166
 43 Eliz. I, c.2, § VI (1601); 39 Eliz. I, c.3, § VII (1597); 18 Eliz. 1, c.3, § I (1575-76). In
late Tudor England and during the colonial period in this country, the primary duty to support
extended to spouses, parents, grandparents and children, each with a duty to support all of the
others. See Riesenfeld, supra note 159, at 199, Some states, such as New York, also extended the
familial obligation of support to grandchildren. tenBroek, supra note 85, at 294. The obligation
to support extended to illegitimate children and to spouses and children abandoned by the other
parent. Id. at 284-86.
' 67 See POUND, supra note 115, at 69-76 (private charity might even, in aggregate, exceed
total state expenditures on relief); LEONARD, supra note 127, at 210-15; M ENCIIER, supra note
15, at 37; tenBroek, supra note 85, at 259-60.
168
 Thus, charitable corporations could be created and endowed in perpetuity, and could be
empowered to receive property for the purpose of dispensing it according to the wishes of the
founder. lb ensure that the founder's will was done, the Chancellor was empowered to appoint
commissions "to enquire . . . of all . . . such Guift . and of the Abuses and ... Falsiiyes
defrauding of the Truste Intente." 43 Eliz. 1, c.4 (1601); 39 Eliz. 1, c.5-6 (1597), See also 14 Eliz.
1, c.14 (1572). The ability of the state to regulate private charities was more important because
during the 16th Century a significant amount of money was placed in private charitable institu-
tions as a result of the abolition of the monasteries. See tenBroek, supra note 85, at 266-67.
165 See POUND, supra note 115, at 70-74.
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endeavors of the local citizenry remained the principal sources of
funding for relief, the latter also backed by the power and support of
the state.'" None of this was new. These practices and the concepts of
local charity and local institutional obligations to fund relief efforts
had been deeply embedded in English custom and practice through
the mechanism of the tithe and the procedure for denunciatio evan-
gelica under Canon Law. '
The Elizabethan Poor Law system and English local practice in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries' 7 ' provided the foundation
for the construction of poor relief systems in the United States. 172 All
of the original colonies, whether or not originally settled by the British,
ultimately embraced substantially all of the notions inherent in the
Elizabethan Poor Law."s Transmitted through the law of the original
colonies, the Elizabethan system was adopted by virtually every other
state in the United States.' 74 Oddly, perhaps, this system, as adopted,
appeared untouched either by the Industrial Revolution or the
vaunted progress of Anglo-European society from one of status to one
of contract.'" Poverty remains a condition of status, a caste apart from
the rest of society which no amount of Enlightenment rhetoric al-
1711 In this manner, the state appropriated one of the two significant parts of the canonic
system, the institutional system of parish poor relief providing the rest of the formal apparatus
of aid. A sizeable portion of the other part of ecclesiastical poor relief—private charitable
efforts—was left to the continued ministrations of religious organizations. See LEONARD, supra
note 127, at 210-20; MENCHER, supra note 15, at 25-26,95-96.
171 See Riesenfeld, supra note 159, at 176-77;Julius Goebel, jr., King's Law and Local Custom
in Seventeenth Century New England, 31 CoLum. L. REV. 416 (1931) for descriptions of English
legal and local practices during the American colonial period.
17-4 For a description of a fairly standard system of poor relief in America during the 1930s,
that of Alabama, and the striking parallels of that system to that of 17th century England, see
WAYNE FLYNT, POOR HUT PROUD: ALABAMA'S POOR WHITES 281-320 (1989).
173 See Riesenfeld, supra note 159, at 201-33; MF,NCHER, supra note 15, at 44-48.
174 1n this respect, the adoption of the Elizabethan Poor Law followed the pattern of the
adoption of the English common law in the United Suites. See Ford W. Hall, The Common Law:
An Account of Its Reception in the United States, 4 VAN. L. Rev. 791 (1051).
175 See Mencher, supra note 15, at 21-53. In this respect, the United States is heir to a long
tradition of social and political discourse of this nature. See generally, OLWEN H. Hurrox, THE
PooR OF EIGHTEENTH CENTURY FRANCE: 1750-1789, at 131-19 (1974) (discussing formal and
informal means for relieving poverty in 18th Century France); JEAN SARRA1LH, LA ESPAN1A
ILUSTRADA DE LA SECUNDA MITAD net. SIGLO XVIII 528-43 (1954) (trans. from French by
Antonio Alatorre) (discussing proposals current during Spanish Enlightenment respecting solu-
tions to problem of poverty). Gertrude Hitnmelfarb has ably described the rhetorical effect of
post-Enlightenment thinking on the discourse of the means of making the poor productive, none
of which affected the fundamental views of society toward poverty or its poor. HIMMELFARB, supra
note 94, at 42-304.
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tered."" Indeed, this status even has a name—the "underclass."" 7 Un-
like Britain, which abandoned the forms and underlying assumptions
of stasis memorialized in the Elizabethan Poor Law upon the adoption
of the National Assistance Act,' 78 systems of poor relief in the United
States, at both the state and federal levels, continue to build on the
notions, and to be subject to the constraints inherent in the underlying
stasis, of the Elizabethan system.'"
C. Out of Paradigms and Archetypes: A General Theory of American
Poor Relief
Let us assume for a moment that state and local governmental
systems of poor relief are essentially static (an assumption we will
examine below in connection with the nature of change inherent in
such systems). The model tells us a number of things about the char-
acteristics of such systems. First, the system accepts as given the funda-
mentals of the current social and economic order, including income
and social inequality. We would expect, in the first instance, that no
matter what its form, no system of poor relief would either directly or
indirectly effect significant changes in the social order."'"
176 See supra text accompanying notes 107-12; 11 istm ift,FARB, supra note 94, at 593, it is hard
to remember our lessons about the demise of law based on status when society continues to
employ the social sciences to prove that the poor continue to constitute a caste apart. Oscar Lewis
confidently described what makes the poor different:
Other traits include high incidence of maternal deprivation, of orality, and of weak
ego structure; conliision of sexual identification; lack of impulse control; strong
present time orientation, with little ability to deter gratification and to plan for the
future; widespread belief in male superiority; and high tolerance for psychological
pathology of all sorts,
Oscar Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, in ON UNDERSTANDING POVERTY 187, 191-92 (Daniel P.
Moynihan ed., 1968).
177 AuLETTA, supra note 86; Jencks, supra note 34.
178 1 1 & 12 Geo. 6, c.29 (1948); see FURNISS & TH,TON, supra note 27, at 104-21.
179 Riesenfeld, supra note 159, at 178. Cf. Bensinger, supra note 35 (examining California
general assistance provisions); Nancy S. Blanton, General Assistance in California, 12 SAN FERN,
V. L. REV. 31 (1984) (same); Stephen E. Kr.Mt, Standards for General Assistance in New Hampshire:
An Analysis and Proposal, 16 N.H. BAR Ass . sti. 135 (1974) (examining New Hampshire's general
assistance provisions and derivations from Elizabethan Poor Law).
'ttFor instance, even the programs of the 1950's Great Society have been described as
attempting to give the eligible poor the tools to function within the economic system, and not to
change the system itself. See WAD, supra note 19, at 33. The notion that the poor will have to
make their own way in the economy as presently constituted continues to be unquestioningly
accepted by a number of commentators and those who seek to shape the course or government
policy. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON POVERTY AND WELEARE, supra note 13, at 63 ("The Task Force
believes that work should be the cornerstone of the reform of welfare. The effectiveness of
work-based reforms will depend not only on the economic and educational policies described in
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Since income inequality rewards productivity and industry, all
systems of poor relief should focus on income or in-kind maintenance.
While each generation produces its losers, no loser should be required
to live below a certain level of dignity. Systems of poor relief are meant
to ensure that those that have less do not have so little that they are
unable to live in a minimally acceptable manner. While static society
is inclined to maintain those who try and lose, it is less inclined to
support (especially with the productivity of others) those who do not
try (who are perceived to be economic criminals). For them, support
is more likely to compel self-help (employment). In any case, we should
expect our system of poor relief to be crafted as a minimalist system,
in the sense of providing minimal assistance.' 81
 It is not fashioned to
eradicate, or even ameliorate, income inequality. It merely sustains, to
varying degrees, those without resources sufficient for the purpose.
With this in mind, the theory would further suggest that these
systems exhibit a certain tension between the desire to provide for
those at the bottom end of the scale of social and income inequality
and the notion that people ought to keep what they earn (and there-
fore should not be forced to part with it to enrich the deliberately
unproductive). This tension should be most clearly evidenced by the
the previous chapter, but also on policies concerning the working poor.") This, of course, is not
to suggest that this notion has never been challenged. For instance, so
-called universalists and
economic libertarians continue to argue that the whole basis on which relief is accorded must
be changed. See infra Part VI, Summary in the Form of a Commentary: Are Static Systems Good or
Bad. Significant voices in academia have, for years, argued that a national guaranteed income
program would eliminate the need both to maintain the poor and to continue to employ a large
bureaucracy of alms givers. See, e.g., David A. Larson, Long Overdue: The Single Guaranteed
Minimum Income Program, 69 U. Drr. MERCY L. Rev. 353,355 (1992). Others have argued that
there ought to exist a constitutionally mandated right to a certain minimum standard of living,
or to housing. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL &
Pus. An'. 185 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL.
& Pus. AFT. 283 (1981). Bul see Ellickson, supra note 65. Academic scholars have also begun to
explore the utility of a universalist approach to poor relief, either as a means of fulfilling the
potential of the current economic and social system, Skocpol, supra note 111, or as a means of
overturning it, PiVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 14.
151 This might be especially true where the level of giving approaches what would be available
if the recipient held a job for which the recipient were qualified. Note that the incentive to prefer
one to the other shifts as the level of relative benefits shifts and as the intangible costs of benefit
acquisition changes. Thus, for example, as the humiliation level increases in connection with the
provision of aid from the state, the cost of receiving aid versus getting a job increases, and the
recipient is more likely to prefer one (the job) to the other (the humiliation). This, apparently,
is the theory employed by some county agencies charged with the dispensing of general assis-
tance. See, e.g., Handler, supra note 6, at 524-33 (describing practices in Los Angeles County,
California). Unfortunately, analyses like this may not matter where there are no jobs available,
whatever the cost or alternative forms of benefit provision. See, e.g., RIEMER, supra note 19, at
43-56.
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tendency of static systems to eschew an absolutist definition of poverty
in favor of a political definition. 182 And, as should be expected, political
definitions might break down along economic, race, gender, and eth-
nic lines.'" While these lines can get crossed, they should reinforce the
underlying assumption that interference with the private ordering of
economic or social relationships is forbidden.'" Aid is always "too
generous," and contributes to the breakdown of the work ethic, 185 or
family or traditional values, 18' or to the decay of large cities.'"
Another characteristic we should observe with uniformity is that
the system should be separable from other programs and concerns of
government. This follows from an acceptance of the notion that the
needy are the cause of their own need. The problems of the poor are
either a result of unfortunate circumstances which render people un-
able to support themselves, or the consequence of an intentionally
made vicious or deviant lifestyle choice. Poor relief systems are, there-
fore, structured to ameliorate the results of need; amelioration of the
182 See SEINER, supra note 34, at 108-75; Lance Liebman, The Definition of Disability in Social
Security and Supplemental Security Income: Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARV.
L. Ritv. 833,855-67 (1976); see also supra notes 88-92.
183 The political debate mirrors the general debate in the United States concerning the
changing role of people in society and the redistribution of power generally in this society during
the latter part of the 20th Century. While the debate is important to the nature of particular
effects of such changes on non-majority peoples, and the powerless, it lies beyond the scope of
this article. See, e.g., articles cited ,supra note 51.
'54A current example: should the amount of welfare payments made to single parents he
dependent on the number of children in the household? This question could encompass ques-
tions of race, Morley D. Glicken, Transgenerational Welfare Dependency, 4 J. CONTEMP. STUD. 31
(1981), gender, Law, supra note 51, sexual orientation, Aids and Homelessness: Personal Accounts,
LAW & LIBERATION; Patti E, Phillips, Comment, Adding Insult to Injury: The Lack of Medically
Appropriate Housing far the Homeless HIV-Ill, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 567 (1990-91), handicap, Lance
Liebman, The Definition of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental Security Income: Drawing
the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARV. L. REV. 833 (1976) and ethnicity, Note, Into the
Mouths of Babes: La Familia Latina and Federally Funded Child Welfare, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1319
(1992).
185 Low INCOME OPPORTUNITY WORKING GROUP, supra note 13, at 37 ("Welfare recipients
may come to have little regard for community standards and local institutions, because no matter
what a community says or does, welfare is guaranteed. The community gradually loses its power
to influence behavior or to enlbrce the mutual obligations that make a community livable.").
186 GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY, supra note 34, at 64-74,259-69 (loss of faith and tradi-
tional values are at core of poverty problem); GILDER, MEN AND MARRIAGE, supra note 14, at
79-98 (family values and traditional gender roles are bedrock of stable and independent working
class); GLAZER, supra note 34, at 140-46 (strength of' traditional structures—Family, church, ethnic
group, neighborhood and voluntary organizations—are essential and have been replaced ineF
fectively by institutionalized forms of relief); Bush, supra ,note 99 (seeking replacement of
governmental charity by traditional forms of voluntary efforts).
187 Skelton, supra note 12 (Address by Governor of California arguing state will continue to
lose jobs as long as welfare spending remains out of control); WILSON, supra note 14, at 46-62.
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causes of need focuses on programs which can "fix" the poor. The
problem of alleviating the condition of the poor is, in this manner,
treated as quite distinct from labor policy, discrimination policy, mone-
tary policy, military procurement or any other problem or policy area.
Static poor law systems tend to respect these boundaries.' 88 It would
follow that since poor relief does not touch on complex matters of
policy, but does concern itself with cost minimization, much of the
administrative machinery of poor relief should be found at the local
level. Local administration, it is believed, reduces aggregate costs and
simplifies the process of discriminating between classes of the needy,
effectively eliminating all who do not qualify for aid.' 89 The "relief of
the poor is a matter which can only be efficiently administered by men
who have a great knowledge of detail.""°
As a minimalist and discriminatory system, the static model would
dictate different treatment of the various categories of potential recipi-
ents of aid.' 91
 Since stasis assumes that the poverty of the able-bodied
reflects voluntary lifestyle choice, it follows that poor relief to the
able-bodied should be extremely troublesome, at least to the extent
that such aid is perceived as a reward for the decision not to work. As
a consequence, aid to the able-bodied will be kept to a minimum, and
likely will be limited to the provision of minimally necessary food and
shelter. In many jurisdictions, governmental aid to the able-bodied
without minor children may approach nothing. For example, Ari-
199
 See, e.g., Fuswiss & TILTON, supra note 27, at 164-66 (noting while notion of full employ-
ment has been embraced as ideal, government has taken minimalist attitude to its achievement,
relying on private sector to achieve goal). Even the New York Task Force on Poverty and Welfare,
in recommending a more interventionist approach to labor policy, remained fairly conservative
in its suggestions, concentrating on a call for more responsive fiscal and monetary policy and
making America more competitive in foreign trade. See TASK FORCE ON POVERTY, Supra note 13,
at 43. But the separation of poor relief policy (as an ameliorative device) from other social policy
areas has come under increasing criticism. See, e.g., FOLKE DOVRING, INEQUALITY: THE. POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION 146-48 (1991) (arguing United States should take more
active role in achieving full employment); BLUESTONE & HARRISON, supra note 32; Reimer, supra
note 19.
199 See Low INCOME OPPORTUNITY WORKING GROUP, Supra note 13, at 51; TASK FORCE ON
POVERTY AND WELFARE, Supra note 13, at 93. Local administration makes it easier for the
providers of relief (taxpayers) to politicize the granting of aid. See Bensinger, supra note 35, at
506.
LEoNann, supra note 127, at 133.
1 '31 The term "discriminatory" is used here both in the sense of treating different classes of
people differently in accordance with economic criteria, and also in the commonly understood
sense of different treatment on the basis of such categories as race, gender, sexual orientation,
ethnicity, and religion.
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zona,' 92 Delaware, 193 Hawaii,'" Lottisiana, 193
 Massachusetts,E"G New Mex-
ico,' 97 North Carolina,t 9" Ohio,'" Oregon,'" South Carolina,'" Ten nes-
See,2°2 Washington,'" West Virginia,'" Wyoming2" and the District of
Columbia.'" do not provide significant aid of any kind to people who
are not otherwise worthy. Worthiness is likely measured as a function
of ability to qualify for any one of the federal categories entitling a
person to federal assistance. The recent concern about the homeless
192 Arizona provides assistance only to persons who are unemployable. See Auz. REv.
ANN. § 46-233 (1988).
193 Delaware limits aid benefits to the elderly, families with dependent children, the disabled
and to unemployables. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 505 (1985).
" Hawaii provides aid only to the aged, blind and the disabled in accordance with the
eligibility requirements of the Supplemental Security Income Program. HAW. Rev. STAT. § 346-52
(1991).
"Louisiana provides aid only to needy, infirm, sick or disabled persons. LA. Rev. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:464 (West 1982).
" Massachusetts limits aid programs to finnilies, children, unmarried parents and the elderly.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 18, § 2(A) (West Supp. 1992).
157 "[PI ublic assistance shall be provided under a general assistance program to or on behalf
of eligible persons who are under eighteen years of age and meet all eligibility conditions fur aid
to families with dependent children except the relationship to the person with whom they arc
living" or are temporarily disabled and are not. receiving AFDC. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-2.7 (Michie
1978).
"In North Carolina, persons who may be eligible for public assistance arc limited to
families, persons at least 65 years old, or persons between the ages of 18 and 65 who are
permanently and totally disabled. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 108A-28, -41 (1988).
199 0hio has a general assistance program that is available to persons over the age of 18 and
under the age of 60. See Onto Rev. Cone ANN. § 5113.03 (Baldwin Supp. 1992).
200 The Oregon Adult and Family Service Division proscribes the eligibility requirements for
general assistance, but Oregon law does not list any specific requirements except for state
residence. See Ott. REY. STAT. §§ 411.710, .740 (Supp. 1989).
201 South Carolina's general relief program is available only to needy Families or handicapped
and unfortunate persons who are not eligible fitr any other type of assistance and unable to
support themselves due to a physical or mental infirmity, See S.C. Cone ANN. §43-5-65 (Law.
Co-Op. Supp. 1992) & § 43-5-310 (Law. Co-Op. 1985).
202 The only programs available to the poor are medical assistance, community clinics, !bud
stamps, energy assistance, and job opportunity programs. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 71-5-101 to
-1310 (Supp. 1992).
'2()3 In Washington, general assistance is available only to people who are ineligible for federal
aid assistance and who arc either pregnant or incapacitated due to a physical or mental infirmity.
See 1992 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 165 (West).
West Virginia does not provide public or general assistance to indigent persons.
505 Wyoming law does not provide public assistance except for AFDC, although it states that.
programs are to be provided to individuals who lack sufficient income or resources to provide
for themselves. See Wyo. STAT. § 42-2-103 (Supp. 1992).
256 The District of Columbia provides for AFDC, General Assistance for Children, Emergency
Shelter Family Services, and General Public Assistance. D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-202.1 (Supp. 1992).
However, General Public Assistance is available only to disabled persons. D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-
205,42a (Stipp. 1992).
1046	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 34:997
will not change the nature of the response of state and federal govern-
ments, even with respect to the destitute able-bodied who lack minor
children to support."'
Since work is "good" and unemployment is "bad," static systems
tend to implement programs that make the provision of aid for unem-
ployed able-bodied recipients as unpleasant as possible."° Since the
core societal imperative under a static regime is to work, we should
also expect static poor relief systems to require the able-bodied poor
to labor for whatever aid is provided. 2°9 Those able-bodied poor who
refuse to work for their keep, whether it be provided by the state or
otherwise, will be punished. This punishment would consist of crimi-
nalizing acts of vagrancy or otherwise assessing penalties on those who
earn their living without the benefit of gainful, honest employment. 210
207 See, e.g., Norman Siegel, Homelessness: Its Origins, Civil Liberties Problems and Possible
Solutions, 36 Viu.. L. REV. 1063 (1991) (arguing homelessness in places like New York City is
function of displacement of racial minorities caused by urban development); Donald E. Baker,
Comment, "Anti-Homeless" Legislation: Unconstitutional Efforts to Punish the Homeless, 45 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 417, 424-25 (1990-91) (describing response of cities to homeless problem).
20° In contemporary terms, the procedures devised for the determination of eligibility can
be complex and drawn out. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint For Equitable Relief, 11 6-41,
City of Los Angeles, supra note 47 (discussing intake procedures for general assistance in Los
Angeles, California). The receipt of aid is deliberately meant to be a humiliating experience,
where, in return for aid, a substantial amount of privacy is surrendered. See PIVEN & CLOWARD,
supra note 14, at 149-61 (describing burdensome and humiliating procedures used in Intake"
process through 1960s); SUSAN SHEEHAN, A WELFARE MOTHER 19-24, 60-66 (1976). But see
Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, supra note 21, at 1200-22 (stultifying effects of seeking aid is
by-product of routinization and bureaucratization of welfare delivery). The very basis of the
proposals of commentators such as Charles Murray is that if you make the able-bodied poor
person uncomfortable enough, that person will be induced to work for his or her keep. See
MURRAY, LOSING GROUND, supra note 14. This notion of the utility of degradation and humili-
ation reflects the views, much more starkly set forth, in connection with the theory behind the
creation of workhouses as the primary means of dispensing aid in England after the 1830s:
If paupers are made miserable, paupers will needs decline in multitude. It is a secret
known to all rat-catchers; stop up the granary-crevices, afflict with continual mew-
ing, alarm, and going-off traps, your "chargeable labourers" disappear, and cease
from the establishment. A still briefer method is that of arsenic; perhaps even a
milder, where otherwise permissible.
Thomas Carlyle, Chartism, in ENGLISH AND OTHER CRITICAL ESSAYS 175 (Everyman ed., 1915).
2°°And, as such, the able-bodied ought to reconsider their decision to forego working, and
comply with the societal obligation to labor, or face starvation. For a critical study of modern
welfare to work programs, see, JUDITH M. GUERON & EDWARD PAULY, FROM WELFARE TO WORK
79-125 (1991) (analysis based on studies of several work inducing or enhancing programs).
210 Seel:WEN & CLOWARD, supra note 14, at 147-77 (describing means by which welfare rolls
are shrunk); Simon, supra note 133, at 632-33, 645-47 (discussing punishments for vagrancy);
Jodie Levin-Epstein, Changes that Won't Serve the Public Welfare, WASH. POST, July 12, 1992, at C8
(describing amendments to Maryland's welfare rules, noting "key state official admitted that the
change is 'punitive' but declared it necessary, because 'families need more assistance in becoming
responsible.'"); Mississippi Proposes Changes in Welfare, NATIONAL PUBLIC Rani°, Morning Edi-
tion, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NI'R File (Mississippi legislature considering requiring
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Another form of punishment might involve conditioning the amount
of benefits received on the conduct of the recipients.
In contrast, relief to the incapacitated should be more open-
handed. The incapacitated did not make a deliberate choice to be-
come unproductive, and are therefore more deserving of aid. More-
over, redistributing income in the form of aid to the incapacitated does
not significantly threaten the social and economic system. The recipi-
ents of this aid are not economic outlaws. But even this aid, though
graciously provided, will be limited by the cost minimization emphasis
of the system and the tendency of static systems to mimic the underly-
ing social and economic norms of productive society. Since society
universally imposes an obligation on certain family members to sup-
port each other,'" that obligation will be mirrored in the obligations
of any system of poor relief. Indeed, the obligations of certain family
members to support each other has been legally recognized in the
poor law of twenty-two states."'" The obligations extend not only to
positive support, but also encompasses reimbursement to the state for
prior support.
Because the maintenance of the incapacitated is significantly more
costly to society than maintenance of the able-bodied (because the
state will compel the latter to work), the determination of incapacity
becomes a political question:21 s Stasis favors policy determinations
women on welfare with more than four children to use birth control and conditioning benefits
on school grades of children of welfare beneficiaries).
211 Currently, state law almost uniformly imposes a duty on parents to support their minor
children. See, e.g., OKLA. STATs. ANN. tit. 10, § 4 (West 1987); FLA, STAT. ANN. § 856.04 (West
1941); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-5 (West 1937); nix. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.02 (West 1975). For a
general discussion of the history of the legal obligations between family members, see Minow,
supra note 11; tenBroek, supra note 85, at 287-91, 298-317.
"See ALASKA STAT. § 47.25.230 (1990); CAL. WELF. & INST. ConE § 17300 (West 1991);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-215 (West 1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 511 (1953); GA. CODE
ANN. § 36-12-3 (Michie 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 23, para 10-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IowA
Cont•: ANN. § 252.2 (West 1946); Mc. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4319 (West 1992); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch . 117A, § 7 (West 1981); Mimi. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 401.3 (West 1991); MINN. S'/WI'.
ANN. § 256D.15 (West Supp. 1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-31-25 (Supp. 1990); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 165:19 (1955); N.Y. Soc. SEItV. CODE § 101 (McKinney Supp. 1992); N,D. CENT. Coo:
§ 14-09-10 (1943); OR. REV, STAT. § 416.010 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973 (1930); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 40-5-13 (1956); UTAft CODE ANN. § 17-14-2 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-127
(Michie 1950); W. VA. CODE § 9-5-9 (1939); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.90(1) (a) (West Supp. 1991).
213 See, e.g., MEAD, supra note 14, at 132-35; Grace M. Marcus, Reappraising Aid to Dependent
Children as a Category, 8 Soc. Smuitrry Bum,!,. 3 (Feb. 1945); Richard P. Weishaupt & Robert E.
Rains, Sullivan v. Zebley: New Disability Standards for Indigent Children to Obtain Government
Benefits, 35 ST. Louts U. L.J. 539 (1991); Lance Liebman, The Definition of Disability in Social
Security and Supplemental Security Income: Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARV.
L. Rev. 833 (1976); Michael Diehl, Comment, Screening Out Worthy Social Security Disability
Claimants and Its Effects on Homelessness, 45 U. MIAMI L. Rev. 617 (1990-91).
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based in part on a notion that society is better off erring on the side
of ability to work, than in favor of incapacity. Thus, a person unable
to walk might still be fit for work as a typist. 214
 We should expect, then,
that static poor relief systems will create a broader rather than a
narrower definition of capacity for work. 215 Static society fosters this
notion in indirect as well as direct ways. Indeed, even the most well-in-
tentioned efforts to protect the work rights of people traditionally
considered disabled can have the effect of eliminating whole groups
of such people from eligibility for poor relief assistance.215
Furthermore, the narrower the definition of incapacity, the
smaller the aggregate obligation of the state to its recipients. 21 Since
the federal categorical aid programs cover certain narrowly defined
classes of the incapacitated, we might expect states seeking to minimize
expenditures to conform their definitions of incapacity to the federal
definition. In that way, states can pass along a substantial cost of poor
relief programs to the federal government. These practices evidence
the manner in which the notions of worthiness and cost minimization
are conflated in the highly manipulable concept of "disability."
214
 "Persons with physical disabilities hold down jobs of almost every description, and many
more could if more were done to remove barriers to participation." TASK FORCE ON POVERTY
AND WELFARE, supra note 13, at 85. The federal government has attempted to create programs
to induce the partially disabled to work. See Plan For Achieving Self-Support (PASS), Pub. L. No.
92-603, § 301, 86 Suit 1468 (1972); codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382a(b) (4) (A) (iii),
1382a(b) (4) (B)(iv), 1382b(a)(4) (1988 & Supp. II 1990); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1180 et seq. and SSA
Program Circular No. 05-90-OSSI (Sept. 28, 1990). PASS permits a person to exclude certain
income and resources otherwise counted in determining Supplemental Security Income Program
eligibility but only to the extent such income or resources are used to achieve vocational goals.
For a practical discussion of how the PASS program works, see, Sheldon, supra note 84.
215
 In other words, if people arc too disabled to continue in their present occupation but
could perform another with training and assistance, then support should be provided that enables
such persons to make the transition." TASK FORCE ON POVERTY AND WELFARE, supra note 13, at
86.
216 See, e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1992) (as amended); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, P.L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.).
217 Certainly the Reagan Administration understood this concept quite well. As a result, the
Reagan Administration fought a very long battle to narrow the definition of incapacity in
connection with federally administered categorical aid programs in support of the incapacitated
disabled population through the Supplemental Security Income Program ("SSI"). Thus, in order
to be eligible for SS1 disability payments, a person must be so disabled that he or she cannot do
any job that exists in the economy, even if the job is not available in the area or the person would
have to be completely retrained. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383 (1988 & Supp. 1I 1990). See TASK FORCE
ON POVERTY AND WELFARE, supra note 13, at 85-86. In addition, the Reagan Administration
attempted to shrink the size of the eligible population by interpreting narrowly the eligibility
criteria for SSI and vigorously prosecuting all cases brought for review. The result was an attempt
to cut the aid of about 485,000 claimants, and 30,000 lawsuits brought by claimants for wrongful
denial of benefits. In the ensuing political storm which followed, the Reagan Administration
abandoned this approach. MEAD, supra note 14, at 134.
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Substantial reliance on private charity, our model tells us, should
also follow from a static society's reluctance to redistribute income.218
In this, of course, Western society takes advantage of millennia-old
religious teachings and social habits respecting the obligation of those
with income or wealth in excess of their needs to make at least a
portion of this excess available for the relief of those who do not have
enough even to meet their basic needs. 2 " And yet, it need not. There
exist practical and theoretical alternatives. It continues to do so only
by reason of adherence to the "rules" and assumptions of the static
paradigm. 220
The paradigm would predict system indifference with respect to
the manner in which the institutional relief is dispensed—that is, either
by a class of professional case workers or by a proletarianized work
force shorn of any discretionary authority. In either case, the goal of
the system is the transfer of the minimum amount necessary. For
purposes of crafting a static system, the only difference between them
is whether a caseworker will make the determination on the basis of
individualized perceptions of minimal needs, or whether such deter-
minations will be made in gross form by resort to rules and regulations
prescribing such minima. 221 Currently, federal aid is dispensed by a
proletarianized work force whose discretion is sharply limited by stat-
ute and regulation; state systems will tend to follow suit, as the least
expensive alternative for the distribution of relief. 222
218 Gilbert Steiner describes the complexity of this reliance on charity—both positive and
negative charity—in relating the results of the elimination of all fbritts of general assistance in
Clermont County, Ohio in 1961. The result, according to Steiner was not only an increase in the
demands on local charitable organizations, but increases in negative charity as well (late rent,
food on credit and the like). SeeSTEINER, supra note 34, at 9. Even in periods of economic stress,
private charitable efforts do not diminish. See Anita Manning, Charitable Spirit Survives Hard
Times, USA TorlAY, Oct. 16,1992, at DI. Indeed, the nation's political leaders have been in the
forefront of arguing for the expansion of charitable efforts over the last decade or so. See, e.g.,
Bush, supra note 99.
219 See infra Part III.B, Paradigm Archetypes.
220 Indeed, where one hypothesizes a non-static system, one might well argue that private
charity becomes inefficient, and, ultimately superfluous. See, e,g„ Abrams & Schitz, supra note
100; Edley, supra note 103. But see Ellen Winston, Some Aspects of Private Philanthropy in Relation
to Social Welfare, H RESEARCH PAPERS (PHILANTHROPIC PRIM or INTEREST) 677-97 (1975)
(Sponsored by Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, U.S. Treasury Dept.,
1977).
221 Of course, as William Simon has amply demonstrated, even this difference in approach
can substantially affect the benefits available in individual cases. See Simon, Invention, supra note
36, at 34-37; Simon, Towns Without Pity, supra note 133, at 1489-92; Simon, Legality, Bureauc-
racy, supra note 21, at 1201-22.
'a2 For a critical description of the means by which federal categorical aid is dispensed,
primarily AFDC, see Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, supra note 21, at 1201-22.
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IV. LIMITS ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF REFORMATION OF AMERICAN
SYSTEMS OF STATIC POOR RELIEF
I have discussed what a static system is and its likely primary
characteristics when implemented. The model provides a guide for
understanding the nature of the universe in which the static system
builder operates and a description of the parameters of ideal poor
relief systems. The static system builder will tend to tinker with systems
to minimize the difference between actuality and the ideal. However,
as a limited, and perhaps limiting view, the static paradigm requires
the treatment of any significant deviation from the ideal with suspi-
cion.225 As such, the static system builder will tend to restructure pro-
grams which deviate (whether in form or effect) from the static mold
into programs more acceptable from that perspective. In this section,
I will define the characteristics of two principal types of limitations to
the reformation of static systems of poor relief. The first deals with
characteristics which undermine the very foundations on which the
static world-view is based; this I describe as "dynamic" reformation.
These forms of change are taboo under a static regime. The second
deals with that fairly limited universe of approaches to the "problem"
of poor relief that constitutes the sole means of approaching the
reform of static systems.
A. Defining What a Static System is Incapable of Being: A Prolegomenon
to a Dynamic View
At the core of what a static system is not, predictably enough, is
the notion of change. The distinguishing feature of a dynamic ap-
proach is its acceptance of the notion that as a result of intervention,
the problems of poverty, destitution and the like can be eradicatedf 24
Intervention can take many forms. For some, it may involve as little as
the application of certain rehabilitative or therapeutic policies;225 for
223 Among the more spectacular examples of this suspicion of the new is perhaps the reaction
to and ultimate defeat of President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan in the early 1970s, a substan-
tially watered down and perhaps problematic, negative income tax proposal. For a discussion of
the Family Assistance Plan and its ultimate defeat, see DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A
GUARANTEED INCOME: THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN (1973).
mCommentators have, over the years, urged or argued for the adoption of this type of
approach to solve the problem of poverty in the United States. See, e.g., HAVEMAN, supra note 32,
at 29-50; LAMPMAN, supra note 63, at 135-45.
225 See Skocpol, supra note 111, at 411-34.
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others, intervention requires coordinated manipulation of labor mar-
kets and general assistance,226
 or the reduction of the extremes in our
system of income inequality by redistributing wealth. 221 It may even
imply the need to overhaul the social and economic basis of society in
the United States.228
 In all of these notions, the goal is similar—to end
dependency and exploitative economic relationships between groups,
not merely to prevent destitution.
A dynamic approach need not necessarily affect all potential re-
cipients of aid; its concern is principally with unemployed able-bodied
people who are capable of becoming self-sustaining. Those who are
incapable of employment are relegated to mere maintenance under
the more traditional static system, or not thought of much at al1. 226
There are several elements commonly shared by the various propo-
nents of the modern dynamic approach: (i) the desire to change the
mores and attitudes of the targeted group, (ii) the perceived necessity
of providing economic incentives to prod the people whose mores and
attitudes have been changed to take specific concrete actions (ordinar-
ily, to get and keep a job); (iii) the necessity of reducing income
inequality (equality of result), or the need to reduce inequality of
opportunity, or some form of labor or job creation policy, or a combi-
nation of these three.
The first element encompasses the imposition on the targeted
poor of certain rehabilitative, therapeutic or educational services. Such
imposition rests on the theory that the problems of this group are
much more than economic and that the giving of money without
226 see, e.g., WILSON, supra note 14; William J. Wilson, Public Policy Research and The Truly
Disadvantaged"460-81, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS (Christopher Jencks & Paid E. Peterson eds.,
1992); RIMER, supra note 19.
227 See, e.g., SHELDON DANZIGER & DANIEL FEASTER, INCOME TRANSFERS AND POVERTY IN THE
1980s (1984) (advocating creation of form of guaranteed minimum income program to eradicate
poverty); HAVEMAN, supra note 32.
228 See, e.g., PIVEN & CLOWARD, REGULATING, supra note 19, at 345 (advocating reforms in
economic policy "that would lead to full employment at decent wages."). But see l'ivEN &
CLOWARD, NEW CLASS WAR, supra note 40 (where authors take position welfare state is here to
stay, and with it, transformation of American political economy; this is in effect the less desirable
alternative they recognized in REGULATING, supra note 14, at 345-48).
229 There is, after all, little that society can require of people incapable of retaining any kind
of employment. Under a dynamic approach, the notion of need based on condition—lack of a
job, disability, age, and the like—becomes the foundation for the creation of programs which
have the effect of eliminating the possibility for the condition. For instance, rather than provide
maintenance for the respectable poor, a family security program could be developed, providing
benefits for all members of the family in a way that reinforces "flindamental values such as rewards
for work, opportunities for individual betterment and family and community responsibility for
the care of children and other vulnerable people." Skocpol, supra note 111, at 411, 429.
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providing social services increases dependency."" The premises under-
lying the creation of dynamic goals are that most of the recipients of
relief who are potentially employable would work if given the oppor-
tunity, that the only thing standing between these recipients and a job
is proper training and referral to existing jobs, and that, once so
trained and referred, these recipients would become self-sufficient."'
There is a fundamental distinction between these notions and those
of the static system. Some of those favoring the dynamic approach
believe that the poor are desperate to find work, if only there was work
to be had"2 or sufficient information about available work or training
to make one better prepared for available jobs. 2" Contrast the basic
dynamic presumptions with that of those accepting the static notion
of things, the latter of whom tend to believe that unemployment is a
lifestyle choice, not dependent on any extraneous disjunctions be-
tween the potentially employable and the job market. 2"
The second element encompasses the structuring of programs of
poor relief to provide targeted populations with incentives to seek jobs,
training and placement services. Incentives can be positive (provide
more money if the recipient cooperates) or negative (reduce the level
of benefits if the recipient does not cooperate), 2" Dynamic systems,
though, need not be limited to actions directly affecting the poor. The
so-called universalists, for instance, have argued that the dynamic goal
of eradication cannot be achieved without regard to general labor
policy,"" a domain traditionally separated from "poverty" policy. When
related to labor policy, dynamic approaches have also been charac-
23° See HANDLER & HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 106, at 104-05 (roughly speaking, equality
of opportunity view).
231 See MURRAY, supra note 14, at 23.
232 See Marta Tien da & Haya Stier, Joblessness and Shiftlessness: Labor Force Activity in Chicago's
Inner City, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 135 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991)
(study based on Chicago neighborhood; authors conclude number of people who did not want
to work for socially intolerable reasons comprised small subset of unemployed able-bodied
studied); REIMER, supra note 19, at 64-89; Robert J. Lampman, What Does it Do For the Poor?—A
New Test for National Policy, 34 Putt. INTEREST 66 (1974).
235 This is perhaps best exemplified by the thinking that resulted in the creation of the
Manpower Demonstration and Training Act (MDTA, 1962-1973) 42 U.S.C. § 2517 et seq. (1988)
(repealed by Pub. L. 93-203, Title VII, § 714, 87 Stat. 883, Dec. 28, 1973), The Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act (CETA, 1973-1982), 29 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1988) (repealed by
Pub. L. 97-300, Title I, § 184(a) (1), 96 Stat. 1357, Oct. 13, 1982) and the Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA, since 1982), 29 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq. (1988 & Stipp. 11 1990). See MEAD, supra note
14, at 27.
234 See Taylor, supra note 12; supra Part II1A, Critical Assumptions: The Static Paradigm.
255 See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 14, at 154-56.
136 See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON POVERTY AND WELFARE, supra note 13, at 16, 42-45; HAVEMAN,
MOM note 32; WILSON, supra note 14, at 149-59; Neckerman, et al., supra note 22, at 416-19.
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terized by an insistence on the interplay between wage policy and
poverty—a fusion which requires, at a minimum, substantial changes
in the minimum wage structure. 237
 Proponents of dynamic, eradicative
approaches to poor relief believe, in Cass Sunstein's words, that "Di t
is a gross misstatement, even if a fashionable one, to suggest that social
and economic regulation has generally proved unsuccessful." 238
The third element introduces social change into the equation. It
is perhaps in this area, more than in any other, that the dynamic
approach clearly begins to distinguish itself from traditional ap-
proaches. A fundamental goal of this dynamic approach is to make the
poor disappear; that requires the poor not to be poor. The easiest way
to achieve this is to require the better-off to support the less well-off
through taxes or other forms of income redistribution. This can be
accomplished in a variety of ways, all of which are fundamentally
dynamic. These approaches range from the relatively conservative to
the radically transformative, and include negative income tax propos-
als,239
 the increase of income transfers or entitlements based on income
levels and related proposals 240
 and the notions generally of equality of
results for traditionally marginalized groups."' Dynamic proposals are
not necessarily limited to the problems of relative poverty, which can
be corrected by income redistribution. Such programs, as proposed,
also tend to be somewhat universalist—tied to various programs calling
for the restructuring of society, including the redistribution of political
237 See Paula Roberts, Why Don't We Do It Right This Time? Redefining the Welfare Reform
Debate, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1305 (1988). But see CASS. R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 100-101 (1990).
2 "SUNSTF.IN, supra note 237, at 2; see also TASK FORCE ON POVERTY AND WEIXARE, supra note
13, at 28-30 ("The Task Force disagrees with the argument that the growth of social welfare
programs during the 1970s is the major reason poverty rates are so high today." Id. at 28. However,
"(w]e conclude that reforms of the welfare system are an important part of an anti-poverty
strategy. At the same time, however, making work more attractive than welfare will require
attention to the situation of the working poor." Id. at 30.).
239 Proposals for programs of income redistribution were first seriously considered in the
1960s with the introduction of proposals for a negative income tax, which basically were meant
to provide income supplements unrestricted as to use. See, e.g., Sheldon S. Cohen, Administrative
Aspects of a Negative Income Tax, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 678-98 (1969); William A. Klein, Some Basic
Problems of Negative Income Taxation, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 776 (1966); Larson, supra note 180, at
355.
24° See, e.g„ WILSON, supra note 14 (advocating integration of comprehensive labor policy for
all classes and melding of social and economic classes); DAVID T. Ei.t.woon, Poott SUPPORT:
POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1988); Francis F. Piven & Richard A. Cloward, The Contem-
porary Relief Debate, in THE MEAN SEASON: THE ATTACK ON THE WELFARE STATE 45, 99 (Fred
Block, et al, eds., 1987) (advocating creation of comprehensive national system of social provision
for the poor).
241 See, e.g., Richard Delsado, Rodrigo 's Fourth Chronicler Neutrality and Stasis in Anti-Discrimi-
nation Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1933).
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and economic power through programs affecting substantial portions
of the society."' Such a restructuring is needed, proponents argue,
because poverty is a structural component of our form of social organi-
zation—the inevitable and ineradicable by-product of our society as
currently organized."'
There is yet no dynamic paradigm. There exists no fully developed
conceptual world view to challenge the reigning static view of reality.
Current dynamic approaches point the way to fundamental change. As
such, they pose a clear threat to the established conceptual order.
Indeed, as I discuss below, these dynamic approaches do not even exist
within any acceptable conceptual framework of the static paradigm. As
a result, they tend to be trivialized, marginalized and rejected as lying
outside the mainstream by paradigmatic thinking seeking to preserve
its intellectual hegemony.
B. Static Systems and Limitations on the Possibilities of Change
The underlying notions of the static view largely define the uni-
verse of possibilities available to the static system builder. In this sec-
tion, I develop a model of the "typical" response of static system
builders to a perceived need for the reform or modification of the
system. This general theory of poor relief reformation is derived from
the basic working assumptions which constitute the generally accepted
intellectual framework for dealing with the poor—the governing para-
digm. This general theory of the limitation of poor relief reform
reflects both the strength of the static paradigm and the manner in
which it imposes its views on social and political reality rather than
receiving instruction from it.244
Programs which specifically disrupt the social or economic order
are beyond the bounds of the conceptual framework of such builders.
242 See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 21, at 695-711; FRANCES F. PIVEN & RICHARD A. CL,OWARD,
POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 264-359 (1977).
243 See, e.g., PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 14.
244 Thus, paradigms are not powerful in an objective sense. Rather, paradigms, such as the
static paradigm, derive their power from their ability to distort, or at least bend, the shape and
limitations of perceived reality is derived from the works of Thomas Kuhn. See Ku HN, COPERNICAN
REVOLUTION supra note 2. As John Steinbruner has noted:
Ptolemaic astronomy formed a paradigm which governed science for many centu-
ries, and men in those centuries held it to be just as compelling as we now hold
the governing paradigms of modern science to be. The Ptolemaic paradigm, how-
ever, was ultimately discarded as other powerful ones have been, and that experi-
ence emphasizes the degree to which even hard science imposes its views on reality
rather than receiving instructions from it.
STEINBRUNER, supra note 2, at 10 n.5.
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Paradigmatic thinking builds substantial obstacles to such disruptions.
Thus, consider the conceptual filter through which static system build-
ers resist programs that reject the underlying static world view. 245 It is
not the social, economic or political system that is at fault, it is the
recipients. Since jobs are available for all who seek them, there is no
reason to integrate labor policy and policies seeking the eradication of
unemployment among the able-bodied poor. 248 Proposals which seek
to transform the social, political or economic order rarely enter into
the political debate; they remain confined to the rarified (and power-
less) halls of academia. At those rare times that such transformative
proposals rise to political consciousness, they are quickly shorn of their
non-static characteristics and then rejected as dangerous, inadequate
or unworkable. That, certainly, was the fate of President Nixon's nega-
tive income tax Family Assistance Plan in the 1970s. 247 Thus neutral-
ized, radicalism is confined within static notions of the acceptable. As
I explore more closely in Part V, what passes for acceptable radicalism
in the static view are efforts to make the poor more "responsible."
Poor relief, therefore, remains focused on the poor themselves.
Since the able-bodied have made a vicious, or at least unenlightened,
lifestyle choice, the correction lies not with the system, but with the
re cipien t. 248 Reforms will then likely take the form of punishment and
compulsion, although these may often be couched in therapeutic lan-
guage. Static programs will be modified to compel desired behavior
more efficiently, that is, to substitute employment, any employment,
245 See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Economics and Politics of Race, 91
MICR. L. REv. 1183 (1995).
246 See MURRAY, supra note 14. (In proposing that welfare be eliminated, Murray argues that
because benefit payments exceed what recipients could receive in real wages in labor market, the
only way to induce able-bodied to work, and control their tendency to breed, is to eliminate most
of these benefits. Id. All former recipients will then have incentive, previously lacking, to take
jobs available, and jobs available would employ all who needed work in world where alternative
to work is starvation. Id.). MEAD, supra note 14, at 4, 61 (since even most rudimentary types of
jobs are available for substantially all who seek them, unemployment is far more a function of
pickiness than of an inability to find work.). See id., at 73, 76-82.
247 For a discussion of the rise, transformation, evisceration and defeat of the Family Assis-
tance Plan, see DANIEL P. Movt•mtax, THE POLITICS OF GUARANTEED INCOME: THE NIXON
ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE, PLAN (1973).
248 See Edward Weisband, Introduction, in POVERTY AMIDST PLENTY: WORLD POLITICAL. ECO-
NOMIC AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 7, 8-9 (Edward Weisband ed., 1989). Thus, the poor are
incapable of bettering themselves because they are unable to speak standard English. See.
Frederick Williams, Some Preliminaries and Prospects, in LANGUAGE AND POVERTY: PERSPECTIVES
ON A THEME 1, 8-9 (Frederick Williams ed., 1970). The poor remain on welfare because they
refuse to take available jobs. See MEAD, supra note 14, at 76-82. The poor do not accept or model
their behavior in accordance with the norms of the middle-classes in American society. See. GILDER,
supra note 14, at 79-98; Mu:17a, supra note 86, at 120-179.
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for institutional maintenance. Adjustment of the benefit levels avail-
able to the poor and required attendance at what are thought to be
job prospect enhancing programs are the forms which compulsion will
most likely take.249
Compulsion of the type of which I speak is substantially punitive.
That is clear enough from the use of benefit level adjustments as a stick
to compel behavior. Punishment also takes more direct routes. Static
reform efforts tend to permit criminal proscription of disapproved
conduct, such as sleeping in the streets, urinating or washing in public,
public intoxication, 250 prostitution and, in some jurisdictions, fornica-
tion, adultery and other forms of deviant conduct as wel1. 25 '
As components of an essentially residualist and minimalist system,
"reforms" will also tend to revolve around the need to save money. The
more money is spent, the more taxes must be raised, and the larger
the redistributive effect of the program. Consequently, reforms will
tend to focus on cost-savings features. These would likely include
narrowing the definitions of the eligible population,252
 or the modifica-
tion or elimination of minimum maintenance levels for the poor, 255 or
the imposition of work or conduct requirements as a prerequisite for
aid. 254
 These reductions can take various forms: for instance, the elimi-
249 GUERON & PAULY, supra note 209, review a number of such programs.
259 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 207, at 417-25, 429-31, 456; Simon, supra note 133, at 632-33,
645-47. •
251
 Mississippi appears to lead the nation in direct reforms in this regard. Its legislature is
considering a proposal to require welfare mothers with more than four children to submit to
mandatory birth control. See Mississippi Proposes, sulora note 210. It is argued that the tearing
down of traditional gender roles and sexual conduct proscriptions, especially where such result
in fornication and illegitimate births, are part and parcel of the reasons there exists so much
poverty: a man without a wife and child to support has little reason to get and keep a job, or even
to marry the woman with whom he breeds. See GILDER, supra note 14.
252 PI'VEN & CLOWARD, supra note 14, at 161 ("Keeping people off the [welfare] roles is the
main method by which relief administrations keep costs down and ward off public attack."). One
method of controlling the size of the eligible population is to require that the recipients have an
address. This requirement, however, has been successfully challenged in California. See Nelson v.
San Diego County Bd. of Sup'rs., 235 Cal. Rptr. 305 (Cal. App. 1987). States have attempted to
reduce the size of the eligible population in others ways: for instance, by income deeming—treat-
ing the income of relatives as available to the recipient for purposes of determining income
eligibility. This also has been successfially challenged on occasion. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Alameda
County Bd. of Sup'rs., 130 Cal. Rju•. 189 (Cal. App. 1976). '
255 This is precisely the goal of the California welfare restructuring proposal I examine in
some detail in Part V, Government Accountability and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1992, California
Proposition 165.
254 See, e.g., MEAD, .supra note 14, at 144-47; Elizabeth Neuffer, Cash-Hungry States Revamp
Welfare, BOSTON GLOBE, July 22,1992, at I (describing various behavior and work habit modifica-
tion goals of several state reform proposals being considered in summer of 1992); infra note 257.
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nation of cost of living increases, 255 or of benefits tied to the number
of children in the household, or capping the number of months a
person may be eligible to receive aid. 255 All such reductions, or efforts
in that direction, will also be tied to efforts to vest local officials with
greater discretion with respect to determining eligibility and setting
benefit levels. 257 These types of reforms form a central part of President
Clinton's efforts to teach the idle poor some "responsibility."'" Addi-
tionally, states and localities will tend to tie benefits to federal pro-
grams, primarily because more of the financial burden would then be
borne by someone else, in this case the federal government.
Lastly, static notions of poor relief encourage the belief that mone-
tary savings can be achieved by increasing the participation of private
charitable groups. These types of reform were made the central tenet
of former President Bush's program for the revitalization of the federal
welfare programs—the so-called "thousand points of light" cam-
paign.'" Reliance on the belief that private charity is available to "fill
the void" makes it easier to reform by a process of selective elimination.
Thus, institutional reform can be characterized by the tendency to
eliminate eligibility for selected categories of people, to reduce benefit
255 Reductions of cost of living increases can take at least two forms. In one guise, the state
will pay newly arrived residents no more than the benefits to which they were entitled in the state
in which they previously resided. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 49.19 (11m)(a) (West Supp, 1992);
Proposed Law: The Government Accountability and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1992, California
slate initiative measure submitted for voter approval in accordance with CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 8
on November 3, 1992 as Proposition 165, § 7. In another guise, the state directly reduces or
eliminates any automatic adjustments in benefit levels based on any cost of living indicator. See
infra Part V.B, Examining the Limits of Static Systems: The Example of California Proposition 165.
Wisconsin's enactments in this regard have been self-consciously aimed not at rehabilitation but
at cost reduction, Thus, its statute provides for the evaluation of some of its programs to
determine whether they deter "persons from moving to this state, ." Wis. STAT. ANN, § 49.19
(am)(2)(e) (Supp. 1992).
256 For instance, in 1992, the Oklahoma Department of Human Services proposed that aid
levels be reduced for all recipients, with greater reductions for able-bodied recipients, and that
assistance be limited to two years. Wayne Greene, Board Kicks off New Philosophy of Welfare,TuisA
Wolu.n, Sept. 1, 1992, at Al. One year later, the Department continued to push its program. See
Wayne Greene, Reform Plan Sets Curbs on Welfare, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 27, 1993, at Al (three year
limit on welfare benefits). New jersey has actually enacted such benefit limitations as part of its
public assistance programs. See NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 44:10-19 to -33 (West 1993).
257 This, of course, is precisely what the courts in jurisdictions like California have attempted
to eradicate. See generally, Bensinger, supra note 35.
256 President Clinton has proposed a two-year maximum for welfare benefits. Such benefits
would be terminated after two years if the recipient has failed to secure a job, and a government
job would be substituted for the benefits. For a description of the plan, see PuocitzssivE Policy
INsTfTuTE, MANDATE FOR CHANGE 217-36 (W. Marshall & M. Schraw cds. 1993).
259 Bush, supra note 99; see also supra note 111.
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levels below that determined to be minimally required by the very
institution that implements the reduction or to reject calls for increas-
ing benefits even to levels below the poverty line. Static systems will
also seek reforms that make more efficient the manner in which
private charitable contributions are actually received by the poor. This
course of reform has been prominent on the agenda of static reformers
since the Tudor period in England.266
 In our own time, the problems
of fraudulent solicitation, to take one example, generate much legisla-
tive concern.261
Irrespective of the details, the conceptual framework of reform
will be limited to refinements to the basic implementary model of
relief—the provision of things for the physical maintenance of the
poor. It rejects any attempt to proceed on the basis of a program that
abandons the basic notion that people get what they deserve, and that
the deserving will take care of themselves, absent physical or mental
incapacity. Static reform will not take the form of any significant re-
structuring of the basic delivery mode for relief. Such attempts might
require, if only to a small degree, the restructuring of the social and
economic order, and that is beyond the consciousness of static system
builders. Radical reform of static systems will tend to resemble that of
California, New Jersey, Wisconsin or Michigan. 262
 A static orientation,
which attempts so little, cannot be expected to measure its reforms or
changes by a larger scale.
V. APPLYING THE MODEL TO DETERMINE THE LIMITS OF CHANGE
The models derived from the static paradigm help explain why
recent attempts to "reform" existing systems are futile, and why efforts
by states to eliminate "poverty" make little real difference. I explore
the nature of this futility first by considering the reasons why current
systems of poor relief do not seem to accomplish their purpose. Then,
by way of example, I will use the model to examine a "reform" proposal
in pure form—the poor relief rules recently proposed and rejected in
California.
26° See, e.g., LEONARD, supra note 127, at 77-78, 206-220; Glazer, supra note 34, at 1-17,
133-39, 168-92; tenBroek, supra note 85, at 265-70.
261 See, e.g., Richard Steinberg, Economic Perspectives on Regulation of Charitable Solicitation,
39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 775 (1988
-89).
262
 See infra Part V.13, Examining the Limits of Static Systems: The Example of California
Proposition 165.
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A. Explaining the Disjunctions Between Goals and Implementation; why
don't current systems of poor relief seem to accomplish their purposes?
At least since the end of the Second World War, and especially
since the declaration of the first "War on Poverty" in 1964, 263 govern-
ments at all levels have trumpeted an attempt to abandon the static
paradigm underlying the existing systems of poor relief in favor of
more dynamic, universalist approaches to the problem of poverty and
inequality. This was accomplished by embracing the goal of eradicating
poverty, and abandoning the goal of mere maintenance of the poor
during the period of their poverty. These efforts have centered on the
numerous federal categorical aid programs,'" which have served as the
testing ground for this new approach. In recent years, mostly in re-
sponse to growing concern about the cost of poor relief, states have
mimicked federal efforts by lacing statements of the primary goals of
their poor relief programs with eradicative notions. These state at-
tempts have been similar to their federal counterparts. For the sake of
simplicity I concentrate on the response of the states through their
respective general assistance programs. 265 State poor law changes op-
265 President Johnson announced the "War on Poverty" in January, 1964, in connection with
the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq. and repealed in 1981). See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 14, at
256-59,258 n.7,
264 For a description of federal categorical relief programs, through the early 1980s, see, SAR
A. LEVITAN & CLIFFORD M. JOHNSON, BEYOND THE SAFETY NKr: REVIVING THE PROMISE OF
OPPORTUNITY IN AmEitic..k (1984). For a discussion of changes since the early 1980s, see Handler,
supra note 6, at 501-23.
265
 Recall that federal categorical grant programs are administered by state welfare depart-
ments along with state general assistance programs. As William Simon has noted, the . develop-
ments affecting each of these programs correspond to analogous developments in the others. See
Simon, supra note 21, at 1201. But, Theodore Marmor and others have argued that the federal
programs of categorical assistance are often the contradictory product of evolving compromises
among four different views of the purposes of poor relief: behaviorist (poor law insist induce the
poor to behave in a more socially acceptable manner), residualist (poor law must provide
subsistence for those who are unable to provide for themselves at that level), social insurance
(poor law must provide economic security, prevent destitution rather than rescuing the fallen),
and egalitarian/populist (poor law is a means to redistribute income and overcome the evils of
modern capitalism). Maumou Er AL., supra note 10, at 23-31. From the perspective of the theory
1 have developed, the static orientation and American systems of poor relief certainly encompass
Marmor's behaviorist and residualist tendencies. 1 believe, however, that American systems of
poor relief to the able-bodied, primarily state general assistance and public assistance programs,
say or speak the language of social insurance, especially when enunciating the purpose of poor
law programs. Such programs, however, incorporate neither the social insurance nor the egali-
tarian/populist basis of program structuring—both principally dynamic approaches. That is not
to say that social insurance programs do not exist. Certainly the social security and unemployment
insurance programs are conceived as social insurance programs—eligibility is based on contribu-
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pear to have been implemented in a variety of forms, essentially by
legislative fiat, overlaying the goals and programs of the more dynamic
orientation to poor relief upon the existing static poor relief systems. 266
Despite this flurry of legislation, the general sense among both
academics and the "common folk" is that these new goals have not
been achieved; 267
 poor relief programs, as reconstituted, have not de-
creased the number of "dependent" poor either in absolute or relative
terms.'" This is particularly the case with recently enacted workfare
programs:269
 Why do these refocused systems seem to have failed? 27°
tion. Contributions under either program, however, are not necessarily sufficient to meet outlay
requirements.
266 At the state level the overlay of dynamic considerations has been crude. California
provides a good example. See infra note 283.
267 Peterson, supra note 55, at 3, 6; Payne, supra note S (quoting Wayne R. Bryant, author
of New jersey legislation eliminating increases in AFDC benefits to women who have additional
children while receiving benefits as describing AFDC as "cradle-to-grave protection from respon-
sibility... , You can't provide guidance and responsibility when you just hand people a check at
the beginning of the month. Its nothing more than a modern form of slavery.").
The notion of the moral, social or economic bankruptcy of the "welfare" system also has
been the subject of attack from non-traditional ideologues. See JAMES O'CONNER, THE FISCAL
CRISIS OF THE STATE (1974) (especially Chapter 6); PIVEN Be CLOWARD, supra note 14; Alfieri,
supra note 21, at 669.
Traditionalist ideologues argue that the Great Society programs had themselves caused the
exacerbation in the poverty problem, and that the only way to solve the problem is to dismantle
the system, in whole or in part, and restore traditional ways of dealing with the able-bodied poor.
See MEAD, supra note 14; GLAZER, supra note 34.
Even among those who believe that the present system is not a failure, there is a sense that
poverty and the poor are not disappearing. Rather than blame the programs themselves, they
blame conditions over which the programs have no control, for instance: (i) rising average
unemployment rates, (ii) an increase in the percentage of the population in high risk groups
and (iii) a long term trend toward inequality in the distribution of market income. See MARMOR
ET AL., supra note 10, at 114.
268 Thus, reports respecting the failure of the new programs are fairly commonplace. See,
e.g., Cindy Simmons, Capitol Comments, UPI, Sept. 25, 1992 (BC Cycle), available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI file (describing early cancellation of four year study of an innovative welfare program
stressing job training because, some believed, the program proved more costly than traditional
welfare program and people who participated in innovative program tended to stay on welfare
slightly longer than those in traditional program). Moreover, these programs have Failed to reduce
poverty at a time when some research indicates that the economic restructuring of the 1980s has
created a proliferation of low wage jobs, reducing the general standard of living of American
workers. See Bi.tmirone & HARRISON, supra note 32, at 7. But see MeAn, supra note 14, at 73
(even low wage jobs provide basis for eradication of poverty, or at least joblessness). MARMOR ET
AL., supra note 10, at 112-14 (Great Society programs did not affect behavior).
2h9 See, e.g., Joanna K. Weinberg, The Dilemma of Welfare Reform: "Workfare" Programs and
Poor Women, 26 New ENG. L. REV. 415, 442-45 (1991) (arguing California's workfare program
GAIN has done tittle to relieve poverty or recycle unemployed back into work force, in part due
to lack of training and other support); HANDLER & HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 106 (studying
effects and administration of AFDC in a number of Wisconsin counties).
270
 Whether they have failed in fact is another question with respect to which there exists
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While easy answers provide little of value in approaching questions of
this scope, 27 ' the theory I develop might provide at least some insight
into possible explanations. I first examine the nature of the shift in the
focus of poor relief, and then examine the means chosen by govern-
ment to implement this goal in light of the model I have created.
1. Documenting the shift of focus
The extent to which states have modified their goals cannot be
assessed without at. least a glimpse at where they started. Understand,
of course, that, at least to the extent that state general assistance
programs remain independent of increasingly imperialistic federal
categorical relief programs,272 states have not moved in lock step in
refocusing their general assistance programs. Indeed, many states have
made no attempt to change even the official focus of the aid programs.
The traditional goals of state general assistance are quite modest.
State general assistance is meant to relieve and maintain the poor who
are unable to support themselves. It is intended to do no more than
provide that those "who are subject to the recurring misfortunes of life
[will] continue to have such aid and encouragement as the county
alone, the State alone, or the State in cooperation with the federal
government may provide."275
 These traditional statutes describe the
obligation of government to the destitute as one of "relief and support"
when support by any other means is unavailable,274 or as an obligation
to relieve and maintain the poor,275 or to "support the poor."276 The
administrative unit is required to provide care and assistance for the
substantial debate. Compare Muteiuv, supra note 14 (arguing systems have failed in fact), with
Mutsu:as Ea. supra note 10 (welfare systems in the U.S. have not, in fact, failed, if only because
Americans have gotten what they wanted).
271 See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 55, at 3, 24.
272
 Recall that state public assistance programs, by accepting funds from the federal govern-
ment, bind themselves to comply with whatever terms the federal administrators of such programs
require. As such, state public assistance programs reflect more federal desire with respect to the
primary focus of such programs than any independent state desire in this respect. See Simon,
supra note 21, at 1201. The general assistance statutes themselves bear some evidence of the
overtaking of state programs by federal dollars. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. Cone § 26-2-102 (1989),
which explicitly acknowledges the dependence oldie Colorado program for the assistance of the
poor on federal programs.
275 W. VA. CODE § 9-I-1 (1990).
274 See, e.g., CAL. WELE. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-273
(West Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56 § 32 (West 1991); R.I. GcN. LAws § 40-5-1 (1990);
S.D. CoolEmo Laws ANN. § 28-134 (1967); 'Mx. REv. Co/. STAT. ANN, art. 2351(6) (West Supp.
1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.02(1)m (West Supp. 1992).
275 MK REV, STAT. ANN. § 165:1 (1990); ALA. CoNsT. art. IV, § 88 (1977).
276 Miss. Cone ANN. § 43-31-15 (Stipp. 1992).
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indigent, 277
 and, much as in the days of late Tudor England, to super-
vise the poor.278
 Such traditional goals, however, can be ambitious as
well, obliging a state to maintain its poor at a higher level relative to
the non-destitute population. 279
The notion underlying these formulations of the purposes of state
poor relief derives from quintessentially static notions. Poverty is a
mark of individual deficiency or incapacity caused by forces beyond
the power of the individual affected, 28° or the result of a deliberate
repudiation of societal work requirements. 28 ' What the eligible poor
are entitled to are "things"—maintenance, support and supervision.
The poor are not entitled to a reformulation of societal or economic
norms for their benefit. The poor are, however, entitled to supervision;
this is society's way of expressing to the poor their responsibility for
conforming their social and economic behavior to the norms. There
are no surprises here. The poor understand that they will not starve,
although they will not live well (compared to other (productive) mem-
bers of society). The working population will understand that they will
not cause the unemployed to die through neglect, that the poor will
leave them alone to continue to reap the rewards of their productivity,
and that the manner in which aid is given will not induce anyone to
abandon work for maintenance.
Modern goals, like a leaky balloon filled with hydrogen, are simul-
taneously lofty and likely to quickly fall to Earth. The language is lovely,
with a power approaching that of Biblical passages. Restated for mod-
ern sensibilities, the modern goals of general assistance include the
promotion of the welfare and happiness of the people, to "encourage
self-respect, self-reliance, and the desire to be a good citizen, useful to
society."282
 Other statutes declare, in a related vein, the goal of assisting
277 N.Y. Soc. Saay. LAw § 62(1) (McKinney 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. lit. 56 § 32 (West 1991).
279 GA. CODE ANN. § 36-12-1 (Michie 1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-132 (1990).
279 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 2560.01 (West 1992), which obligates the state, among other
things, "to provide an integrated public assistance program for all persons in the state without
adequate income or resources to maintain a subsistence reasonably compatible with decency and
health; and to provide work readiness services to help employable and potentially employable
persons prepare for and attain self-sufficiency and obtain permanent work."
28° MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 3(3) (1991), provides that, The Legislature may provide such
economic assistance and social and rehabilitative services for those who, by reason of age,
infirmities, or misfortune are determined by the legislature to be in need."
551 Thus, a New Jersey Legislator, who is in support of modifications to the state's AFDC
requirements, could state without much opposition that "the most useful thing welfare can do
for the poor is to press middle class values upon them." See Taylor, supra note 12.
2124 CAL. WEi.E. & INST. CODE § 10000 (West 1991). The statute reads, in pertinent part:
It is the legislative intent that aid shall be administered and services provided
promptly and humanely, with due regard for the preservation of family life, and
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those without the means to meet the costs of necessary maintenance
"to attain or retain their capabilities for independence, self-care, and
self-support'"288
 or that of encouraging and assisting the needy "to
achieve economic independence and self-sufficiency." 284 Federal politi-
cal imperatives have not escaped the race toward lofty language. The
rhetoric of federal welfare programs has been strongly laced with
affirmations of "rehabilitation," or "independence and self-support,"
or "responsibility. "285
What do all these inspirational statements mean? Logically
enough, when stripped of their rhetoric, they seem to indicate a well-
intentioned desire to eradicate poverty. They exhibit a desire that the
poor act like the rest of the population; like good middle class working
people, whether they want to or not."' They express the hope that the
able-bodied poor will grow up, leave home and stop mooching off the
rest of the citizenry. The expression, at least, is dynamic. They imply
without discrimination on account of race, national origin or ancestry, religion, sex,
marital status, or political affiliation; and that aid shall be so administered and
services so provided, to the extent not in conflict with federal law, as to encourage
self-respect, self-reliance, and the desire to be a good citizen, useful to society."
Id. Other state codes have similar provisions. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 401 (1968); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 501 (1985).
The purpose of this provision is to express the statutory purpose and legislative intent of the
California Welfare and Institutions Code (§§ 10000-18971), has been employed by California
courts to limit the discretion of counties in connection with the administration of their general
assistance programs. See infra notes 291-92.
255 See Cow. REV, STAT. § 26-2-102 (1989).
284 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-9-101 (1989).
283 This lofty language is meant to sugarcoat the work obligation at the core of all poor relief
schemes. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE WORKING GROUP UN THE FAMILY, THE FAMILY: PRESERVING
AMERICA'S FUTURE 51-58 (1987). For a short discussion of the rhetoric in connection with the
imposition of federal work requirements, and the political nature of such rhetoric, see MEAD,
supra note 14, at 219-33. These euphemisms can easily be used by those who wish to impose
work tests as a condition for the receipt of benefits, as well as by those who wish to provide the
poor with guaranteed incomes. Compare MICKEY KAUS, THE END or EQUALITY 121-48 (1992)
(end to poverty and stigma of relief can only be brought about by forcing poor to work for their
keep) with LAMPMAN, supra note 63, at 155-68 (reducing income poverty through governmental
transfers is worthy goal); and Alfieri, supra note 21, at 678-95 (poor must be entrusted with
responsibility for their own transformation, and eradication of their poverty, through strategies
of empowerment in which poverty has clearly defined but subordinate place).
285 See supra, note 95, quoting New Jersey Assemblyman Wayne R. Bryant in connection with
the debate over New Jersey's revisions to its AFDC program. In arguing in favor of the necessity
for rules eliminating benefit increases for women who breed while on welfare, the Assemblyman
urged that the best thing that the modifications could do would be to press (superior) middle
class values upon the recipients of aid. See Edward C. Bonfield, The Future of the Lower Class, THE
VIEW FROM BELOW: URBAN POLITICS AND SOCIAL POLICY 46,59 (Susan S. Fainstein & Norman
I. Fainstein eds. 1972) (identifying middle class culture as "normal" and those of lower classes as
defective and poorly preparing its members to survival in American political culture).
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wealth redistribution and entitlements,287 notions inimical to the static
vision.
The notions embodied in the "new and improved" hortatory state-
ments of intent suggest static vision overload. How is poverty to be
eradicated under the terms of these statements of goals? Certainly not
by providing the poor with the means of achieving political power, full
employment and financial independence. Not surprisingly, legislatures
have done little to implement these new goals. 288 The most significant
difference between the ancient systems of poor relief and those in
place after the imposition of the new statutory purposes is that the
official statutory compilations of the several states have more words in
them. The result is frustration, consternation, and dissatisfaction. Poor
relief systems are required to travel forward, but walk backwards; they
are, in this sense, conceptually neither here nor there and always ripe
for further reform. On the other hand, we have at least provided our
elected officials with something to do over and over again. I turn next
to a brief examination of the (non) means chosen by legislatures to
effect their new goals.
2. Means Chosen to Implement the Restated Goals
One would suppose that with the changes in the stated purposes
of general assistance would come substantial changes in the means
used to deliver services to the poor. What we discover, instead, is that
state general assistance statutes have not been modified to take into
account their newly restated goals. The result, of course, is that funda-
mentally static systems of relief, designed primarily to maintain and
relieve the poor, are now burdened with the task of eradicating poverty.
The additional burden placed on state general assistance programs,
however, has not been accompanied by any kind of substantial change
in the manner in which the programs are structured or adminis-
tered.289 Even in states which might be considered exceptions, such as
287 See, e.g., Mooney v. Pickett, 94 Cal, Rptr. 279 (1971); Robbins v. Superior Ct., 211 Cal.
Rptr. 398 (1985); infra Part V.11, Examining the Limits of Static Systems: The Example of California
Proposition 165.
288 See MARMOR ET AL., supra note 10, at 228, 231 ("[M]ost programs that make up the
American welfare state have been around for quite a while in one form or another. That form is
constantly changing, but almost never radically, whatever ballyhoo attends this or that amend-
ment.").
281
	 instance, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10000 (West 1991) was first enacted in 1947 and
made applicable to county general assistance obligations, Those obligations, set forth at CAL.
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California, where the courts have attempted to give substantive content
to the otherwise hortatory poverty eradicative provisions, 290 the result
has been not so much a rejection of the static vision of reality as an
attempt merely to expand the minimum levels of benefits and the size
of the eligible population. 291 While such actions could be characterized
WELT, & INST. Coin: § 17000 (West 1991), were first enacted in 1855 and remain substantially
unchanged. See Mooney, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 284. Counties were expected to fulfill the new expecta-
tions using tools created in the nineteenth century and for a purpose fundamentally different
from that newly imposed under the inspiring message set forth in CAL. WELF, & INST. CODE
§ 10000, California courts, however, have applied these hortatory provisions in construing the
general assistance obligations of the counties. See, e.g., Robbins, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 403 n.13 rile
legislative history does not indicate why the Legislature decided that such a statement of statutory
purpose was necessary at the time section 19 was enacted. Accordingly, this court must rely on
the plain meaning of the terms of section 10000 in implementing the provisions of division 9.").
299 See Mooney, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279; Boehm v. County of Merced, 209 Cal. Rptr, 530, 532 (Cal.
App. 1985). See generally, Bensinger, supra note 35, at 521-23, 528-35. Having taken this position,
though, I note that as the static theory would predict, to the extent that decisions such as Boehm
begin to have significant redistributive effect, static system builders will seek to overturn them.
This, essentially, is what the Governor of California and his allies are attempting to do through
Proposition 165, discussed infra in Part V.B, Examining the Limits of Static Systems: The Example
of California Proposition 165.
'91 Courts in three states (Illinois, New York and Montana) have expanded the eligible
population by holding that persons on strike do not refuse employment and therefore cannot
be denied public assistance on that basis. See Lascaris v. Wyman, 292 N.E. 2d 667, 671 (N.Y. 1972);
Strato-o-Seal Mfg. Co. v. Scott, 218 N.E. 2d 227, 230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966); State ex ml. International
Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers v. Montana State Dept. of Public Welfare, 347 P.2d 727,
738 (Mont. 1959).
Several other court decisions in New York have expanded the minimum level of benefits and
the eligible population. In Thrower v. Perales, the court compelled the Department of Human
Services to grant home relief to homeless plaintiffs, and rejected the Commissioner's argument
that homeless shelters are public institutions which rendered homeless persons ineligible for
home relief. 523 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). Furthermore, the court in Shaw v. Wyman
held that a recipient can become temporarily ineligible for aid if he willfully fails to report to a
job interview. 337 N.Y.S.2d 98, 100 (App. Div. 1972). Failure to report, however, is not "willful" if
there is no public or private means of transportation available to the recipient. Id.
The Court of Appeals of Indiana expanded the minimum level of benefits in State ex rel.
Van Buskirk v. Wayne Township, Marion County, 418 N.E.2d 234 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). The court
held that a township trustee cannot deny shelter relief [element of general assistance] to home-
owners because the trustee is obligated to provide any type of aid to provide shelter or to prevent
loss of shelter. Id. at 243. The court also stated that the trustee must provide transportation to
seek and accept employment and provide furniture and utensils, including heating and cooking
stoves, and special medical diets, when eligible individuals are unable to provide such items for
themselves. Id. at 246. In addition, the trustee must do whatever is necessary to restore terminated
heating and utility service in cases of pressing hardship, including repayment of reconnect fees,
Id. at '247.
In Maine, three court decisions have increased the size of the eligible population. See
Beaulieu v. City of Lewiston, 440 A.2d 334, 341 (Me. 1982) (municipality cannot automatically
disqualify applicant for assistance because he is purchaser of shelter); Page v. City of Auburn, 440
A.2d 363, 364 (Me. 1982) (municipalities cannot enact ordinances which automatically disqualify
applicant for general assistance because he voluntarily quit job); Gilman v. City of Lewiston, .524
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as "anti-static" in spirit, they do little to alter the basic purpose of the
system—to sustain the poor, not to eradicate poverty.
Despite the hortatory language now gracing many state public
assistance provisions, state systems of general assistance continue to
deny any relief to employable persons otherwise ineligible for federal
categorical aid programs. Essentially, able-bodied persons without
young children are excluded from such programs.'" Exclusion from
relief does not appear to me to be a therapeutic or transformative
means of ending the poverty of the excluded. Also, as the static model
would predict, the eradicative goals unveiled over the course of the last
forty or so years, much like toys given a small child, to be played with
as long as they are not used to destroy anything, have been neutralized
by transforming them into tools of an essentially static vision. In the
case of the eradicative goals, this means that the attainment of such
goals may not be achieved at the expense of the public fisc, or the
social or economic order.'" Moreover, state general assistance pro-
grams continue to be based, as they have been for millennia, on the
notion that aid to the poor must start with, and largely consist of,
providing for the material needs of the poor, from time to time, and
to the extent needed.
Further, insinuated into new eradicative goals is the ancient static
notion that since unemployment is a vicious lifestyle choice, the eradi-
cation of poverty, if it is to be achieved, must derive largely from efforts
to change the habits of the poor. In effect, the new goals permit
productive members of society to indulge the static fantasy that the
poor are America's noble savages, frightening, burdensome, lazy and
ignorant. 294
 If only they were more like the rest of the working popu-
lation. Eradicative efforts, then, are mostly characterized by static no-
A.2d 1205, 1207 (Me. 1987) (municipality cannot disqualify applicant for general assistance
because he was discharged from employment for misconduct).
The Supreme Court of Nevada also expanded the number of people eligible for public
assistance. Clark County Social Serv. Dept v. Newkirk, 789 P.2d 227, 228 (Nev. 1990) (counties
may not automatically exclude employable persons from eligibility).
Court decisions in Wisconsin have had a similar effect on welfare benefits. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Arteaga v. Silverman, 201 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Wis. 1972) (county may not consider applicant's
past single voluntary termination of employment in determining eligibility for general assistance);
State ex rel. Sell v. Milwaukee County, 222 N.W.2d 592, 595 (Wis. 1974) (statute providing for
general assistance does not prevent applicant with assets from being eligible for benefits).
292 See supra notes 192-208.
293 Thus, eradicative goals means teaching the poor to be responsible; that is, to get a job
and get off the dole. See Payne, supra note 8.
294jENcKs, supra note 32, at 201-03; supra notes 107-12.
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tions of "obligation," that is, the "right" to work. These take the form
of provisions for mandatory 295
 or optiona12" job training programs, job
referral programs297
 and general education programs.298
 At the federal
level, a number of programs exist for the purpose of forcing those who
take other people's money to begin to act more like the people from
whom they take (notice here how static notions inhere in the way we
characterize the "transaction)") by getting married, getting a job, and
becoming "responsible" citizens. 2" None of these programs, however,
focus the efforts of eradication outside of the population to be
"treated" for the disease of laziness, incompetence or ineptitude.
Among the most publicized, and fairly typical of the lot, are proposed
changes to the AFDC provisions of several states, under which benefits
will be terminated after a number of years," or will be denied for
children born to a recipient of aid,"' or will be reduced if the recipient
or his or her children fail to attend school, 802
 or will be reduced to new
residents." From the static perspective, these programs can be char-
acterized as little more than more subtle and sophisticated versions of
295 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 305, para 5/6-1.4 (Smith-Hurd 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 39-709 (d)(B) (3) (Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4316-A (West Supp. 1992); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 256D.051 (3a) (West 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-3-304(3) (1991); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 62, § 405.1(d) (Supp. 1993). For a review of a number of these programs, see GUERON &
PAULY, supra note 209, at 79-191.
296
 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-281a (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-20-13-1
(Burns 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 91(1)(d) (West 1991). For a review of studies of a
number of these programs, see GUERON & PAULY, supra note 209, at 79-191.
297
 See IDAHO CODE § 31-3404 (Supp. 1992); hi. ANN. STAT. ch . 305, para 5/6-1.4 (Smith-
Hurd 1993); KY. REV. STAT. § 205.200(7) (a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 4316-A(1)(B) (West Supp. 1992); MD. SOC. SERV. CODE ANN. § 88A-17A-1(a) (1991);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-3-303(1)(a) (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 405.1(a) (Supp. 1992).
298 See supra note 291.
299
 Federal job training and employment programs are described in LEVITAN, supra note 6,
at 115-41; MEAD, supra note 14, at 121-35. The most recent attempt by the federal government
to induce the poor who receive federal money to work is embedded in the Family Support Act
of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), which seeks to eradicate the poverty of
single mothers through a combination of mandatory work and job training while providing
limited child care.
"pThe Oklahoma Department of Human Services has proposed cutting all welfare benefits
after three years, substituting a job for benefits after the three year period. Wayne Greene, Reform
Plan Sets Curbs on Welfare, TULSA WORLD, Oct, 27, 1993, at AI. Florida sought to limit aid to 24
months, H. 1023, Reg. Sess., 1993 Fla. Laws.
"I See supra note 8 (New Jersey provisions).
502
 See S. 140, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1993 Mich. Laws (AFDC benefits reduced $25 per month
for each Michigan child with more than two unexcused absences). N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-23
(West 1992) (requiring participation in vocational and counselling programs); supra note 8
(Maryland provisions).
393
 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 49,19 (West. Supp. 1992); supra note 8.
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the Statute of Laborers304
 or other ordinances commanding the unem-
ployed to work."'
Consequently, United States society has not rid itself of poverty
nor of the poor. It has no intention of doing so. General assistance
provisions are not administered to "encourage self-respect, self-reli-
ance, and the desire to be a good citizen, useful to society." 306 Such
programs do not assist those without the means to meet the costs of
necessary maintenance "to attain or retain their capabilities for inde-
pendence, self-care, and self-support," 307 nor do they encourage the
needy "to achieve economic independence and self-sufficiency. "308
These programs fail because "economic and demographic changes
have created rapid increases in the number of needy persons who are
homeless or without other necessities of basic existence.""° Perhaps
they are meant to fail, at least in the sense of fulfilling the expectations
they might raise among the poor. That, too, is quintessentially static:
"the options being put before the nation are to continue present relief
arrangements, perhaps modified by measures to shift the local fiscal
burden to the federal government, or to adopt the age-old approach
to relief explosions—namely, the introduction of work-enforcing meas-
ures. It is a poor choice to be sure, but it is the politically real choice
nevertheless." 310
"4 See supra note 151. For a discussion of the and-vagrancy conceptions of modern welfare
laws, and the preoccupation of such law with work requirements, see Margaret K. Rosenheim,
Vagrancy Concepts in Welfare Law, 54 CAL. L. REV. 511 (1966).
505 1n this manner, society indulges itself much like King Canute commanding the sea to stay
put. Obviously, I take the position to the limit. There no doubt are substantial numbers of people
who are aided in significant respects by job training and placement programs. Judith Gueron
and Edward Pauly review the data generated by a number of studies of work incentive programs,
including several "innovative" demonstration projects. They conclude that the studies provide
evidence that welfare to work programs as currently conceived are neither as successful nor as
useless as either the advocates or opponents of such programs would have you believe. Most are
expensive. For a discussion of their conclusions, see, GUERON & PAULY, supra note 208, at 24-39.
3t)6 CAL. Weir. & INST. CODE § 10000 (West 1991).
3°7 See Col.O. REV. STAT. § 26-2-102 (1989).
3t)8 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-9.101 (1989).
309 See TEX. Hum. RES. CODE ANN. § 34.001(a) (1) (West 1990). As some scholars have argued,
these programs also fail because the states have failed to devote substantial resources to solving
the problem. Thus, the argument goes, if the state would devote substantial enough resources to
programs such as job training (or retraining) and placement, the state might well be able to meet
its eradicative goal. See FURNISS & TH,ToN, supra note 27, at 179-83; GANS, supra note 41, at
268-70. To the extent, however, that people continue to lose their jobs, or businesses fail, or
people enter the labor market, the state would have to continue its role as a jobs "clearinghouse"
indefinitely. Poverty, in the sense of people unable to provide for themselves, would perhaps be
substantially reduced, but societal efforts to maintain this state of reduction would have to
continue unabated if this "success" is to have any lasting effect.
3L° PIVF.N & CLOWARD, supra note 14, at 346-47.
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This result should come as no surprise. The static paradigm would
indicate that such systems are capable of only limited function. Recall
that, at most, these limited functions include the sustaining, feeding,
clothing, and housing of the poor. Recall further that, in many static
systems, the institutional aid provided to the able-bodied is substan-
tially more limited than this.3" And yet, these new goals purport to set
a new course for institutional relief, that of eradicating poverty. This
new course is supposed to be navigated by a system which is only
reasonably efficient at delivering material things to those in need.
Charles Murray has described this legislative response to the problem
of poverty "escapism," explaining that "those who legislate and admin-
ister and write about social policy can tolerate any increase in actual
suffering as long as the system in place does not explicitly permit it." s' 2
Perhaps legislators are best able to respond to perceived desires of the
population by telling them what they want to hear, without the bother
of actually having to do what they say they have done. In this sense,
the new eradicative purposes of our poor relief statutes can be best
understood as (an empty) political gesture. They are the words that
hide the inattention to programs left substantially unaltered.'" 3
I have argued that this divergence between dynamic goals and
static systems, the one rooted in change, and the other rooted in
immutability, could help to explain why such reoriented systems did
not seem to "work," that is, to eliminate poverty. 9 ' 4 Contrary to the
common view that these systems do not work well, the theory helps
explain that they work quite well. What they work well at, however, is
the provision of the bare necessities to the qualified poor, not the
eradication of poverty nor the creation of a self-sustaining class of poor.
As long as legislatures are content to change the purpose of ancient
provisions, without adjusting the provisions themselves to meet the
changes in purpose, such measures will continue to function as they
311 See supra notes 291-305 and accompanying text.
512 MulutAv, supra note 14, at 235. Of course, Murray's sweeping proposals to solve the
problem, to dismantle substantially all of the programs in place for the maintenance of the poor;
might be as problematic as the recent legislative proposals to solve the poverty problem by
enacting legislation decreeing this worthy goal. See Mattison, supra note 37, at 93.
313 On the politics of poverty reform rhetoric from a "liberal" perspective, see Malan - z Kr
Al,, supra note 10, at 228-29.
Y"4
	 see SUNS•EIN, supra note 237, at 101, 106-07, 230 (describing perverse results of
regulatory failure in income redistributive welfare programs—they accomplish opposite of their
intended purpose—and describing means of reforming nature of regulation so stated purpose
might be effected).
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always have, the newer purpose ignored, and the determination made,
sooner or later, that the statute fails to meet its new goals. 3 ' 3
B. Examining the Limits of Static Systems: The Example of California
Proposition 165
The theory I have been developing can also help us to understand
why poor law reforms seem to take a static turn, even when the stated
purposes of the reforms are not static. The theory can tell us at least
two things. First, it can help us to understand the limits of the vision
of the static system builders and, in that manner, explain why "reforms"
tend to take a particular path. Second, contextualizing any such "re-
forms" within a governing paradigm helps explain the divergence
between stated purpose and actual goals of such "reforms." 316 Testing
the utility of the theory merely by examining the rhetoric of welfare
reform, which I did in Part A, has provided a glimpse of the manner
in which stasis insinuates itself into reform. I believe it is also useful to
examine the theory's potential as a basis for understanding the limits
of political and legislative rhetoric and reforms by examining a con-
crete attempt at reform. Reform unadulterated by compromise and
expediency can provide us with a clear view of the manner in which
reform operates in a static poor relief context. For this purpose, I have
chosen the representative set of provisions contained in a recent Cali-
fornia voter initiative, Proposition 165, 317
 the Government Account-
ability and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1992 ("GATPA").
315 Of course, the legislature does more than create systems that arc incapable of fulfilling
their stated or popularly conceived purposes. More important, perhaps, is that they create a series
of somewhat lofty expectations on the parts of both the recipients and those whose money is
funding the system. The recipients tend to expect that, by submitting to the peculiar dictates of
the local program, they will obtain work or otherwise achieve the advertised self-sufficiency.
Instead, they find jobs, if they find them at all, which are not good. See the stories of participants
in AULETTA, supra note 86, at 210-19; MEAD, supra note 14, at 149-50.
116
 This result has been seen in the divergence between the restated purposes of many systems
of state general assistance, and the traditional methods of actually dispensing aid. See supra Part
VA, Explaining the Disjunctions Between Goals and Implementation; Why Don't Current Systems of
Poor Relief Seem to Accomplish Their Purposes.
317 Proposed Law: The Government Accountability and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1992,
California state initiative measure submitted for voter approval in accordance with California
Constitution Article II, § 8 on November 3,1992 as Proposition 165. I note, but do not explore,
the context in which Proposition 165 arose. In 1992, California was in the midst of a severe
recession, state government was revenue-starved and the populace was looking for a scapegoat
While exploration of the details of this context adds flavor to the analysis, it does not affect the
analysis, its utility or the result. For further discussion of Proposition 165 in context, see infra,
notes 321-22,363.
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California Proposition 165 consisted of two major parts, which at
first glance do not appear related. Proposition 165 was certified for
voter approval in the November, 1992 general election,'" but failed to
win voter approval for a variety of reasons, many of which probably
had little to do with the poor relief features of the proposition.m A
significant portion of Proposition 165 concerned a redistribution of
power between the governor and the legislature respecting the budget
process and control over state fiscal matters. A significant effect of
GATPA was to alter the manner in which the annual state budget was
adopted and implemented, generally in favor of the governor and at
the expense of the legislature. The governor was to be given until
March 10 to submit a budget proposal to the legislature. Failure by the
legislature to approve a budget by June 15 would result in the suspen-
sion of the salaries and certain privileges and perquisites of the gover-
nor and legislators. If no budget were to be passed by July 1, the
governor would be empowered to declare a state of fiscal emergency
and to impose a budget based on projected revenues, at least until the
legislature passed, and the governor signed, a new budget. 32°
As an integral part of the process of controlling the state budget,
Proposition 165 determined that "the California welfare system must
be substantially restructured to put less emphasis on unconditional
public aid and more emphasis on values fundamental to a free society:
personal responsibility, self-sufficiency, employment and family."821 This
338
 Pursuant to California Constitution Article IV, § 1, "the people reserve to themselves the
powers of initiative and referendum." In all other respects, the legislative power is vested in the
California Legislature. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd, of Equalization,
149 Cal. Rptr, 239 (1978). The California courts recently rejected a challenge to the right to place
the initiative measure, Proposition 165, the "Government Accountability and Taxpayer Protection
Act of 1992" on the ballot. See League of Women Voters v. Eu, 9 Cal, Rptr. 2d 416 (Cal. App.
1992).
319 See Ellis & Jacobs, supra note 7. Proposition 165 failed to win voter approval along with
Proposition 167, the later of which was placed on the ballot by political opponents of Proposition
165 and was aimed at solving the welfare and budgetary problems cited in Proposition 165 by
cutting the state sales tax and significantly raising taxes on wealthier individuals and corporations.
See id.; see also Paul Jacobs & Virginia Ellis, Prop. 165 Lags; Right-to-Die Balloting Close, L.A. Timrs,
Nov. 4,1992, at Al (suggesting as reasons for failure to pass measure (i) opposition by California
Democrats to provisions of Proposition 165 which would have given Republican Governor exten-
sive control over budget process, and (ii) diversion of financial support for measure from
corporate and wealthy individual supporters to effort to defeat of Proposition 167).
32(} GATPA, §§ 4-5, It is easy to see why this portion of the measure might inspire a certain
amount of suspicion and disapproval in a state where the governor and the legislative majority
were members of different parties and with different political agendas. The provisions could easily
be used to usurp the Legislature's budgeting role,
521 GATPA, § 3, This characterization of the proposed reforms as a "substantial restructuring"
would have become a permanent fixture of California law, since GAI'PA required that statement
be written into the state constitution as new article I, § 31.
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restructuring was to be accomplished by reducing governmental poor
relief expenditures. The poor relief provisions of Proposition 165 deal
primarily with the administration of federal programs, and most sig-
nificantly with Aid to Families With Dependent Children ("AFDC") . 322
Proposition 165 also would have effected significant reform of the
California general assistance system. With respect to the reforms pro-
posed affecting both general and public assistance, the proposals are
profoundly static in orientation, aimed primarily at cutting costs, re-
ducing benefit levels and tightening eligibility criteria to decrease the
size of the eligible class. As such, and despite the lofty purposes set
forth in Section 10000 of the California Welfare and Institutions
Code,323 the modifications would have strengthened the general assis-
tance program's primary goal of maintaining the poor as cheaply as
possible, and do little, if anything, to "encourage self-respect, self-reli-
ance, and the desire to be a good citizen, useful to society." Indeed,
the conceptualization of welfare reform as a subset of overall fiscal
reform related to the state's budget process, which was confirmed by
the California appellate courts in certifying Proposition 165 for voter
approval, is strong evidence of the reformers' adherence to the limi-
tations inherent in the static paradigm.324
I. Public Assistance Reforms
The public assistance provisions of Proposition 165 ostensibly con-
centrate on what is termed "flexibility." 325 At least in California, flexibil-
3'4Z See GATPA §§ 6-9, and infra notes 343-54.
323 CAL. Wv.i.r. & INST. CODE § 10000 (West 1991).
324 GAT1'A § 2, explicitly merges the provision of aid to the poor and governmental fiscal
policy. It declares that "California's fiscal imbalance is also reflected by a growing social imbal-
ance. In the past few years, welfare caseloads have escalated at a growth rate four times faster
than our general population.... This is why welfare reform and budget reform are one and the
same." Id. See infra note 350 for the text of this provision. Indeed, the major hurdle for those
who sought to prevent the proposition from appearing on the ballot was to show that the welfare
provisions of the proposition were unrelated to the budgetary provisions. Under the "single
subject rule," an initiative may not be brought for a vote unless its provisions cover only a single
subject. This rule is satisfied if the initiative's "provisions are either functionally related to one
another or are reasonably germane to one another or the objects of the enactment" Harbor v.
Deukmejian, 240 Cal. Rptr. 569, 582 (1987). The court in League of Women Voters rejected this
contention, finding that the welfare provisions are reasonably germane to the stated purpose of
the initiative. 9 Cal. Rptr. 416, 423 (Cal. App. 1992). "The budget balancing objective of GATPA
is also served by restoring to the government the power to make annual adjustments in expen-
ditures under the state welfare system, which the initiative identifies as a primary engine of
budgetary imbalance." Id.
325 According to its proponents, "GATPA seeks to introduce flexibility and reduce expendi-
tures in the slate welfare system, a program which constitutes a major force driving the budget
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ity translates into budgetary flexibility requiring the elimination of
statutorily mandated cost-of-living increases in grants for AFDC, Sup-
plemental Security Income/Supplemental State Program (SSI/SSP)
and In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS)."' Substituted for the cost-
of-living increases would be a system based on annual redeterminations
by the California Department of Social Services to be based on pro-
jected caseload and the amount appropriated in the annual budget. 327
In effect, federal categorical poor relief would be based on the ability
of the state to pay, rather than on the needs of all of the potentially
eligible population.
Flexibility would also require an absolute reduction of welfare
expenditures by reducing maximum AFDC grants by 10% during the
first six months of eligibility and an additional 15% thereafter."' In-
creases in AFDC grants would be prohibited with respect to children
conceived while the mother was receiving benefits, certain benefits
afforded pregnant women would be eliminated and teenage mothers'
grants would be restricted. 329 In addition, the initiative would require
certain behavior from recipients. Parents under nineteen years of age
would receive a $50 per month increase in benefits if they attended
school with fewer than two unexcused absences per month. Failure to
meet this requirement would result in a $50 per month reduction in
benefits."" Mothers under eighteen years of age would also be required
to live with their parents or legal guardians."' New California residents
out of balance yet which is still susceptible to legislative control." League of Women Voters, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 419.
326 GATPA, §§ 7, 8, 16-18.
327 /d. § 12.
328 Id. § 7. Other states are considering similar reforms of their categorical aid programs. See,
e.g., U.B. 1023, Reg. Sess., 1993 Fla. Laws which would cut AFDC benefits for all recipients in an
effort to foster seff-sufficiency.
329 GATPA, §§ 6-7. This is similar to a proposal currently under consideration in Florida. See
H.B. 1023, Reg. Sess., 1993 Fla. Laws, eliminating benefit increases for children born to an AFDC
recipient. Currently New jersey is the only jurisdiction that has successfully enacted a program
restricting benefit increases fur children born to AFDC recipients. A number of jurisdictions
besides Florida are currently considering similar proposals. See supra note 8.
330 GATPA, § 9. Other states have enacted or considered similar programs. See, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 44:8-114 (West Stipp. 1992), which requires recipients with children over two years of age
to attend educational programs; see also infra note 365. A Michigan reform proposal, titled the
"Higher Attendance in Michigan's Schools Act," is similar to GATPA § 9, except that it imposes
a school attendance -requirement on the children of AFDC recipients rather than on the recipi-
ents themselves. S.B. 140, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1993 Mich. Laws. For a discussion or other
programs, sec supra note 8. A number of such programs are also examined in GuEttoN & P Auu ,
supra note 209, at 107-20.
331 GATPA, § 6. This provision, of course, would indirectly, but effectively, overrule Bernhardt
v. Alameda County Board of Supervisors, 130 Cal. Rptr. 189 (Cal. App. 1976), which prohibited
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would be eligible for benefits in an amount no greater than the maxi-
mum to which they had been eligible in the state of prior residence
for the first twelve months of residence in California.'" Mothers would
also be encouraged to identify the fathers of their children in order to
qualify for AFDC, presumably so that the fathers would have to bear
their fair share of the expense of raising their children."'
Clearly, the proposed changes to the administration and funding
of the state's public assistance programs demonstrate its substantial
static orientation. The primary purpose of the proposed modifications
is cost savings."' Note that the static bent of the "reforms" is not so
much the attempt to reduce the costs of the administration of the
system of relief per se, but the implementation of this cost-cutting ethos
by reducing the amount of funds the state would be willing to devote to the
maintenance of the poor. Thus, in California, cost savings are effected in
a manner a static view based theory would predict: (i) a uniform
reduction of benefits across the board, (ii) a reduction in the size of
the class to be benefitted (recall the static system's tendency to politi-
cize the definition of eligibility), and (iii) a limitation of benefit in-
creases by tying such increases, not to need, but instead to whatever
amount might be allocated for that purpose by the legislature. The
parallels to the Elizabethan Poor Law are striking. Provisions for the
identification of the fathers of bastards occupied a central place in the
Elizabethan scheme, primarily as a means of decreasing the fiscal
burden on the state with respect to the care and raising of these
children."' Similarly, a rudimentary settlement scheme is attempted as
a means of controlling the migration of the destitute to California by
limiting the grants of new residents. The purpose, to discourage wel-
fare shopping and the influx of beggars and vagrants to the state,
mirrors the purpose underlying the settlement provisions of Tudor law.
These changes fall most significantly on women with small chil-
dren, a category of poor once thought deserving because they were
the enforcement of a regulation which effectively required young adults to live with their parents
by limiting their eligibility for general assistance to all but exceptional cases. A similar provision
has been adopted in Wisconsin. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.19(4e) (a) (West Supp. 1992). Texas is
considering a similar proposal. See H.B. 54, 73rd Leg., Reg. Sess., 1993 Tex. Laws.
"2 GATPA, § 7. A similar provision has been enacted in Wisconsin. Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 49.19(11m) (a) (West Supp. 1992). Texas is considering a similar proposal. See H.R. 54, 73rd
Leg., Reg. Sess., 1993 Tex. Laws.
5" GATPA, § 15.
"4 Id. § 2; see League of Women Voters v. Eu, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 416, 423 (Cal. App. 1992); supra
Part III.A, Critical Assumptions: The Static Paradigm.
995 See tenBroek, supra note 85, at 284-86; supra Part III.B, Paradigm Archetypes.
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deemed incapable of working (recall that women with young children
were expected to devote their energies to nurturing their children),
but now "reclassified" as able-bodied workers who have chosen not to
work. Since they are now deemed capable of supporting themselves,
they should do so with all available speed. Indeed, GATPA § 2 makes
clear the reason for these provisions by declaring that "every citizen
also has an obligation to do their best to contribute to the welfare of
society." Clearly, the static social order has made a choice for the
able-bodied, including women with young children: they can best con-
tribute to society by fulfilling their Biblical obligation to work, and by
ignoring the Biblical injunction to breed.
Thus, closely bound with the desire to reduce costs, is the quin-
tessentially static notion that the able-bodied have a duty to work, that
their failure to work is a deliberate life-style choice, and that, but for
the exaggeratedly high level of benefits, the able-bodied would seek
productive employment. People have the right to work; they have no
right to relief. 'Welfare must be returned to its proper role as a
transition to gainful employment and self-determination and must
include an element of mutual obligation between government and the
recipient.""6 GATPA § 2 further characterizes the nature of this rela-
tionship between the state and the pauper: "We believe that the State
has a responsibility to look after the welfare of individuals in need. But
we declare that every citizen also has an obligation to do their best to
contribute to the welfare of society."
The behavior modification provisions of the act also demonstrate
the static orientation of the authors of the GATPA. The purposes of
those provisions are basically punitive. As with every static system, we
expect that the poor's right to receive benefits is conditioned on
"productive" activities. Breeding while on the dole, failure to attend or
finish school, and refusal to arrange one's living arrangements to suit
the state (i.e. refusal of teenage parents to live with their parents) are
all punished, primarily by reducing benefits. Again, the problem is not
conceived of as originating with defects in the social or economic
system; the problem is that the state is put in the uncomfortable
position of having to support society's "losers," and it will fulfill this
obligation as cheaply as possible. Thus, in proposing GATPA, Governor
Wilson acknowledged that he would be accused of being elitist, racist,
callous and uncaring, but countered, "Do they (his critics) think it is
336 GATPA, § 3, adding CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
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fair that working families pay for welfare benefits that have grown twice
as fast as their family incomes?" 337
GATPA was billed as a substantial restructuring of traditional wel-
fare. 538
 As applied to federal relief programs, however, it is not. What
any of the proposed changes have to do with anything but run-of-the-
mill cost control in the face of an ever-increasing demand for services,
is speculative at best. The modifications do not alter the essentially
static orientation of the federal categorical grant system as adminis-
tered in California: that the poor be given the minimum necessary in
a manner that will not disturb the economic status quo. Indeed, the
GATPA's principal proponent, Governor Wilson, quite self-consciously
declared that its purpose is to ensure that the social and economic
status quo must be protected against the destabilizing effect of spend-
ing for the inaintenance of the poor. "California will lose more jobs
unless we work to provide fundamental reform to the business climate.
Part of that is fundamental budget reform and control of state spend-
ing. That reform is the California Taxpayers Protection Act."339 Califor-
nia provides, in this instance, an archetypal example of the use of the
Biblical work imperative recast in modern socio-economic jargon, cou-
pled with the notion that abandonment of this work imperative is
socio-economic disaster. 34°
2. General Assistance Reforms
GATPA's flexibility also has a decidedly static feel with respect to
the proposed general assistance reforms. Under GATPA, county boards
of supervisors, currently charged with the administration and funding
of general assistance, would be given sole discretion to set general
assistance levels, taking into consideration the availability of funds and
337
 Vice Kerslter, Big Drive to Cut Welfare: Wilson Plans Initiative for 1992 Ballot, SAN FRAN.
CHRON., Dec. 10, 1991, at Al.
338
 See supra, note 323.
339 Pete Wilson, Address to the Valley Industry and Commerce Association of Woodland Hills,
California (n.d.), in Skelton, supra note 12.
310
No matter how tempting it may be to declare that everyone ought to have his
"needs" fulfilled without regard to "effort, thrift or foresight," only a society bent
on self-destruction or radical change of economic and political structure would
create incentives for individuals or homilies deliberately to avoid private provision
of those items which the society itself has officially declared to be minimum goods.
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 SUP. Cr.
Rev. 41, 72 (1972).
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the projected caseload."' The county supervisors' discretion would be
limited in at least one respect, however—general assistance levels could
not be set at amounts greater than that available to the recipient
(assuming that the recipient was eligible) under the AFDC program in
California."' In effect, the state department of social services, by setting
maximum levels of AFDC, would have the power, albeit indirectly, to
set maximum general assistance levels as well. In addition, the general
assistance provisions would be amended to make explicit that eligible
persons could not double-dip, by making recipients of AFDC payments
ineligible for general assistance."'
These provisions attempted to modify the way in which California
provided general assistance in two significant respects. First, they re-
stricted the ability of a county to seek reimbursement from the state
for increases in the size of the general assistance population which
might result from the diminution of the size of the population eligible
for federal categorical relief."' The restriction would have been ef-
fected by permitting counties not to increase their general assistance
budgets, even if the size of the eligible pool increased dramatically.
141 GATPA, § 19. That section acids a new subsection (b) to CAL. WELF & INST. CODE § 17000,
which would provide, in relevant part, that:
Notwithstanding Section 10000 and subdivision (a), the level for general assistance
grants or in kind aid, if ally, provided by a county or city and county for the relief
and support of incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated by
age, disease or accident shall be set by the Board of Supervisors in its sole discretion,
taking into consideration the availability of county or city and county funds lion such
aid and the projected caseload, and shall not exceed the grant available to the same
size family unit receiving aid pursuant to [federal aid programs].
112
 Id § 19.
349 id. § 19, which would have amended CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17020 (West 1991), which
currently provides that any person eligible for state administered federal aid programs "shall not
be eligible for monthly payments provided pursuant to this part if the maximum payment
standard established by county pursuant to Section 17001 exceeds the payment level established
pursuant to [the state administered federal programs.]"
344 •his arises from a peculiarity of California taw which compels the slate to reimburse
counties for "costs mandated by the state." CAt.. GOV'T CODE § 17561 (West Supp. 1993). "Costs
mandated by the state" include "any increased costs which a [county] is required to incur . , . as
a result of any [state] statute . . . which mandates a ... higher level of service of an existing
program. . ." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 17514 (West Supp. 1993). There is a question regarding
whether the state may be required to reimburse counties for increased general assistance pay-
ments resulting from changes to stale eligibility requirements for non-county welfare programs,
such as AFDC. See League of Women Voters v. Eu, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 416, 423-24 (Cal. App. 1992).
As a result of the changes to the general assistance provisions, county governments would
not be required to increase spending on general assistance as a result of the state cutbacks
proposed in GATPA. Consequently, as a legal matter, no obligation for state reimbursement would
arise under CAL. Cov'T CODE § 17561 (West Supp. 1993).
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Thus, the provisions permitting county supervisors to set general assis-
tance levels, not with respect to the needs of the poor, but primarily
with respect to the availability of funds, would have permitted the
county to reduce the amount of aid it was required to give the poor.
The obligation to supplement inadequate levels of county assistance
would be foisted on someone else, most likely private charity. The ease
of this conclusion betrays its static underpinnings.
Second, the manner in which this elimination of the reimburse-
ment requirement was effected would have substantially overturned a
number of recent California cases which had held to the contrary."'
In effect, the modification to the general assistance provisions would
permit counties to revert to a system of determining aid levels pre-
viously held in violation of the general assistance provisions by Califor-
nia courts. In City of San Francisco v. Superior C,ourt, 346
 the court held
that the method by which San Francisco set general assistance levels—
by dividing the amount the city administration allocated to general
assistance by the estimated number of recipients 347—failed to meet the
county's obligations under the California general assistance statutes.
According to the San Francisco court, counties were required to adopt
standards upon which adequate assistance levels could be determined,
and to set assistance at a level high enough to meet the minimum
subsistence levels of the eligible population. 318
 Under Proposition 165,
the focus would shift away from
 minimum subsistence levels to the
relationship between the "availability of funds" and the pool of eligible
recipients. Furthermore, the amount of funds available would be a
direct function of the desire of the county to tax itself." 9
The reforms described in Proposition 165 were primarily directed
at cutting governmental expenses."° This is a fundamentally static form
345 See supra notes 29 1 -9 2 .
346 128 Cal. Rptr. 712 (Cal. App. 1976).
347 This, of course, yielded an amount significantly below estimates of the minimum required
to exist at a subsistence level in San Francisco, and also below that accorded to general assistance
recipients in neighboring counties. See City of San Francisco, 128 Cal. Rptr. 715. How was the
difference supposed to be made up? Naturally enough, as in a good static system, by reliance on
the large and active community of private charitable organizations.
343 See City of San Francisco, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17.
349
 Lower tax burdens related to welfare expenditures would, it was hoped, reverse the trend
of the state's taxpayers to flee the state and its growing tax burdens. See GATPA, § 2.
35°The purposes of GATPA were set fbrth in 1 2, which provided, in relevant part:
Despite repeated attempts by the people to limit the size of government programs,
the public sector continues to grow faster than our ability to pay for it. California's
taxpayers must now work well into the fifth month of the year to earn enough
income to pay all our taxes.
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of relief. GATPA focused on the needs of the poor, at least with respect
to the legislative obligation of the general assistance and public assis-
tance programs in California to be administered to "encourage self-re-
spect, self-reliance, and the desire to be a good citizen, useful to
society,"351 only to the extent that it declared that "every citizen also
has an obligation to do their best to contribute to the welfare of
society."352 With respect to recipients who meet this obligation, the state
would be willing "to look after the welfare of [those] individuals in
need."'" California then, like other states facing the same "problems,"
would then encourage self-reliance and the desire to be a good citizen,
useful to society, by enforcing the recipient's obligation to work."'
Proposition 165, then, shares the view of the static system builders
that it is not the system that is at fault for creating or sustaining poverty;
rather, able-bodied recipients have only themselves to blame for their
condition. Since the able-bodied have made a vicious, or at least un-
enlightened, lifestyle choice, they, and not the system, require correc-
tion. 35  GATPA, as expected, attempted to modify the system in place
This is a burden that can only become More and more onerous, The reasons why
arc autopilot spending programs, or entitlements—the prime engine driving Cali-
fornia's perennial overspending.
California's fiscal unbalance is also reflected by a growing social imbalance. In
the past few years, welfare caseloads have escalated at a growth rate kitr times faster
than our general population.
While California's tax-receivers grow quickly in numbers, California taxpayers are
starting to flee our State. This leaves California with proportionally fewer taxpayers,
and State government in a perpetual budget crisis. No matter how robust our
economy becomes, the State will not be able to finance existing programs at current
levels with projected tax revenues.
This is why welfare reform and budget reform are one and the same. The State's
fiscal future is in jeopardy and reforms of the budget process, including reform of
significant programs of public expenditure which have heretofore mandated auto-
matic increases without regard to the capacity of the State fisc, must be adopted
immediately.
We are willing to finance essential services. We believe that the State has a
responsibility to look after the welfare of individuals in need. But we declare that
every citizen also has an obligation to do their best to contribute to the welfare of
society.
Id.
351 Cm.. WELE. & lnrsT. Coin § 10000 (West 1991) (see supra note 283 for text of provision).
The purpose of this provision was described by the California courts as requiring a liberal
interpretation of welfare laws, to facilitate the evolution of public welfare from public charity to
social justice. See County of Los Angeles v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 179 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1981);
Robbins v. Superior Ct., 211 Cal. Rptr. 398, 404 (1985).
352 GATPA, § 2
3" Id.
354 Compare the proposed changes to AFDC rules discussed supra in notes 8 & 328.
355 California Governor Pete Wilson, a sponsor of GATPA, is tints quoted as staling with
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for the purpose of providing greater incentives for the poor to help
themselves, that is, to get off welfare. The incentives reflected the
typical static limitations on acceptable alternatives to "solve" the prob-
lem—to make public assistance less attractive to the recipients, who
feel freer than the rest of society to act irresponsibly (at least more
irresponsibly than the sober working population) while on the dole."6
Thus, GATPA called for the downward adjustment of the benefit levels
available to the poor, and reduced the benefits of recipients for other
acts of wrong conduct, such as breeding, failing to attend school
regularly or failing to live with parents. Since a job is available for all
who wish to meet their "obligations to do their best to contribute to
the welfare of society," job acceptance, not job creation, is necessary. 357
As an essentially minimalist set of reforms, GATPA, as I have
related, tended to revolve around the need to save money. The more
money is spent, the more taxes ,
 must be raised, and the larger the
redistributive effect of the program. The result was socio-economic
disaster: "California taxpayers are starting to flee our State."" 8 Conse-
quently, reforms emphasized cost savings features. I have discussed the
most directed cost savings feature of GATPA, the ability to set general
assistance levels taking into consideration the availability of funds and
the projected caseload.359
 Equally significant was the return of a sub-
stantial amount of discretion to the county supervisors with respect to
the setting of such grant levels. 360
 With such discretion, county super-
respect to the recipients of welfare: "Let's choose to prevent injury and enrich human potential,
rather than to continue warehousing human failure." quoted in Kershner, supra note 335.
356
 Speaking in favor of his proposed reduction of the level of benefits offered to California
recipients of federal categorical aid, California Governor Pete Wilson declared that "Welfare is
meant to support families. Now it is weakening and even pulling families apart. The welfare system
actually encourages teen pregnancies." Whitmire, supra note 8.
357
 For instance, GATPA innovations, like those of New Jersey and several other states, would
eliminate increases in AFDC benefits for increased family size where additional children arc born
to recipients while receiving public assistance. See GATPA, §§ 6, 7. The stated purpose of these
innovations is to induce the recipients to act more "responsibly" and to help such people get off
the dole more quickly. In reality, this "reform" flows naturally from the basic conception of poverty
as caused primarily by the poor themselves. See id. Presently, New Jersey is the only state which
has eliminated the increment in benefits under AFDC for which a family would otherwise be
eligible as a result of the birth of a child during the time the recipient is on welfare. See NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 44:10:3.5 (West Supp. 1993). Similar proposals await approval, however, in the legislatures
of Connecticut, Missouri, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. See S.B. 143, Reg. Sess.,
1993 Conn. Laws; N.B. 27, 87th Leg., 1st. SeSs., 1993 Mo. Laws; H.B. 1492, 44th Leg., 1st Sess.,
1993 Okla. Laws; H.B. 2580, 175th Legis., 1991-1992 Reg. Sess., 1991 Pa. Laws; S.B. 308, Statewide
Sess., 1993 S.C. Laws.
358 GATPA, § 2; see Skelton, supra note 12.
"9 GATPA, § 19.
36° This is precisely what the courts in California had substantially eradicated. See, generally,
Bensinger, supra note 35.
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visors could limit eligibility by tying eligibility criteria to those used for
federal categorical grants. While the county would not be able to deny
relief to those ineligible for federal assistance, they might limit benefits
based on the number of children in the household, or the existence
of close relatives whose incomes might be deemed available to the
applicant."'
The resulting practical effect of GATPA would have been to in-
crease the participation of private charitable groups in programs to
maintain the poor. While GATPA is silent with respect to the role of
private charity in this regard, it seems clear that private charity is
expected to fill the void left by the state. Those who can bear the costs
will be expected to do so to minimize the redistributive effects of large
state programs in relief of the poor; otherwise, the poor with no place
to turn in California would have to leave, migrating to another juris-
diction where the benefits are better." 2 The latest AFDC "reforms,"
including those set forth in GATPA, appear to do the same thing,
whether the proponents say so or not."3 Thus, as the static model
would predict, elimination of minimum benefit levels is not necessarily
a determination that such people do not need to be maintained.
Rather, it reflects the determination that private institutions be forced
to handle the problem and that whatever they did (or failed to do)
would be adequate.
GATPA, then, in typical static fashion, concentrated on refine-
ments to the basic implementary model of relief—the provision of
things for the physical maintenance of the poor. GATPA does not
represent any kind of significant or radical restructuring of the basic
theory of poor relief or even of the delivery mode for such relief as
may be accorded the poor. It is, rather, more in the nature of an
attempt to return the general relief system to its antique origins, as a
loose governmental system of preventing starvation, supplemented in
large measure by private efforts, or the ingenuity of the poor them-
selves in their struggle to survive. California's radical reform, then, was
3ffiThese are things that county supervisors could not do under current California case law
interpretation of the general assistance provisions. See, generally, id.; Blanton, supra note 179.
5621 believe this is one of the clearest implications of the speeches Governor Wilson was
making in support of Proposition 165. The sense was that the state was draining its resources and
imposing increasingly larger tax burdens on the working population to support the idle, as a
result of which the productive citizens were leaving the state. See Kershner, supra note 335
(quoting Gov. Wilson as saying, "Additional tax collections would be both unfair to the taxpayers
and dangerous in the risk they pose of driving even more employers out of California."); Skelton,
supra note 12 (quoting Gov. Wilson as saying, "The bottom line is, I'm trying to stop California
from being a welfare magnet.").
365 With respect to GATPA, see supra notes 320-43.
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as "radical," "different" or "new" as those, for instance, of Florida,
Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey or Wisconsin. 3" Indeed, it is less
"radical" than the reforms suggested in other jurisdictions. 365
 It
amounts to nothing more than an attempt to shift the mix of aid
available, and the price the poor must pay for the receipt of such aid.
It does not institutionalize a different philosophy of aid giving. As such,
it will suffer the same triumphs and failures as the system it will
"replace," and yet remain little more than what it began as—a low-level
income maintenance program for certain pre-selected elements of the
destitute.
VI. SUMMARY IN THE FORM OF A COMMENTARY: ARE STATIC
SYSTEMS GOOD OR BAD?
I discussed static systems and the static paradigm that underlies
them. I have described the underlying assumptions of which the incli-
nation to static poor law system-building is perhaps merely sympto-
matic, argued that this orientation is unchanged by modifications to
such statutes urging any of a number of different (and non-static)
purposes, and that irrespective of the labels applied, any reform of our
existing systems of poor relief will also tend to be limited and funda-
mentally static. Static systems, I have argued, are rooted in the accep-
tance of the status quo; such systems are also rooted in the unques-
tioned acceptance of the notion of the benefits of income inequality
as the evidence of an economic system that rewards thrift and industry,
and punishes sloth and economic irresponsibility. Jobs exist for all who
seek them; the able-bodied who do not work, therefore, have made a
lifestyle choice which should not be lauded. Those unable to work for
their keep and who lack the wealth to support themselves through
ill-fortune or irresponsible conduct need support, but not at the price
of taking away the monetary rewards of the frugal and industrious.
Thus, society's goal is not to reward those who by adversity, ill-luck or
otherwise, do not have the means to support themselves. The object
of poor relief is to maintain the poor, nothing more.
In contrast to the notions and values represented by static systems
are those dynamic, eradicative notions which have found their way into
the hortatory sections of many state statutes of general assistance. 3°6
364 See supra note 8.
365
 For example, California would not impose the requirement of birth control implants on
indiscriminate breeders who are on the dole, whereas the state of Mississippi may impose such a
requirement. See Mississippi Proposes, supra note 210.
366 See supra Part V.A, Defining What a Static System is Incapable of Being.
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These conceptions of the poor and the nature and function of relief,
while differing radically among themselves,567 have some similarities in
approach. All seek the ultimate eradication of poverty. Many argue that
eradication requires some level of significant income redistribution.
Others argue that some type of universalist policy is necessary to
achieve the end of poverty; 368 poverty is a function of labor policy, or
the lack of available jobs, and not of policy necessarily directed primar-
ily to the habits or peculiar inclination of the poor. 369
The static paradigm accepts the status quo and seeks merely to
ameliorate existing conditions. The emerging dynamic outlook seeks
to eliminate a disagreeable condition. Is one approach necessarily
"good" and the other "bad?" It would be easy to say yes—"good" means
eradicating poverty, or at least saying so, and "bad" means not caring
enough about the poor to want to do everything possible to end their
misery. Provocatively stated, the answer seems easy; but is it?
Whatever its deficiencies when compared to the lofty goals of
more dynamic approaches, the static system does seem well-suited to
its modest purpose—the prevention of acute destitution. While this
may not be much, it is more than nothing. Giving little to those in
need, it requires relatively little from those who must support the
system. It neither disrupts social nor economic order; it is not income
redistributive; it does little to reward idleness. Most importantly, it
requires little political will to implement or maintain."'' When coupled
with hortatory statements of more dynamic purpose, it might even,
somewhat cruelly, serve the purpose of making taxpayers feel good
about the use to which their tax dollars are being put.
In contrast, dynamic, eradicative programs require more invest-
ment of human and capital resources than do static systems. They tend
to disrupt the social and the economic system, and are likely income
redistributive."' They are indifferent to many of the personal peculi-
arities of behavior of the poor, usually assuming that these are func-
Sli7 Id.
368 See supra, notes 237-39 and accompanying text
3fi9 See, e.g., RIEMER, supra note 19; supra Part IV.A, Defining What a Static System is Incapable
of Being.
3" It should be noted that. even this type of passive minimalist system might well be subject
to popular pressure for reduction in times of acute economic stress, when it is most needed. The
example of the California response to its current economic slowdown, Proposition 165, is sub-
stantial evidence of this. See PivaN & CLOWARD, supra note 14, at 341-47; supra Part III.A, Critical
Assumptions: The Static Paradigm.
371 See supra Part VA, Explaining the Dr's-junctions Between Goals and Implementation: Why
Don't Current Systems of Poor Relief Seem to Accomplish Their Purpose.
1084	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 34:997
lions of economic conditions. 372
 No such program is simple, either in
conception or implementation; consequently, even when imple-
mented, there is no assurance that such systems will actually accom-
plish their purpose. 373
 Most importantly, perhaps, such systems may be
enormously expensive to support over an unknown period of time."'
Consequently, a nation without the political will to undertake such
endeavors will likely be reduced, ultimately, to perpetuating the mean-
ness of parading their substantially static systems about, dressed in the
purposes of a more dynamic orientation.
Neither approach is inherently good or bad. Both approaches rely
for validation on the outlook and politics of the people advocating a
particular approach. Either can be justified on the basis of the "proper"
manipulation of political considerations, expediency, economics or any
other principalled (or unprincipalled) means which elites in this na-
tion employ to make choices among alternatives. 375
 This manipulation
follows from the acceptance (or rejection) of the notions of the static
paradigm, and not the other way around.
But, rather than choose either, we have contented ourselves by
disguising one as the other. This is a painful national delusion. It may
be that a nation or a state might lack either the political will, wealth
or knowledge even to attempt the implementation of any kind of
dynamic program. In this event, perhaps the population might have
to content itself with a well-crafted static system until a more generous
day arrives. On the other hand, a jurisdiction embarking on a more
dynamic program might understand the costs and complexities of such
an approach and be prepared for the social and economic modifica-
tions which might be at the heart of such programs. While that may
972 See id.
"See, e.g., JENCKS, supra note 32, at 228-33 (arguing universalist programs are based on
faulty premises; but proposing type of universalist program aimed at aiding all single mothers
with low wage jobs); Roger Wilkins, The Black Poor Are Different, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1989, at
A23 (arguing universalist, dynamic programs will not solve special problems of African-Ameri-
cans).
371 See Robert Greenstein, Universal and Targeted Approaches to Relieving Poverty: An Alterna-
tive View, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 437, 452-56 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson, eds.
1991); Louise B. Russell, Proposed: A Comprehensive Health Care System For the Poor, 7 BROOK INGS
REV. 13, 17 (Summer, 1989). But see HAVEMAN, supra note 32, at 177 (asserting program he
proposed would cost only 1.5% more than federal expenditures for comparable programs).
375 For a discussion of the manner in which political choices are made in the United States,
See, e.g., JOHN D. STEINGRUMER, THE CYBERNETIC THEORY OF DECISIONMAKING: NEW DIMEN-
SIONS IN POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1974); ROBERT DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN
THE AMERICAN CITY (1961); RICHARD NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER (rev. ed. 1990); Ralph
Huitt, The Congressional Committee: A Case Study, 48 AM. Pot. Set. REV. 340-65 (1954).
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not be a bad thing, and certainly many people so believe, the elimina-
tion of poverty will require more than a mere governmental pro-
nouncement to that effect.
The static paradigm predicts many things about the manner in
which the condition of the poor is alleviated; it does not predict or
require honesty. What a generation of "reform" in the area of poverty
law has demonstrated is that the United States is blessed with legisla-
tures which have chosen (consciously or unconsciously) to embrace
the traditional approach to poor relief and the implications of the
static paradigm, all the while dishonestly peddling this choice as the
implementation of a new and improved, dynamic transformative sys-
tem for the permanent eradication of poverty.
